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DISSENT AND CRITICAL THOUGHT 
IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
INTRODUCTION 
Dissent and critical thought are recurrent and increa-
singly significant phenomena within East bloc societies. 
Their growing importance can be attributed to numerous fac-
tors. One is their presence within the East bloc at a time 
when there is an unprecedented process of reform underway in 
the USSR, the effects of which are being felt throughout 
Eastern Europe. Another factor is the uneasy co-existence 
of this dissent with governments which are experiencing an 
uncertain process of leadership change as leaders who have 
been in power for decades in their respective countries 
either leave or prepare to leave their posts. Still another 
is the presence of these manifestations of dissent and 
critical thought on an unsurpassed scale at the very same 
time as the prospects for a new era of East-West detente 
have improved substantially. Accordingly, the cumulative 
effect of developments such as these has been to accentuate 
the need to thoroughly comprehend the ideas and activities 
of those individuals, groups and movements which are stri-
ving for social and political change in these East bloc 
societies. 
With this in mind one can turn to the particular case 
of the German Democratic Republic (DDR) or East Germany. 
For a long time the DDR was a sorely neglected topic of 
academic research. This was especially true in the West 
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where it was not diplomatically recognized until the early 
1970's. Prior to that the DDR was considered something less 
than a legitimate political entity. western academics paid 
even less attention to examples of dissent and critical 
thought in the DDR. 
existent. 
In the public mind they were non-
The June 1953 workers' insurrection illustrated this 
situation well. It quickly became a forgotten event 
except in Wes t Germany. The scant attention paid to later 
manifestations of dissent focused only on the most prominent 
intellectual critics in the DDR. In fact, it was not until 
the expulsions of Wolf Biermann and Rudolph Bahro in the 
last half of the 1970' s and the subsequent emergence of a 
small but very significant autonomous peace movement in the 
1980' s that some Western observers began to take serious 
notice of the ongoing existence of East German dissent. 
It is in view of this situation that a serious and 
broad analysis of the phenomena of East German dissent and 
critical thought is overdue in North America. It is in the 
context of the most recent manifestations of these phenomena 
and their relationship to the broader political developments 
noted above that the need for such an analysis has taken on 
an unprecedented degree of importance and even urgency. 
This is especially true since there now exists in the DDR a 
discernible and enduring oppositional force which 
constitutes an integral part of 
and increasingly integrated 
an ongoing East Bloc-wide 
and mutually supporting 
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phenomenon of oppositional activity. In addition, this 
now be considered activism can, to a growing extent, 
something of a complement to the reform process emanating 
from Moscow. I t also has the potential to supersede the 
latter. 
The project attempted here consists of addressing this 
need for an analysis by formulating an in-depth, chrono-
logical study of the phenomena of dissent and critical 
thought in the German Democratic Republic which is designed, 
ul timately, to demonstrate their significance for the DDR 
and, by implication, for the East bloc and Europe as 
a whole. This task will be pursued in the following 
manner. 
Chapter One will provide an analysis of the origins, 
early development and consolidation of the German Democratic 
Republic as a state administering a social system closely 
approximating the one forged by Lenin and Stalin in the 
Soviet Union. As will be seen it was out of this socio-
political context that the first major manifestations of 
dissent arose in 1951 and, much more importantly, in 1953. 
The description of these will be complemented by an examina-
tion of the pivotal role of the USSR in shaping these 
developments. 
Chapter Two will similarly highlight the decisive role 
of the USSR in shaping both the development of the DDR and 
the manifestations of dissent and critical thought during 
the remainder of the 1950' s. This will be accomplished by 
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discussing the impact in the DDR of the 1956 East bloc 
crisis and how the Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED) -led government of Walter Ulbricht managed to survive 
the pressures for political change which it engendered. 
Thus, considerable attention will be paid to the East German 
government's response to the limi ted process of de-
Stalinization led by Soviet Communist Party leader Nikita 
Khrushchev. The effects of the dramatic events in Poland 
and Hungary during 1956 will likewise be a topic of major 
concern. 
Chapter Three will, in part, examine the evolution of 
Church-State relations in the DDR. This examination will 
trace their difficult development from the early years of 
the DDR up until the agreements reached between them in 1978 
establishing the East German Protestant Church as a unique, 
independent institution wi thin East German society capable 
of sheltering independent political activity. This chapter 
will also consider the significance of the construction of 
the Berlin Wall with respect to its effect on the stability 
of the DDR and on the form and content of East German dis-
sent and critical thought. 
Chapter Four will focus on the critical voices wi thin 
the East German intellectual and cultural communities. 
These communi ties have been ongoing sources of dissent and 
critical thought much to the chagrin of the SED hierarchy. 
This was especially true during the 1960's and 1970's. Con-
siderable attention will be devoted to the leading critics 
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wi thin these communi ties. These include Robert Havemann, 
Stefan Heym, Christa Wolf, Reiner Kunze, Wolf Biermann and, 
especially, Rudolph Bahro. The latter formulated a maj or 
political critique of East German society and called for its 
revolutionary transformation. The role of these individuals 
will be analyzed with a particular view towards developments 
in the 1980 IS. The analysis of their ideas and activities 
will also facilitate an understanding of the significance of 
Eurocommunism for East German dissent and critical thought. 
This will likewise illustrate the importance of both the 
Prague Spring experiment and the Soviet-led Warsaw 
Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia for dissent in the 
DDR. 
Chapter Five will follow on the treatment of the 
significance of the 1968 experiment in Czechoslovakia by 
examining the impact of Solidarnosc and the Polish Crisis on 
East German dissent and critical thought. This will entail 
a detailed look at the official East German response to 
social unrest in Poland, an assessment of the situation 
currently faced by workers in the DDR and a look at their 
reactions to the formation of an independent trade union 
movement in Poland. 
examples of 
during the 
activity. 
visible 
period 
Consideration will also be given to 
discontent by East 
of Solidarnosc's 
German 
above 
workers 
ground 
Chapter Six shall provide a detailed analysis of the 
autonomous peace movement in the DDR. The analys is of it 
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will rightfully make Chapter Six the single most substantive 
chapter of this work. Three reasons in particular can be 
cited for giving extensive treatment to the autonomous peace 
movement. One is that this movement represents the most 
sustained expression of independent political activity in 
the history of the 
teristic of having 
political activity. 
DDR. Another is its special charac-
spawned other currents of independent 
Notably it has led to the birth of 
feminist and human rights activism and has aided the 
development of ecological activism. The third reason is 
that without it there would probably not be an oppositional 
force active in the DDR today. 
Chapter Seven will be devoted to the appearance of 
these ecological and explicitly human rights initiatives and 
to their roles in facilitating the rise of the consciously 
oppositional force now active in the DDR. In the process of 
addressing these movements the political impact of the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident in East Germany will be consi-
dered in some depth. Attention will also be devoted to the 
nature of the new East German opposition, the far-reaching 
political critiques of East German society which it has 
advanced and specific initiatives the new opposition has 
proposed which would begin a process of social and political 
change in the DDR. 
The analysis will partially conclude with an overview 
of the topic which contemplates the reasons why manifes-
tations of dissent and critical thought in the German 
Democratic Republic have 
have. Following this, 
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assumed 
these 
the unique character they 
examples of independent 
political activity will be compared to similar phenomena 
elsewhere in the Soviet sphere of Europe. Such a comparison 
will, in turn, help to make it possible to judge the 
relative influences of the Soviet Union and West Germany on 
the nature of oppositional activity in the DDR. 
The above will facilitate an assessment of the present 
significance and future potential of the new East German 
opposition. This assessment will likewise offer some 
indication of what the political future holds for the German 
Democratic Republic as a separate German state closely 
allied with the Soviet Union. 
8 
CHAPTER I 
THE STALINIST REVOLUTION 
AND THE 1953 INSURRECTION 
The process which culminated in the transformation of 
the Soviet Zone of occupied Germany into a formally indepen-
dent state administering a social system based upon the 
Soviet model commenced with the arrival of the Red Army 
together with the emigre leadership of the German Communist 
Party (KPD). The emigre faction of the KPD leadership or 
the 'Ulbricht Group' quickly proceeded to restore function-
ing essential services. This was done with the assistance 
of the Soviet Military Administration. Thus, from the 
outset the KPD's emigre leadership, functioning under Soviet 
guidance, started to emerge as the leading social and 
political force in the Soviet occupied zone. 
The subsequent legalization of all anti-fascist 
political parties and mass organizations such as trade 
unions, under the auspices of an 'Anti-Fascist Democratic 
Order I did not alter the fact that the KPD was acquir ing 
this leading role. Nor did the KPD's professed support for 
political pluralism in the Soviet occupied zone. Ulbricht 
made this clear at the time. He said the new political set-
up "must look democratic but we must have complete 
control."l 
The Anti-Fascist Democratic Order later gave way to the 
formation of a I National Front I and the founding of the 
German Democratic Republic (DDR) on October 7, 1949. In the 
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interim many crucial political, economic and social changes 
took place. Notable among these was the formation of the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in April 1946. 
Immediately following the war there existed strong 
sentiment favouring a merger of the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) with the KPD thus uniting the two main parties of the 
German working class. Initially, the KPD was opposed to the 
idea wanting to delay unification until it was certain that 
its cadres could assume control of the key leadership 
positions in the future unity party.2 
The SPD meanwhile insisted on a merger based on the 
free decision of the members of both parties across all of 
Germany. This would assure SPD dominance since even in the 
Soviet Zone support for the social democrats exceeded 
support for the Communists. Faced with this situation the 
KPD moved to merge the two party organizations within the 
Soviet Zone without the approval of either the national SPD 
leadership or its membership in the Soviet Zone. It suc-
ceeded in this by enlisting the support of a section of the 
SPD led by Otto Grotewohl who was subsequently awarded the 
top post in the new Socialist Unity Party. With the Soviet 
Mili tary Administration I s assistance the new SED proceeded 
towards the consolidation of an effective monopoly of 
political power. 
Another major step towards the establishment of one 
party rule involved the formation of two new parties in 
1948. The National Democratic Party of Germany and the 
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Democratic Peasants Party of Germany were formed specifi-
cally to undermine the pos it ions of the Liberal Democratic 
and Christian Democratic Parties both of which constituted 
significant opponents of the SED. Accordingly, the two new 
parties were pro-Soviet and owed their existence to the SED 
since they were immediately integrated into the National 
Front which it dominated. 
The integration of the mass organizations into the 
Soviet-controlled political process accentuated the trend 
towards one party rule. These mass organizations had been 
transformed into SED directed bodies accounting for over 
half the zone I s population in their memberships. The SED 
politically strengthened itself by seeing that they acquired 
representation in the Volkskammer or People's Chamber since 
this helped it to achieve domination of the legislative 
process in the Soviet zone. 3 
Elections went in a similar direction. Relatively free 
elections were followed by ones in which dissident SPD 
candidates were not allowed to run. By 1950 elections were 
characterized by a dis tinct lack of choice. Voters could 
only choose a single list of National Front candidates. 
The SED also underwent major changes during this 
period. It was initially a mass party retaining a strong 
social democratic influence and stood for a specific German 
Road to Socialism. But this too was a temporary phenomenon. 
Events such as the intensification of the Cold War, the 
Berlin Blockade and the Soviet-Yugoslav split facilitated 
11 
the imposition of Stalinist orthodoxy within the Party. The 
SED consequently became more of a cadre organization 
modelled on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).4 
Deviations from Soviet ideological orthodoxy became 
identified with Yugoslavia and I Titoism. I Advocates of a 
German Road to Socialism such as ideologist Anton Ackermann 
were vilified. The principal losers in all this were the 
former members of the SPD. Their influence in the ruling 
party declined to the point where by 1950 there were almost 
no former social democrats remaining in the ruling 
Politbureau. 
The one person who benefited most from this process was 
Wal ter Ulbricht. He became the General Secretary of the 
SED's Central Committee at the Third Party Congress in July 
1950. Significantly, Ulbricht was the person in the SED 
leadership who the Soviets trusted most. An orthodox 
adherent of the Soviet political line, his consolidation of 
undisputed power in the Party was symptomatic of the 
progressive Sovietization of East German society. The 
political changes taking place were accordingly matched by a 
corresponding economic and social transformation. 
The economy in the immediate postwar period was in 
ruins. The situation of the East German population was 
pitiful as a result of the combined effects of war 
devastation and massive Soviet-imposed reparations. 5 The 
Soviets dismantled over a thousand factories and took them 
away. The reparations sapped the economy, adversely 
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affecting investment in particular. 
These problems were compounded by sharply reduced 
access to essential raw materials and half finished products 
normally obtained from west Germany. These goods could not 
be obtained in adequate quanti ties from other East bloc 
states. In addition the flow of East German refugees west-
ward began resulting in losses of labour power. 
The economic transformation of the Soviet Zone 
progressed under these conditions. One of the new regime's 
first moves involved the expropriation of property belonging 
to ex-Nazis. The expropriation of the landed estates 
belonging to the Junkers followed shortly thereafter. The 
result was a radically restructured agrarian population. 
Subsequent moves aimed at the transformation of the 
East German economy were engineered by the German Economic 
Commission. The Soviets established it on June 27, 1947. 
The economy was then subjected to a calculated and costly 
disengagement from the west in the latter part of 1948. 
This development roughly corresponded to the introduction of 
6 
a planned economy. 
Industry was accordingly concentrated in the state 
sector of the economy. I ts development was conditioned 
according to Soviet priorities. As a result heavy industry 
was stressed to the detriment of consumer goods production. 
The SED specifically set out to expand the production of raw 
materials, iron, steel and energy. 
Despite these moves and the later initiation of a 
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Soviet style Five Year Plan for 1951 to 1955 the DDR still 
had not fully installed a Soviet model economic system. In 
fact the DDR was the only East bloc state to retain anything 
7 like a viable private sector into the early 1950 IS. But 
this was only a temporary deviation. 
In July 1952 Ulbricht, at a SED conference, proclaimed 
that the DDR was "building Socialism."B In line with 
Stalinist dogma this necessitated "an intensification of the 
class struggle." with respect to the economy this meant an 
accelerated push to develop heavy industry and especially a 
drive to collectivize agriculture. The latter resulted in 
worsening food shortages as agricultural production dropped. 
Industrial production had already been adversely affected by 
sweeping nationalizations. 
The Party's policies concerning education, youth, 
religion and culture reflected a complementary social 
transformation. Thus, in education a law was enacted in 
1946 prohibiting educational institutions other than those 
of the State. With the foundation of the DDR came a 
wholesale importation of Soviet features into the educa-
tional system. 
subject. By 
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compulsory too. 
Soon the Russian language was a compulsory 
1951 the study of Marxism-Leninism was 
The Free German Youth (FDJ) quickly monopolized all 
youth work in the Soviet Zone. The FDJ was one of those 
mass organizations which facilitated the SED I S realization 
of a monopoly of political power. Erich Honecker, the 
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future leader of the Party and a close ally of Ulbricht at 
the time, emerged as the head official of this youth 
organization. 
By 1950 Free German Youth membership stood at over one 
million. From its inception the FDJ functioned as a 
mobilizing tool in support of the Party. This function was 
complemented by its role as a means to politically socialize 
East German youth. By the mid-1950's the FDJ also served as 
a source of recruits for the newly formed National People's 
Army (NVA). 
Nonetheless, the FDJ had its problems. For example, a 
major internal purge was deemed necessary when it fell far 
short of its goal in obtaining volunteers for the para-
mili tary forces which existed before the formation of the 
NVA in early 1956. 10 
Stalinization proceeded similarly with respect to 
religion and culture. Religious freedom as well as official 
tolerance towards Christianity were progressively reduced. 
By 1952 religious instruction had been virtually eliminated 
in the schools and the churches became the object of 
systematic harassment. CuI ture meanwhile was subordinated 
to the political line on the arts put forward by Stalin's 
Commissar for Contemporary Culture, Zhdanov. 
Opposition to such policies were dangerous. The 
possible consequences were indicative of how the trans-
formation of East Germany had been backed up by an all-
pervasive police apparatus which had been administered and 
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expanded by the SED and its predecessor, the KPD. Horst 
Bienek learned this in 1951. A protege of Brecht, he 
distributed a leaflet critical of official cultural policy. 
For doing this he was arrested, tried in secret and 
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sentenced to 25 years hard labour. The DDR was firmly in 
the grip of Stalinism. 
Stalin's death did not result in any substantial 
changes at first. It did shock the DDR's rulers sufficient-
ly to plunge them into a temporary state of confus ion and 
disorientation. Conversely , it raised hopes for an eas ing 
of repress ion and liberalization. But Ulbricht frustrated 
these hopes by resisting pressures to de-Stalinize both from 
within the DDR as well as from Moscow. He did this despite 
the prevalence of severe shortages, rising numbers of East 
German citizens fleeing to the west and the existence of 
jails packed wi th political prisoners. His intrans igence 
rested on hopes that the hard-line faction around Molotov 
would win the unfolding power struggle within the CPSU. 12 
This did not happen. 
Consequently, the decisive impetus for substantial 
measures to de-Stalinize the DDR came from the 
I revis ionists I in Moscow. Their pressure was instrumental 
in forcing the implementation of the 'New Course' announced 
on June 11, 1953. Expropriations of private property were 
abruptly halted. Recently collectivized farms were returned 
to their original owners. Plans for the development of 
heavy industry were sharply cut back. Persons jailed during 
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the 1952 collectivization were released en masse. Citizen1s 
legal rights were enhanced. Policies concerning culture and 
1 0 0 lOb 1 0 d 13 re 19lon were 1 era lze . Significantly, Ulbricht viewed 
all these new policies as wrong. 
Not everyone in the DDR directly benefited from the New 
Course. It contained nothing specifically for workers. In 
fact they saw themselves as the one section of the popula-
tion which had been ignored. 14 
The lack of concessions to workers was particularly 
offensive since just two weeks earlier, on May 28th, the SED 
had imposed new, higher work norms on them. These norms 
effectively raised their workloads and cut their real 
incomes. Furthermore, the new norms were integral to the 
SED1s strategy for economic recovery in the face of 
approaching bankruptcy. This indicated an official desire 
to make the working class bear a large part of the burden of 
resolving a growing crisis the workers were not responsible 
for. The move testified to the plight of the East German 
workers under SED rule. 
In reality the DDR1s workers were exploited and 
powerless. The I dictatorship of the proletariat I was in 
fact a dictatorship over the proletariat. East German 
Socialism likewise bore some of the worst features of 
capitalism. Thus, the norm system was indicative of the 
widespread use of piece-rates in East German industry which 
along with systems of bonuses created enormous differences 
in income. In general, workers I incomes were low. In 1950, 
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real wages were less than half of what they had been in 
1936. 15 In addition, the SED's focus on capital accumu-
lation, collectivization of agriculture and its stress on 
heavy industry created shortages of goods. 
The official trade union shared in the responsibility 
for the workers' situation. Labour organizations had been 
amalgamated into the Free German Labour Union (FDGB). Like 
the official youth body, the FDGB was one of the mass 
organizations directed towards the realization of the 
Party's goals. For example, during the Stalinist period, 
these official labour unions assisted SED agitprop campaigns 
in favour of higher work norrns: 6 
Worker acceptance of these conditions was enforced by 
the Stalinist police apparatus as well as by bodies like the 
ones which made up the Free German Labour Union. Resistance 
was nearly imposs ible as a result but it did occur on a 
small scale. Specifically, in the summer of 1951 there were 
clashes between workers and the People's Police in several 
centers. These were sparked by increases in workloads not 
matched by financial gains. The main event involved a 
revolt by uranium miners in Saalfel. 17 
Resistance became more possible after Stalin's death 
due to the combined, accumulating pressures for reform 
corning from within East German civil society as well as from 
within the CPSU and then from within the SED itself. 
Consequently, more strikes occurred in the spring of 1953. 
These affected workplaces in Eisleben, Finsterwalde, 
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Furstenwalde, Chemitz-Borna and other towns indicating a 
rising tide of working class dissent. The strikers issued 
demands which would be heard again in June. 18 
The pressure for reform within the SED was intertwined 
with a power struggle not so different from the one 
occurring within the Soviet Party. The SED leadership 
conflict was also dependent upon the latter's outcome. 
Within the DDR it had the important effect of creating a 
division which weakened the State's capacity for action. 
The struggle involved a challenge to Ulbricht's 
leadership by fellow Politbureau members Wilhelm Zaisser, 
the Minister of State Security, and Rudolph Herrnstadt, the 
editor of the Party newspaper Neues Deutschland. Ulbricht's 
rivals had other Politbureau members on their side. They 
also had a sweeping program of reform along revisionist 
lines but this program never saw the light of day. 
Their program met this fate for a number of reasons. 
Zaisser and Herrnstadt were handicapped by a lack of popular 
support. They also had no structural mechanisms at their 
disposal which could enable them to mobilize either the SED 
rank and file or the population against Ulbricht. Zaisser 
and Herrnstadt made a crucial tactical error as well. They 
aligned themselves with the ill-fated Beria in the CPSU 
power struggle in Moscow.1 9 
Nonetheless, the decisive factor in keeping Ulbricht in 
power as SED leader was the East German working class. It 
saved Ulbricht by taking advantage of the more relaxed 
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political atmosphere to vent its collective rage against him 
and the system he ruled. 
The June 1953 insurrection started with a strike to 
protest the increased work norms. The job action involved a 
mere 80 to 100 construction workers employed on Stalinallee 
in East Berlin. They left their workplace and began a small 
demonstration which formed behind a crudely painted banner 
which read "Down with the 10 Percent Rise in the Norms." 
Metal workers joined in followed by scores of others. In 
little time East Berlin's workers had rallied to their cause 
and the march swelled to some 10,000 people by the time it 
reached the main government building in the capital. 
As the protest grew its demands became more overtly 
poli tical and hence more radical. 
supporters 
Ulbricht's 
chant ed, 
removal 
"We are not 
from power, 
The strikers and their 
slaves." They demanded 
the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from the DDR and free elections. Aspirations for 
German re-unification were evident as well. Significantly, 
all these desires corresponded closely with the political 
program of the West German SPD revealing that the East 
German workers still identified with its traditions. 
The split at the top of the SED led to panicky con-
fusion within the hierarchy over how to respond to the 
protest. The situation was different at the rank and file 
level of the Party. Information documented after the revolt 
revealed widespread participation by SED members. Subse-
quent purges further indicated that a third of those 
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disciplined had been members of the old German Communist 
Party prior to Hitler's accession to power. This too 
indicated continuity within the working class. East German 
workers who identified with the more revolutionary tradi-
tions of the German workers I movement seemingly saw the 
struggle against Ulbricht as a continuation of their past 
struggles for a proletarian society.20 In view of the rapid 
spread of the revolt across the DDR such phenomena must be 
interpreted as a wholesale disintegration of working class 
support for the SED. 
On the evening of the 16th the Politbureau, which had 
already been divided on the issue, rescinded the norm 
increases. But this action was too little too late. The 
failure of either Grotewohl or Ulbricht to meet the 
protesters assembled in East Berlin led the insurgents to 
call for the developing strike to be generalized. In 
addition, news of the mass protest in the capital ignited 
similar responses throughout East Germany. In Halle, for 
example, over 50,000 demonstrators assembled in the city IS 
market square while the local radio station was occupied by 
thirty strikers who broadcast communiques issued by the 
central organization arising out of the city-wide strike. 
More radical still was a call issued by the strike 
committee in Bitterfeld. It advocated the formation of a 
.. I d fl' k 21 provlslona government compose 0 revo utlonary wor ers. 
The dynamic of the insurrection across the DDR was such that 
the strikes, demonstrations, and mass factory occupations 
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replaced and superseded one another. 
Although the movement was wholly spontaneous in 
character it did achieve a degree of organization through 
the formation of strike committees sometimes representing 
entire cities or industrial regions. Nonetheless, the 
workers did not realize effective means of co-ordination 
beyond this. Often they were hampered by a complete lack of 
awareness of what was occurring even in other sections of 
the same enterprise. 
The Ulbricht regime was paralyzed nonetheless because 
the revolt spread to the point where it affected over 250 
centers. Matters were left to the Soviet Commandant in East 
Berlin, Major-General Dibrova, to save the SED government 
from collapse. He called out forces of Soviet tanks, 
armoured cars and lorry-borne infantry to restore order. 22 
These forces soon overwhelmed the city's workers who were 
almost completely unarmed. 
initial success was limited. 
Even so, the Soviet military's 
On June 18 the streets of East Berlin belonged to the 
Red Army. However, strikes persisted sometimes for weeks 
with the workers' demand .. shifting in favour of the release 
of imprisoned strikers. Furthermore, 80,000 miners struck 
in Erstegeberte beginning on the 18th. By the next day the 
entire mining region was in open insurrection. 
forces needed ten days to regain full control. 23 
Soviet 
The insurrection was confined principally to the 
working class. It was concentrated in the DDR's older 
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industrial regions. East German youth largely supported it 
but university students generally did not. The peasantry 
and the middle class did nothing. In view of this one 
cannot escape noticing that the social sector of the popula-
tion which did not directly benefit from the New Course was 
the one which rebelled while those who directly gained 
something from it did not. Therefore, had the New Course 
incl uded a reversal of the norm increases together with 
other concessions to the working class the revolt certainly 
would not have taken place or at least not at this time. 
But the revolt was handicapped by more than its limited 
soc ial base. 
of major, 
Europe. 
Most decisively, it was doomed by the absence 
simultaneous unrest elsewhere in Soviet-East 
On balance, this first major example of social unrest 
in Soviet-East Europe was a clear failure. The rising not 
only failed to remove the Ulbricht regime but actually saved 
Ulbricht because it occurred just as the maneuvering within 
the SED Politbureau to topple him was reaching its climax. 
Therefore, had the rising not occurred at the moment it did 
a sweeping leadership change resulting in the initiation of 
a maj or reform programme may have taken place. What is 
more, Ulbricht saw his own vindication in the rising because 
he blamed it on the retreat from Stalinist orthodoxy.24 
A decision by the Soviets once again proved decisive in 
this respect. Moscow opted to support Ulbricht against 
Zaisser and Herrnstadt. Apparently the Soviets feared 
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sacrificing Ulbricht would be seen as a sign of weakness. 
Given how clear the lack of popular support for the SED 
government was, such 'weakness' could conceivably have led 
to the disintegration of the DDR as a Soviet-client state. 25 
The Soviets accordingly moved to solidify the stability 
of the DDR. East German reparations payments were abruptly 
terminated and the costs exacted to pay for the maintenance 
of Soviet troops in the DDR were reduced. Several months 
later the USSR moved to give the DDR more credibility by 
giving it full formal sovereignty. 
to conduct its own foreign policy. 
This included the right 
The Soviets also exacted a price from Ulbricht in 
exchange for these measures of support and it too was 
designed to enhance the viability of the DDR. Ulbricht was 
forced to embrace the New Course. However, he did so for 
only as long as he had to. Thus, many of the concessions to 
civil society contained in the New Course were taken back 
within a year of the insurrection. By 1955 the New Course 
was formally abandoned. This meant that the workers' rising 
had salvaged not only Ulbricht's power but virtually all of 
the aspects of the social order identified with him. 
Other developments in the aftermath of the insurrection 
were consistent with these events. For example, once the 
dust began to settle the regime's spokespersons were openly 
self-critical. On June 24th Grotewohl went so far as to 
state how "the guilt for the events of the past days rests 
with ,,26 us. But soon official accounts of the revolt 
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uniformly portrayed it as a counter-revolutionary putsch 
instigated by the West. 
Economic concessions were likewise made as insurrection 
was ending. Wages rose. Food and clothing were suddenly 
abundant. The Free German Labour Union became more overtly 
concerned about defending its members living standards. But 
later the work norms which sparked the revolt were re-
imposed. Widespread repression also occurred together with 
the execution of strikers. 
Generally, the substantial restoration of Stalinism in 
the DDR was evident by the Fourth SED Congress in 1954. It 
showed the Party was not going along with the general thaw 
. d t' th S . t U· 27 eVl en ln e OVle nlon. This kind of intransigence 
would remain a general characteristic of Ulbricht's rule and 
would def ine the context wi thin which future examples of 
dissent would be manifested. 
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CHAPTER II 
1956: THE IMPACT OF THE EAST BLOC CRISIS 
In 1953 Stalin's death led to significant changes in 
the USSR. The Soviets accompanied these with pressure on 
the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) to begin 
to de-Stalinize the DDR. Similar developments would mark 
1956 and principally began with the historic 20th Congress 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). 
Nikita Khrushchev's blistering but carefully selective 
denunciation of Stalin on February 25th at the end of the 
congress marked an irretrievable step by him toward the 
creation of a new climate in the Soviet Union and in the 
Communist movement as a whole. 1 The reaction of top East 
bloc Communist Party leaders to Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" 
was quite unenthusiastic. To varying degrees they had 
committed the same kinds of crimes as Stalin. Furthermore, 
they had committed these wi thin the past decade and they 
ruled younger, more vulnerable regimes lacking broad popular 
support. 
Ulbricht was no exception. But at least he was not 
tainted by the kind of legacy created by the executions of 
top Party leaders which occurred in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. Ulbricht was also first off the mark in 
distancing himself from Stalin although not from Stalin's 
system of government. 
Just one week after Khrushchev's Secret Speech an 
article by Ulbricht appeared in the SED daily Neues 
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Deutschland. In it he declared that Stalin , despite his 
services in' building Socialism had done "severe damage to 
the Soviet state and the Soviet Communist Party" by placing 
himself above the Party and that he could not be considered 
a classical Marxist author. Soon afterwards, Ulbricht went 
on to spell out his criticisms of Stalin in more detail. He 
included specific reference to the Great Purges of the mid 
to late 1930's.2 
Another significant move came at the Party's Fifth 
Congress in late March 1956. DDR Premier Otto Grotewohl 
sharply rebuked the arbitrary way in which justice had been 
administered in East Germany. The SED then reprimanded the 
Minister of State Security and struck a special committee to 
investigate abuses in the judicial system. An amnes ty fol-
lowed in April in which some 20,000 people were released. 
Later on, a number of prominent victims of the Party's 
purges during the Stalinist era were politically rehabili-
tated. Among them was the one time "National Communist" 
Anton Ackermann. 
These were important steps. But they were not truly 
indicative of the intent of the Ulbricht regime nor were 
they consistent with Ulbricht's basic distaste for 
Khrushchev's assault on Stalin. As in early 1953 Ulbricht 
was again determined to frustrate any major move towards de-
Stalinization. He intended to pursue a course away from 
Stalinism only insofar as political circumstances left him 
no choice. Ulbricht likewise desired to reverse or at least 
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halt the process of reform as soon as it became opportune to 
do so. Ulbricht went so far as to try to turn the attention 
of the Party exclusively toward economic policies in the 
early spring of 1956. Such a maneuver amounted to wishful 
thinking. This was because Khrushchev's Secret Speech had 
set off a powerful reformist current within the ruling Party 
and among prominent circles in the East German intelligent-
sia. 
Playwright Bertolt Brecht's activity in the summer of 
1956 was indicative of where at least a section of the 
intelligentsia was heading at the time. During a meeting of 
writers and intellectuals he told those present that 
Ulbricht was an orthodox dictator who was alienated from the 
people, whose policies had completely destroyed the humanis-
tic content of Socialism and who had created an intolerable 
situation within the DDR.3 In effect, Brecht was taking 
advantage of the new possibilities available in 1956 for 
independent activity and using them to rally the intelli-
gentsia against Ulbricht. This implied an attempt to 
facilitate a sweeping de-Stalinization of the East German 
system. Brecht had placed himself at the centre of the 
first significant manifestation of intellectual dissent in 
the history of the DDR. 
The international context in which Brecht undertook 
this initiative was decisive. Events in Poland and Hungary 
were rapidly unfolding in a reformist direction with the 
intelligentsia playing a major role in both countries. This 
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was increasingly the case after the June 17, 1956 workers' 
rebellion in Poznan. 
The impact of the Poznan events and its consequences 
within Poland on the DDR were considerable especially since 
they occurred less than four months after Khruschev's attack 
on Stalin. At the official level the Poznan rebellion was a 
source of alarm and encouraged a hardened attitude towards 
reform. A measure of this official concern could be seen in 
the pages of Neues Deutschland. Shortly afterwards it 
stated that in the face of such developments "the workers' 
and peasants' state can be of steel-hard rigor.,,4 
The effect on the growing movement for de-Stalinization 
was greater still. The fact that the Polish Party leader-
ship gave in to the demands of the insurgent workers 
following the suppression of the rebellion inspired advo-
cates of change wi thin the SED. In their eyes the Polish 
Party had set an example worthy of imitation in the DDR. 
This view gained more and more credibility as Gomulka rose 
to power in the early autumn of 1956. The logical result 
was a commitment by these SED dissidents to see the 
realization of a Polish October in the DDR. 5 
Wolfgang Harich emerged as the principal figure in the 
emerging movement to transform the SED. A Party member 
since 1946 the youthful Harich was a prominent academic at 
East Berlin's Humbolt University who identified with the 
views of Ernst Bloch, an advocate of a more humanistic 
Socialism. He first identified himself as a Marxist critic 
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of the Ulbricht dictatorship in 1953 as did Brecht. 6 But it 
was the situation prevalent in the autumn of 1956 which made 
him truly significant. 
Harich like Brecht was a member of the intelligentsia 
who remained loyal to the cause of Marxism. I t was this 
loyal ty which shaped their respective challenges to East 
German Stalinism. However, Harich distinguished himself 
from Brecht by articulating a comprehensive reform programme 
which he hoped the SED would adopt and which constituted the 
first consistent formulation of East German reform Communism 
to become known outside the DDR.7 
The core of this programme expressed a desire to 
realize a specific German Road to Socialism I cleansed of 
Stalinism'. As such it was in continuity with the original 
objectives of the SED. Similarly, Harich's programme 
emphasized the need for a return to the rule of law and to 
terminate the cult of the personality in the DDR. It called 
for the creation of Yugoslav-style workers' councils, a 
partial return to private enterprise and the cessation of 
forced agricultural collectivization.· Intellectual freedom 
was also to be restored and there would be renewed official 
tolerance toward the churches. 
Beyond these measures Harich went so far as to call for 
the liquidation of the secret police and complete sovereign-
ty for the Volkskammer or East German parliament. Logically 
Har ich firmly rej ected the dogma that the Soviet Union IS 
system was a model for other countries. With respect to the 
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DDR's international role Harich did not go as far as to 
advocate neutrality which is what the Hungarians were about 
to want. Instead Harich sought to have the DDR remain in 
the East block but as an equal partner with complete 
independence. This would mean the DDR, which owed its very 
existence to the Soviet Union, would be instrumental in 
ending Soviet dominance of the region and would follow the 
Yugoslav lead in challenging the USSR's then dominant role 
in the international Marxist-Leninist movement. 8 
This National Communist programme for democratization 
of the DDR was in tune with the spirit of the time in 
E as t ern Europe. It placed Harich essentially on side with 
what Gomulka appeared to stand for and, even more so, with 
Nagy whose commitment to democratization was more genuine 
than the Polish leader's. But unlike them Harich was 
neither at the head of a powerful popular movement nor had 
anything resembling the strong support within civil society 
which Gomulka and Nagy both had in the autumn of 1956. Con-
sequently, Harich together with his political programme 
suffered a severe handicap from the outset. 
This handicap together with the DDR's weak 
international position and its dependence on the USSR shaped 
Harich's strategy for turning his programme into a political 
reality. Harich accordingly sought its realization by legal 
means naively hoping the SED leadership would freely adopt 
it. This did not happen. In fact Harich did not even find 
someone who dared to present his programme to the Party 
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leaders. In face of this obstacle Harich delivered it to 
h 't b ' l' 9 t e Sovle Em assy ln Ber In. 
This action demonstrated Harich I s incredible faith in 
the existing system and the good will of the Soviet leader-
ship. Furthermore, Harich pursued official Soviet support 
while simultaneously maintaining contacts with the Petofi 
Circle in Budapest and West Germany's Social Democratic 
Party. Such links indicated a conviction that he could 
bridge the differences between these parties and the Soviets 
and achieve some degree of consensus in favour of his pro-
gramme among all of them. In view of the reluctant Soviet 
acceptance of Gomulka such a notion may not have been 
completely implausible. But the invas ion of Hungary would 
abruptly prove it was fantasy. 
If Harich's naivety seemed to know almost no limits the 
same was true of his political ambitions. Specifically, 
Harich's contacts with the West German social democrats 
showed he wanted more than a sweeping transformation in the 
DDR. He also wanted to facilitate German re-unification. 
It was Harich's view that the prospects for re-unifying 
Germany would greatly improve given the adoption of his 
programme by the SED. 
Those involved with Harich in the movement for sweeping 
reform scored only one success of note. They managed to 
have Gomulka I s October 20, 1956 speech in which the new 
Polish leader set out his reform programme, secretly 
published in the DDR. This was done in defiance of 
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opposition from Ulbricht and indicated a significant degree 
of reformist sentiment in the Party. Nonetheless, Harich's 
grand designs would come to nothing. In a matter of days 
the Hungarian events would guarantee this as the Soviet 
invasion demonstrated the very real limits of Moscow's 
tolerance of change in the East bloc. Harich did not 
appreciate these limits and the terms of his programme 
clearly put them to the test. 
Harich was arrested in late November together with a 
number of his political allies. In March 1957 he received a 
sentence of ten years imprisonment at hard labour for 
allegedly 'conspiring to overthrow the East German 
10 governmen t ' • Most of Harich's sentence would be served. 
But these measures alone were obviously deemed insufficient. 
The theories of Harich's mentor, Ernst Bloch, also had to be 
subjected to official condemnation. This occurred at a 
swiftly convened theoretical conference in Leipzig. 11 Both 
the heresy and the heretic had to be decisively crushed. 
Repression was also employed to silence real or poten-
tial sources of unrest at the time. Meetings of writers, 
artists and journalists at East Berlin's Club der 
Kulturschaffen were stopped effectively eliminating the 
DDR's equivalent of Hungary's Petofi Circle. Manifestations 
of student unrest aimed at achieving greater intellectual 
freedom, university education free from SED control and 
freedom for students to form their own organizations took 
place. These were halted through a combination of official 
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stalling tactics and strong arm methods. 
Open dissent by workers was minimal. Yet Ulbricht 
resorted to preventative measures designed to turn them 
against the students and intellectuals. These moves were 
followed by a new economic package in the months immediately 
after the Hungarian Revolution. It included the 
introduction of a 45 hour work week, pension increases and 
an expanded program of housing construction. 12 Such 
initiatives showed that the memory of June 1953 was still 
fresh in the minds of Ulbricht and of the workers. 
Ulbricht felt vindicated by the Hungarian Revolution 
much as he had felt vindicated by the June 1953 insurrection 
in his own domain. Earlier on he had warned against the 
Soviet supported ouster of the Stalinist Rakosi from power 
in Hungary. Ulbricht had also called for a crackdown on the 
anti-Stalinist Petofi Circle. The East German leader 
understood how the course of events which began with 
Khruschev's attack on Stalin threatened the stability of the 
region and the very system he ruled in the DDR. After all, 
had not these developments facilitated the formulation of 
Harich's programme for the wholesale de-Stalinization of 
East Germany and thereby potentially enhanced the possibili-
ties for German reunification? And would not Harich's aims 
mean the political demise of Ulbricht and perhaps the 
dissolution of the state he dominated? 
The Hungarian Revolution was also Ulbricht's salvation 
regardless of the naivety of Harich's initiatives. It 
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directly led to a new re-affirmation of Soviet support for 
him. More importantly still, the Revolution facilitated the 
systematic reversal of much of Gomulka's reform programme in 
Poland and led to an immediate conservative shift in Soviet 
policy direction. As a result, support for democratic 
reforms and a National Communist course for the DDR lost 
much of whatever ideological legitimacy it had within the 
ruling SED. 
Nonetheless, the fragile nature of the DDR in the 
1950's would not allow Ulbricht to remain secure after the 
1956 East bloc crisis began to dissipate. He would face two 
new challenges by 1958. 
One of these was a new form of internal Party dissent. 
It arose from an unlikely source. Namely, this dissent came 
from economic planners associated with the Minister of Heavy 
Industry, Fritz Selbmann. These technocratic critics op-
posed Ulbricht's ideologically orthodox economic and 
administrative policies as harsh and misguided. 
heavily punished as a result. 13 
They were 
The Minister of State Security Ernst Wollweber and 
Secretary of the Central Committee Karl Schirdewan mounted 
the other challenge to Ulbricht. This, however, was not a 
manifestation of dissent. It was a struggle for power by 
two leading moderates within the SED leadership. These 
individuals attacked Ulbricht for his incompetence and 
failure to account for the unique qualities of the DDR. 
They were nonetheless not seeking changes which would lead 
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to a sweeping transformation of the existing order and 
sought Moscow's backing amidst the post-1956 political 
climate. 
Wollweber and Schirdewan lost and were purged. This 
occurred for much the same reason Zaisser and Herrnstadt 
failed in 1953. Specifically, a power struggle in the 
Soviet Communist Party had worked to the advantage of 
Ulbricht. 14 Extensive purges followed throughout the ranks 
of the SED. Due to these events and later developments such 
as the marked increase in the viability of the DDR following 
the erection of the Berlin Wall Ulbricht would be able to 
exert virtually unchallenged control of the SED until 1971 
when the USSR finally turned against him. 
Looking at the DDR in the 1950's two phenomena concern-
ing dissent and critical thought become quite apparent. One 
is the way in which the DDR's dependency on the Soviet Union 
for its very existence profoundly affected express ions of 
East German dissent. Thus, the combined effects of the June 
1953 workers' insurrection and the Hungarian Revolution 
smothered whatever possibilities there were for the 
emergence of a sustained movement of dissent. In particu-
lar, this was accomplished by the silencing of social groups 
capable of facilitating such a movement and by enabling the 
continuation of a neo-Stalinist system of rule in the DDR. 
The Soviet factor was decisive at nearly every 
juncture. The USSR facilitated the foundation of the DDR 
through the roles played by the emigre Ulbricht Group in the 
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German Communist Party and the Soviet Military Administra-
tion. Then the Soviet system was imposed on East Germany 
through the policies of a Stalinist ruling party led by the 
USSR's most trusted German, Walter Ulbricht. 
The Soviet-imposed 
after Stalin's death. 
system was likewise modified right 
This was done at the USSR's 
insistence. Ulbricht's views counted for little as the 
institution of the New Course demonstrated. 
By overseeing the construction of the DDR's social 
system prior to Stalin's death and by being instrumental in 
its modification in the months immediately afterwards the 
USSR, in effect, set the stage for the spontaneous, massive 
outburst of dissent in June 1953. The USSR was also respon-
sible for crushing that dissent when the East German workers 
brought the Ulbricht regime to its knees. Furthermore, it 
was the USSR which kept Ulbricht in power despite his 
thorough lack of popular support and a major challenge to 
his leadership emanating from within the SED Politbureau. 
Ulbricht's subsequent resistance to further de-
Stalinization measures during 1954-55 was not of crucial 
importance although it did exemplify a degree of insubor-
dination which would be repeated with greater consequence 
years later. As a result, in the face of Khrushchev's 
attack on Stalin, Ulbricht could mount only partially effec-
tive resistance to new pressure for change. With respect to 
dissent it was this major turning point in the history of 
the Soviet Party which set in motion the course of East 
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German dissent in 1956. It was similarly the Soviet move to 
crush the Hungarian Revolution which was decisive in 
silencing this second and final major manifestation of 
dissent in the DDR in the 1950's. 
As noted, the combined effects of the June 1953 events 
and those during 1956 in Hungary smothered any chance of a 
sustained movement of dissent emerging in the DDR. 
Recognition of whose aspirations were crushed in the process 
facilitates an understanding as to why. 
In June 1953 it was principally the workers whose 
aspirations were crushed since it was almost exclusively 
their insurrection. Consequently, the will to resist within 
the section of society possessing the greatest capacity to 
confront the regime was broken. Owing to the imposition of 
this forced passivity by Soviet tanks the Ulbricht regime 
enjoyed the strong prospect that future manifestations of 
dissent within East German civil society would remain 
marginal and, hence, much easier to cope with. 
1956 certainly bore this out. Relative worker passivi-
ty together with continued silence on the part of the 
peasantry during this year of bloc-wide crisis prevented the 
occurrence of anything as profound as the Hungarian 
Revolution or even the Poznan rebellion in Poland. Dissent 
within civil society was confined primarily to students at 
some universities and the numerically small intelligentsia. 
Due to this, the only threatening dissent emerged from 
within the SED and these Marxist dissidents were seriously 
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handicapped by their lack of support within and their 
alienation from a civil society which did not distinguish 
them from the Ulbricht regime. 15 In the case of Harich, 
this problem together with the weak, dependent nature of the 
East German state compelled him and his associates in the 
SED to naively aspire through legal means to secure, on the 
one hand, the support of the Party leadership for their 
programme and support from outside the DDR, particularly in 
Moscow, on the other. They did this despite the essentially 
subversive nature of their programmatic goals. 
The suppression of the Hungarian insurgents spelled the 
political demise of these critics and their aspirations 
within the SED. It also spelled the demise of the 
aspirations of the dissatisfied university students and 
members of the critical intelligentsia. Nonetheless, the 
goals of all three were not repressed as severely as the 
workers' aspirations had been in June 1953 primarily because 
their actions did not lead to such a volatile internal 
situation. Hence, the possibility of these groups making 
new expressions of dissent remained less remote. 
Overall, the combined effects of both insurrections was 
still overwhelming in terms of dampening social resistance 
wi thin East German civil society. The effects were less 
substantial wi thin the SED. This was shown by the techno-
crats' dissent in 1958. 
The possibilities for further dissent were also 
seriously impaired in 1953 and 1958 when challenges to 
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Ulbricht from other SED leaders were defeated. Had any of 
these struggles for power succeeded this could have resulted 
in a more liberal, less repressive regime. Under such 
circumstances the possibilities for social resistance in the 
DDR would almost certainly have proven better. Potent ial 
critics would probably have found it easier to acquire 
'space' or the room to maneuver so essential to engaging in 
durable independent pol i tical act ivi ty. Poss ibili ties for 
social experimentation by sectors of the ruling elite which 
would be conducive to independent political activism may 
also have emerged. 
If all of these phenomena are considered together the 
gravity of the combined impact of June 1953 and the 
Hungarian Revolution starts to become clear. Manifestations 
of dissent and critical thought were now certain to be 
essentially isolated phenomena confined to individuals or 
specific groups for quite some time to come. Nonetheless, 
dissent would cont inue to constitute a potential threat to 
the regime due to the systemic weaknesses of the DDR. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHURCH 
AND THE BERLIN WALL 
Before proceeding with an examination of dissent from 
the 1960 l s onwards two vital and partially related subjects 
affecting the evolution of the domestic politics of the DDR 
merit attention. One is the development of the Church-State 
relationship. The other is the impact of the construction 
of the Berlin Wall. 
As noted before, during the formative years of the DDR 
up until Stalin1s death, religious expression was under 
attack to the point where religion was almost completely 
removed from the school system and harassment of the 
churches had become systematic. The official onslaught only 
abated after Stalin 1 s death and even then the Church-State 
relationship remained very difficult. Confrontations 
persisted and the SED continued to pursue a divide and 
conquer strategy which would only allow for a wholly 
subordinate and dwindling religious community in the DDR. 
Two issues were outstanding in sustaining the 
antagonistic nature of the relationship during the 1950 1 s 
and into the 1960 1s. One was the introduction in 1954 of 
the Jugenweihe or official Youth Dedication. This was 
initiated by the SED and directed at 14 year olds. 
Atheistic in content, the Youth Dedication has constituted 
a secular equivalent of confirmation in which the 
participant makes an affirmation to the State, to Socialism, 
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to friendship with the USSR and pledges his or herself to 
1 give one's best at school and at work. The move epitomized 
the Party's determination to socialize youth according to 
official values and to push the churches to the margins of 
East German society where their role would be restricted to 
holding purely religious services. 2 
The Protestant Evangelical Church, which is by far the 
DDR's largest and most influential, stubbornly resisted the 
initiation of the Youth Dedication. It considered this rite 
a violation of the DDR Constitution's guarantees of relig-
ious freedom. The Protestant Church responded by refusing 
confirmation to anyone who took the Jugenweihe. However, 
the SED effectively countered by making the official rite a 
necessary condit ion for advanced schooling and entrance to 
th f . 3 e pro essJ..ons. 
The Church was faced with the certainty of many young 
East Germans opting for the Youth Dedication despi te its 
wishes and accordingly distancing themselves from organized 
religion for the sake of their futures. In short, the 
future viability of the Protestant Church was put in 
jeopardy. So it gave in. The DDR' s main Church began to 
confirm youths who had taken the Youth Dedication which, by 
1958, was next to obligatory for everyone in East Germany. 
The Protestant Church had made a major concession to the 
political status quo. 
A similar outcome marked the other particularly 
contentious issue affecting the course of Church-State 
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relations. This involved the Protestant Church's insti-
tutional ties to its West German counterpart through the 
Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD). The SED came to adopt 
an increasingly dim view of this bond particularly as the 
prospects for German re-unification on terms suitable to the 
ruling East German Party became more remote. 
Among other things this relationship had the undesired 
effect of encouraging the view that the East German state 
was a passing phenomenon. It was also seen as an 
indestructible tie between East and West Germany. 
Perceptions like these were thorns in the side of a ruling 
party locked in an international diplomatic struggle with 
the government in Bonn over the legitimacy of the East 
German state and still trying to win the acceptance of its 
own population. These facts exemplify why the SED became 
ever more determined to force the East German Protestant 
Church to separate from its West German counterpart. 
West Germany's entrance into NATO and the formation of 
the West German armed forces gave the SED an ideal oppor-
tunity to press the matter because these developments led to 
the 1957 Military Chaplaincy Agreement. Through it the EKD 
provided West German soldiers with the services of military 
chaplains. This created a tangible link between the West 
German military, NATO and the East German Protestant Church. 
Ulbricht quickly exploited the issue going so far as to 
accuse the EKD of overtly approving NATO policies, West 
German rearmament and the use of atomic warfare. 4 
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Later, the SED succeeded in initiating a process of 
separation by keeping Protestant Evangelicals in the DDR 
from meeting their West German counterparts by refusing to 
allow the Synod of the United Evangelical Church in Germany 
to meet in East Berlin in 1961. 5 Final separation came 
eight years later on June 10, 1969. On that date the Synod 
of the Federation of Evangelical Churches (Kirchenbund) of 
the DDR was formed. 
These developments had the cumulative effect of compel-
ling the main church in the DDR to accept the realities of a 
viable, sovereign East German state administering an 
essentially Soviet-model social system. For the SED this 
acceptance was a major political victory and a vital step in 
the process of East German nation building. It also 
facilitated the emergence of a new Church-State relationship 
based on accommodation especially between their respective 
hierarchies. This in turn would help to guarantee the 
Church's status as an independent institution in East German 
society. The character of the new role of the Church was 
most succinctly stated by Bishop Albert Schonherr of Berlin 
in 1971. He said, "We wish to be a Church within 
Socialism. ,,6 
Within this kind of framework Church-State relations 
experienced substantial improvements during the 1970's. But 
because the new accommodation was more focused at the top of 
these institutions the potential for new tensions was much 
greater at the lower levels and this is where new 
47 
manifestations of conflict arose. Thus, individual 
Christians continued to suffer direct or indirect discrimi-
nation on a regular basis. Similarly, low-level SED 
officials often persisted in maintaining a hard line towards 
religion. 
The suicide burnings by Pastor Oskar Brusewitz in 1976 
and Pastor Rolf Gunther in 1978 exemplified the sometimes 
sharp contrast between sentiments within the Church 
hierarchy and at the base levels as these spectacular 
incidents of dissent testified to the anguish felt by at 
least some Christians over their perceived plight in the 
DDR. As could be expected, Pastor Brusewitz's suicide 
horrified both Party and Church officials. 
The impact of these in combination with a visible rise 
in popular discontent in the DDR in the latter 1970's 
facilitated a milestone in the improving Church-State 
relationship. This was the historic March 6, 1978 meeting 
between SED Chairperson Erich Honecker and Bishop Schonherr. 
It resulted in the conclusion of agreements which were 
hailed as constituting a model of what relations should be 
between Church and State in a Socialist country. 
At this meeting Honecker spoke of the Protestant Church 
as a socially significant, 
Schonherr somewhat similarly 
both materially and in ideas, 
self-supporting organization. 
spoke of the need for space, 
in which the Church communi-
ties could work, worship and carryon their educational 
9 programs. The multi-faceted agreements included provisions 
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giving the Church increased access to the official elec-
tronic media, greater possibilities to import literature 
from the West for ecumenical purposes and opened channels 
through which it could address charges of discrimination 
against Christians. Terms such as these empowered the East 
German Protestant Church with privileges which are 
unequalled in any other Soviet bloc state with the obvious 
exception of Poland. 
With respect to the possibilities for dissent and 
critical thought in the DDR the situation established 
through the March 6th agreements was indeed significant. In 
a manner also similar to Poland the achievement of an 
understanding between the Church and the State entrenched 
the position of the Protestant Church as a powerful, inde-
pendent institution within an East bloc society. This 
likewise meant the consolidation of the position of the one 
major, non-official institution empowered with the right of 
free assembly. And in the case of the DDR the Protestant 
Church would distinguish itself as a forum for public 
appearances by artists and writers on a scale incomparable 
to that of the churches in the West. 10 Furthermore, this 
was true in society in which the intelligentsia has been the 
most consistent source of dissent and critical thought. 
Nonetheless, in stating these things it must be noted 
that the situation differs with respect to East Germany's 
smaller, less influential Roman Catholic Church. It has 
consistently shied away from public affairs by limiting 
49 
itself to pastoral work. The Catholic Church has also 
adopted a different path by viewing the concept of 'The 
Church in Socialism' with suspicion. Still, the East German 
Catholic Church has similarly felt the need to come to terms 
with the SED ruled state by accepting it as a fact in order 
to avoid conflicts which prove fruitless. 11 
The East German government's action in 1961 in prevent-
ing a meeting between East and west German Protestant 
Evangelicals in East Berlin as a way to push for the 
establishment of a separate DDR Protestant Church was also 
consistent in int~nt with its most important initiative of 
the same year, the construction of the Berlin Wall. 
Subsequent history has shown how that action made August 13, 
1961 a decisive turning point in the history of the DDR. It 
similarly had a profound impact on the nature of East German 
dissent and critical thought. In particular, the construc-
tion of The Wall had the effect of shaping the context 
wi thin which these phenomena would occur as well as their 
content and objectives. 
Regardless, the foremost purpose for constructing what 
would constitute the most deadly border in the history of 
the modern world was to secure the future existence of the 
DDR. This was so because in August 1961 the East German 
state's very survival was increasingly in doubt owing to the 
massive exodus of its citizens westward. From 1949 through 
to the end of 1961 this state which ruled a population of 
about 17 million people had nearly 2.5 million emigrate. 
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What is more, during the period just prior to The Wall's 
construction the rate of emigration had risen to nearly 2000 
12 persons per day. 
The type of people who were leaving particularly 
exemplified the seriousness of the situation. They included 
East Germany's most skilled and productive citizens. Almost 
half of those who fled in 1961 were under 25 years old. 
Perhaps as many as one quarter of those who left from 1949 
onwards were members of the technical intelligentsia. 
During 1960 and 1961 a great many were farmers who departed 
in response to a sweeping agricultural collectivization. 
All told, the depletion of economic skills and productive 
abilities threatened to devastate an economy already 
burdened by shortages of all kinds and serious inefficien-
cies. Simply stated, the Berlin Wall was a means to avert a 
possible collapse and lay the basis for a revival of the 
DDR's economy. 
nothing less. 
The political survival of the SED required 
The Berlin Wall also served an explicitly diplomatic 
purpose related to the preservation of the East German 
state. Specifically, its construction was sanctioned by 
Khrushchev as a tactic to compel the West to recognize the 
DDR and end the diplomatic isolation imposed on the East 
German state through Bonn's Hallstein Doctrine. Achieving 
this acceptance of the status quo in Germany was essential 
if the USSR was to realize its larger objective of Western 
recognition of the status quo in Europe. 13 This, in turn, 
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would enable the USSR to pursue a more flexible policy 
toward both German states. 
The domestic impact of the construction of the Berlin 
Wall was far-reaching and multi-faceted. Now, for the first 
time since the DDR's establishment the SED leadership could 
begin to consolidate its regime within its own borders. As 
a consequence the East German population was forced to 
ei ther accept or oppose the system without the al ternati ve 
f 1 . 14 o eavlng. Accordingly, with the uncertainty over the 
DDR's survival sharply diminished by this watershed event 
the effective, systematic and durable honing of a Soviet 
model society was far more possible. 
Yet, initially, this was not what happened. There was 
instead a clear shift toward liberalization and the start of 
an important per iod of reform. This was especially true 
with respect to the economy and, like the policy decision to 
build The Wall, the subsequent push for reform was under-
stood as a political strategy designed to consolidate SED 
rule. 
The reform package was named the New Economic System 
( NES ) . The NES involved partial moves toward a market 
economy intended to resolve the inefficiencies of a 
centrally planned economy by giving a share of responsibil-
ity to individual 15 concerns. This initiative lasted from 
1962 to 1967 and was in large measure responsible for the 
achievement of what has since been termed the 'East German 
Economic Miracle.' 
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The resulting economic progress together with a politi-
cal relaxation by the SED which lasted until the end of 1965 
in turn facilitated greater acceptance of the social system 
by the population and even fostered the emergence of a 
certain national pride in the accomplishments of the DDR. 
Indeed, by 1963 a sense of East German national identity 
began to appear. Ulbricht took the lead in encouraging this 
by making "national interest" and "national economy" common 
phrases in the lexicon of East German officialdom. 16 
The process of consolidation was quite apparent in 
military terms as well. After the Berlin Wall went up so 
did the military value of East Germany's National People's 
Army (NVA). As a result the NVA became an increasingly 
important component of the Warsaw Pact's armed forces. This 
process culminated in the DDR's assumption of a 'Junior 
Partner' role in the Soviet-dominated East bloc military 
alliance. 
Clearly then, what happened on August 13, 1961 was a 
major turning point. With respect to dissent and critical 
thought, as noted, anyone who was not content now had to 
learn to accept the DDR's system or work to change it. The 
Wall also shattered almost all hope of there being a sub-
stantive return to political pluralism of the kind which 
existed in 1946. Furthermore, as the prospects for a united 
Germany faded whatever prospects for change which survived 
necessarily became much more exclusively focused on the DDR 
itself. Realities such as these necessarily precluded 
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anything more than a gradualist, reform-oriented strategy 
for political change for the foreseeable future if not 
longer. Furthermore, the facts of the Soviet-DDR 
relationship along with the repressive nature of SED rule 
dictated that even movement of this nature would have to be 
guided by considerable caution. 
Within this context initiatives for reform would 
necessarily have two principal focal points. One would be 
the SED which did have a loosely constituted liberal 
leadership faction alongside centrist and conservative or 
Stalinist ones. The other would be the Protestant Church 
for reasons already noted. 
Thus, in the period leading up to the 1980's, the 
leading critics of the East German government would turn out 
to be principally either SED members or persons who in some 
way associated themselves with the Protestant Church. 
Accordingly, the ideas 
mainly be Marxist or 
espoused by these dissenters would 
Christian influenced. within this 
framework phenomena akin to Eurocommunism would surface and 
those responsible would be subjected to official vilifica-
tion by a still vulnerable and fearful ruling elite. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INTELLECTUAL DISSENT IN THE 1960's AND 1970's 
The tendency for the manifestations of dissent and 
critical thought which appeared after August 13, 1961 to 
either emerge from within the ranks of the ruling Party or 
to be linked to the churches was, in part, highlighted by 
the persons who became both the leading critics of the 
government during the 1960's and 1970's and the mainstays of 
oppositional activity. Robert Havemann, Wolf Biermann, 
Stefan Heym and Christa Wolf were foremost among them. 
Rudolph Bahro and Reiner Kunze also proved to be of con-
siderable importance. 
The father figure, as it were, of dissent in the DDR 
was the late Robert Havemann. A life-long Communist, 
Havemann joined the German Communist Party before the Second 
World War. He was jailed for this reason during the Nazi 
period. Havemann even shared residence in Berlin's 
Brandenburg Prison with the current SED First Secretary 
Erich Honecker. 1 After the SED took power Havemann became a 
member of the Volkskammer or East German Parliament. These 
personal credentials worked in his favour when he became a 
diss ident and as a result he suffered neither prison terms 
nor forced exile. 
1956 was a turning point for Havemann just as it was 
for many East German intellectuals. Khrushchev I s attack on 
Stalin came as a shock to him. It moved Havemann to break 
with Stalinism and get involved in the intellectual ferment 
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of the time. Nonetheless, Havemann did not gain notoriety 
as a political heretic until 1963-64 when the DDR was 
experiencing perhaps its most liberal period to date. These 
were the years in which Dr. Havemann delivered a series of 
defiant and highly popular lectures at East Berlin's 
prestigious Humbolt University, the residence of many of the 
DDR's internal critics over the years. Havemann's lectures 
openly challenged the Party's ideological orthodoxy. In 
them he reiterated an earlier demand of his for a clear 
dividing line between science and official dogma. Havemann 
challenged the SED's line on a number of other key ideologi-
cal issues as well. 
By this time Havemann's aversion to Stalinism was very 
clear. He equated it with Bonapartism. Stalinism, in his 
view, was a perversion of the essentially democratic charac-
ter of Socialism. This kind of perspective was highlighted 
in a 1964 interview where he stated, 
Not as one disappointed in the socialist idea but 
as its confirmed partisan I demand the total 
eradication of Stalinism and dogmatism in all 
their manifestations. Our goal must be a social 
order in which Libertarian Socialism has been 
given realitYo2 
The SED leadership considered these openly expressed 
views and Havemann's series of critical lectures at Humbolt 
intolerable. Consequently, the SED Central Committee 
officially condemned Havemann in early 1964 then expelled 
him from the Party and stripped him of his academic title at 
Humbolt. 3 He remained undaunted. 
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Four years later Czechoslovakia was in the midst of its 
Prague Spring. Havemann, who had come to believe that 
tension between 'the State and the masses' would elicit the 
'second phase of the Socialist Revolution' , was 
understandably enthusiastic. Dubcek's experiment seemed to 
vindicate his conception. Accordingly, years after the 
Prague Spring was brought to an abrupt end Havemann held 
firm to the view that a Prague Spring is an historic 
inevitability in all socialist countries. 4 
Havemann saw the Warsaw Pact invasion as a grave 
political blunder which the Soviets would eventually have to 
acknowledge. His sons, who were obviously influenced by his 
views, went beyond words and took protest action. They were 
arrested as a result. 
In the years which followed, Havemann's ideas drew 
increasingly close to those of the main West European 
Communist Parties which had also condemned the invasion as 
contrary to the best interests of Socialism. By 1979 
Havemann clearly fel t a bond with the Eurocommunist cause. 
In a statement marking the 30th anniversary of the founding 
of the DDR he wrote, 
If we in the DDR were finally to begin the 
construction of the Socialism of which our 
Eurocommunist comrades dream, so that they would 
no longer be forced to distance themselves from 
our Actually Existing Socialism, then the DDR 
together with the other socialist countries could 
become the pacemaker of the great socialist turn 
in Europe ° 5 
In the same statement Havemann went on to demand the 
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abolition of censorship, the establishment of an independent 
newspaper and the release of DDR citizens jailed for free 
expression. 
Havemann was quite pointed in viewing the absence of 
intellectual freedom as the DDR1s greatest flaw. In his 
essay Freedom As Necessity he attributes the economic 
failure of Socialism and its declining international 
standing to the lack of democratic rights. This shortcoming 
is, in Havemann1s view, the decisive brake on development in 
what he terms Ithe pseudo-socialist countries 1 . 
Havemann believed the prevalent lunfreedom l has to be 
blown apart as a prerequisite for any chance of realizing 
true Socialism. Significantly, Havemann considered the 
freedom he envisions as qualitatively superior to the 
freedom which exists in the West. Havemann1s objective was 
a material freedom and independence for the individual based 
upon dependence only on the socialist community as a whole, 
on its culture and maturity.6 
Throughout this period Havemann endured systematic 
harassment. The State 1 s campaign of persecution peaked in 
the last half of the 1970 1s. During this time he was placed 
under house arrest for two and one half years and at various 
times had up to 200 members of the People1s Police stationed 
around his home. Havemann1s ordeal never fully ended until 
after his death in April 1982. There was even a police 
presence at the burial of this mainstay of oppositional 
activity who during his last year gained recognition as an 
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inspiration for the DDR's autonomous peace movement. 
Havemann's ability to remain in the DDR until his death 
without experiencing a fate worse than house arrest was not 
shared by his friend and fellow activist Wolf Biermann. He 
would be expelled. Together, these two individuals formed 
the centre of intellectual resistance in the DDR from the 
mid-1960's until the late 1970's. Havemann and Biermann had 
much in common. They even emerged as figures wi thin the 
critical intelligentsia at the same institution, Humbolt 
University, where Biermann, another convinced Marxist, 
studied. At Humbolt Wolf Biermann became involved in 
Bertol t Brecht's theatre group and soon found himself at 
odds with the SED's cultural policies. By 1963, he was also 
having problems with the Party's censors and was marked as 
an oppositionist, expelled from the SED and banned from 
making public appearances. As a balladeer, Biermann's later 
to be famous songs with their politically incisive lyrics 
were restricted to circulation wi thin an informal audience 
of like-minded critics of the SED who exchanged tape record-
ings of them. 7 
Wolf Biermann was a cultural figure. Consequently, the 
treatment he experienced corresponded closely to shifts in 
SED cultural policy. This was demonstrated when the period 
of liberalization which followed the erection of the Berlin 
Wall was terminated in 1965 with no further significant 
relaxation until Honecker replaced Ulbricht in 1971. Thus, 
at the 11 th Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED in 
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December 1965 during which Honecker gave the Politbureau 
report signalling a return to rigid cultural policies, 
Biermann was made the principal object of official 
criticism. Thanks to this newly acquired notoriety Biermann 
would only be permitted to make two public appearances in 
the DDR over the next eleven years. 
The Prague Spring made a major impression on Biermann 
who now felt that 'reactionary Stalinist bureaucrats' at the 
top of the SED hierarchy constituted the real enemies of 
Socialism in the DDR. Biermann did not simply react to the 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia by denouncing it. He 
echoed views similar to Havemann's. In one of his songs he 
wrote I "The Paris Commune lives on in Prague, the Revolution 
frees itself." 
Poli tical freedom was another concern Biermann shared 
wi th Havemann. Biermann also shared this concern and a 
strong affinity with the late Rosa Luxemburg. She con-
tended, 
without general elections, without unlimited 
freedom of the press and assembly I without the 
free struggle of opinions I life dies out in all 
public institutions; it is transformed into a 
fictitious life wherein only the bureaucracy 
remains the active elementos 
Yet it is significant that Biermann, like Havemann, still 
viewed the DDR as the better Germany since it had eliminated 
capitalist private property forms. 
Not surprisingly, Biermann gravitated towards Euro-
communism. He saw the Eurocommunist transformation of the 
61 
leading west European Communist Parties as a gratifying and 
remarkable development. Biermann delighted at the June 1976 
East Berlin Conference of workers' parties where the 
Eurocommunists made their presence felt in a major way and 
where the SED leadership was compelled to give their ideas 
an unprecedented degree of exposure within the DDR. 
Very soon afterwards Erich Honecker and his colleagues 
decided they had had enough of the DDR's Eurocommunist 
balladeer. In November 1976 they dealt with Biermann by 
granting him a temporary exit visa to perform a series of 
concerts for the West German Metal Workers Union. Once he 
was out of the DDR the Party had the door shut behind him 
citing the critical nature of the performances he gave as 
justification for the expulsion. In particular, the 
official daily Neues Deutschland charged Biermann with 
"gross violation of his civic duties and a hostile perfor-
mance directed at our socialist state." 9 The paper also 
called him an 'anti-communist rowdy'. No doubt the Party's 
indignation was increased by the fact that millions of East 
Germans had been given the opportunity to view Biermann in 
concert thanks to a West German television broadcast of one 
of his performances. 
The expulsion set off a relative storm of protest in 
the DDR and across Europe. Among those who condemned the 
SED's action were the Eurocommunists. This brought the SED-
Eurocommunist relationship to a new low. 
Within the DDR students in Jena joined forces with 
62 
local workers in collecting several hundred signatures on a 
protest petition. Expressions of solidarity also came out 
of factories in East Berlin. Slogans appeared on walls 
around the capital denouncing the expuls ion while wreaths 
were anonymously placed at popular landmarks which Biermann 
had sung about in his songs. Elsewhere, in Erfurt, a young 
stagehand received a prison sentence for collecting signa-
tures on a petition. 
The action against Biermann brought the long-standing 
tensions between the Party and the critical intelligentsia 
to a head. Fearing that Biermann's expulsion marked the 
start of a return to Stalinist policies twelve leading East 
German writers signed an open letter to the SED leadership 
urging it to reverse the expulsion decision. Neues 
Deutschland refused their request to have it published. 
Yet, within days word of the letter had spread sufficiently 
that approximately 100 more people signed it. 
To the SED leaders this was a provocation. They 
believed the storm of protest was in fact the work of 
Biermann's friend Robert Havemann. As a result, a vigorous 
attack was launched against the intellectual critics and 
anyone else the Party could single out. 10 The subjection of 
Havemann to prolonged house arrest was set in this atmos-
phere. Specifically, the official action was a response to 
Havemann having a letter of his own protesting the expulsion 
published in West Germany's Der Spiegel magazine. Mean-
while, author Christa Wolf, who at one time had been a 
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candidate member of the SED Central Committee, was expelled 
from both the Party and the Berlin Committee of the Writers' 
Federation for having joined the chorus of protest. 
Others suffered worse fates. A year after the uproar 
had subsided it was apparent that at least twenty persons 
had been jailed and dozens of others had been forced to 
leave the DDR. This was the level of repression the Party 
leadership deemed necessary given that the wave of protests 
had involved several hundred artists and poets and had even 
led to the formation of an intelligentsia-based Committee 
for the Defense of Freedom and Socialism in East Berlin. 
Still more repression followed. Determined to adopt a 
tougher overall stance towards dissent the Party submitted 
"catch-all" legislation to the Volkskammer for formal 
approval. Consequently, laws which widened the legal 
definitions of what constituted a 'crime I against the DDR 
were passed in April 1977 and in June 1979. One particular 
amendment set out a new crime termed 'public defamation of 
the DDR' which was clearly aimed at the critical intel-
ligentsia. The 1979 legislation specifically toughened 
existing penalties for and addressed the problem of 'illegal 
contacts I with foreigners for the purpose of assisting in 
the publication abroad of material harmful to the DDR.ll 
The intent of this law was clear given the tendency of East 
German dissident writers to evade official censorship by 
having their work published in West Germany. 
Prominent East German writer and political critic 
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Stefan Heym responded to the State's onslaught by vowing to 
continue to fight for the full implementation of the provi-
sions of the DDR constitution guaranteeing the right to free 
speech. Heym, who once said, "I don't live in the DDR to 
keep my mouth shut.", is yet another one of East Germany I s 
long-standing critics who is still loyal to Marxist 
S '1' 12 OCla lsm. 
Heym' s commitment to Socialism can be traced back to 
Germany's pre-Nazi period. I t prompted him to choose to 
live in the DDR and to support its early social transfor-
mation. However, Heym had his illusions about the DDR 
shattered by the June 1953 workers' upris ing. By 1956 he 
was at odds with what he had come to see as the adverse 
effects of SED orthodoxy on the quality of East German 
literary work. 
What stands out about Heym is his determination to stay 
in the DDR and make life better there. By the mid-1960's 
his commitment to fostering a more democratic, intellectual-
ly open society was earning him sustained official scorn. 
Thus, in December 1965, he shared Biermann's distinction of 
being attacked by Erich Honecker at the 11th Central 
Committee Plenum. 
The year 1965 was also significant insofar as it was 
then that Stefan Heym's The Boredom of Minsk appeared. This 
work contained the following four point manifesto concerning 
cultural freedom. 
1. The Party has no monopoly of the truth. 
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2. There is an imminent conflict between writers 
and functionaries. 
3. Taboos have to be disregarded. 
4. Hardship has to be accepted while pursuing the 
first three principles. 13 
One of Heym's later works, The King David Report, 
showed he meant what he said about taboos. In this work 
Heym dealt with probably the most sensitive East German 
taboo of them all. Namely, he wrote about the DDR's ex-
periences with Stalinism and Stalinism's residual presence 
in contemporary East German society. 
Stefan Heym similarly meant what he said with respect 
to enduring hardship. As one of the twelve writers who 
initially signed the letter to the SED leadership in support 
of Biermann he was a central figure in the tense situation 
which prevailed in the late 1970's and suffered as a result. 
In June 1978, not long after Honecker was lashing out at 
"artists and writers who do not correctly understand the 
class character of SED policies" and was promising to combat 
vigorously "those ideas which contradict Scientific 
Socialism," Heym was excluded from all public events and 
prevented from publishing anything. He was also expelled 
from the SED for "serving the class enemy" and removed from 
the off icial Writers' Union. 14 Knowingly or not, the SED 
had substantiated Heym's concerns about the continued 
presence of Stalinism in the DDR by responding in a 
Stalinist manner. 
Heym nonetheless carried on as a political critic into 
the 1980's. This persistence was exemplified by his 
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enthusiastic response to the birth of autonomous peace 
activism in the DDR and by a statement made on January 14, 
1982. In the latter he openly took issue with the SED's 
line on the Polish crisis. 15 
In the field of east German critical theory one person 
has clearly stood above all the others. Rudolph Bahro 
earned this distinction by virtue of his acclaimed 
theoretical work The Alternative in Eastern Europe and as a 
result of his other analytical statements concerning the 
nature of Soviet bloc societies and the process required to 
transform them in a socialist direction. 
Bahro's appearance on the East German dissident scene 
came relatively late and did not last very long. Yet 
another SED member, he joined the Party as a teenager in 
1952. By 1965 he had risen within it to become the deputy 
editor of the official SED student journal. Bahro then went 
on to serve for years as a valued member of the technical 
intelligentsia. 
Whereas the crises of 1953 and 1956 marked turning 
points for Havemann, Biermann and Heym it was the 1968 East 
bloc crisis over Czechoslovakia which turned Bahro into an 
oppositionist. Indeed, as he indicated repeatedly in the 
late 1970's, the Prague Spring experience fundamentally 
affected his views on Socialism and what was necessary to 
realize it. Accordingly, Bahro's worldview was profoundly 
shaken by the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968. Bahro reacted 
against the intervention believing it has the counter-
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revolutionary effect of diminishing the number of people who 
believed in the possibility of socialist renewal. 16 
From that point onwards Bahro was a determined foe of 
the East German ruling elite. However, he kept his opposi-
tion to it to himself at first. In fact, Bahro took the 
unique course of embarking on several years of theoretical 
study which culminated in his book. 
Once The Alternative was completed Bahro logically 
chose to turn to West German sources for its publication. 
This decision was something the SED leadership would seize 
on and which directly influenced the enactment of the 1979 
law aimed at those who had their works published in West 
Germany. The political ante was raised even higher when 
Bahro agreed to an August 23, 1977 West German television 
interview concerning his book as a means to get his ideas 
across to people on both sides of the border dividing 
Germany. 
Immediately after its broadcast the East German 
Peoples' Police went into action. On August 24th Bahro was 
hit with espionage charges. The following day Neues 
Deutschland reported on the incident noting that the 
security forces of the DDR had arrested another spy for West 
German intelligence. 
The victimization of Bahro gave the DDR's international 
image another black eye. European leftists and Amnesty 
International responded with campaigns in his defence. The 
Eurocommunists rallied to his support with Spain's Santiago 
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Carillo going so far as to call for Bahro's release on West 
German television thereby conveying the message into the 
DDR.17 The far-reaching protests had some effect. Bahro 
was sentenced to eight years in prison but released after 
about a year. He ended up in Wes t Germany where he went on to 
become a prominent member of the West German Greens. 
Despite all the furor the immediate impact of Bahro' s 
ideas on the DDR seems to have been limited mainly to lower 
and middle levels of the SED. Accordingly, a report in Der 
Spiegel at the time claimed the book was being widely read 
by East Berlin SED officials and there was a statement by an 
anonymous East German apparatchik declaring, "Bahro's 
courage has earned him an honourable place in the history of 
the German workers' movement." 18 However, it would be 
several years before it would become apparent that their 
impact on East German dissent and critical thought was 
substantial. 
Bahro's views as expressed in the 1970's were, in any 
event, quite important and very unique in many respects. 
Their significance rests not so much on their comprehen-
siveness as their being predicated on the experiences of 
what Bahro refers to as 'Actually Existing Socialism' in the 
Soviet sphere of influence and of the experience in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 in particular. 
Proceeding with the same outlook and the same objective 
which Marx had in mind when he studied capitalism Bahro 
cri tiques Actually Existing Socialism as another system of 
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oppression and exploitation which is so far removed from 
Communism that another revolution is necessary to set it on 
the road again. Bahro went as far as to state with respect 
to the political apparatus that, "Ours is a state-machine 
the likes of which Marx and Engels wanted the proletarian 
revolution to smash.,,19 
In making this assertion Bahro maintains that the heart 
of the matter lies with the Party. He simultaneously viewed 
it as both the prevalent obstacle to progress towards 
Communism and as the place within the system of Actually 
Existing Socialism where the problem of revolutionary 
potential is bound up. Proof of these things were to be 
found both within the SED and the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia during 1968 especially given the role the 
latter played in the Prague Spring experience. 
Bahro thus viewed the ruling SED as the concentrated 
expression of the fact that the momentum of the October 
Revolution had expired and that we have reached a point on 
the non-capitalist road of industrialization where we can no 
longer advance qualitatively.20 To this conclus ion can be 
counterposed his glowing account of the Czech Party in 1968. 
He portrayed it as the sparkplug of a liberatory process 
maintaining, 
As soon as the Czech Communist Party dropped the 
first slight hint that it was about to resume the 
original emancipatory role of the Communist Party, 
every compass needle of hope in society at once 
began to swing round and point towards it. 21 
Bahro, in effect, sought a process where the Party's 
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stifling grip over East bloc societies would be broken and 
in which a wholesale regeneration of the ruling party would 
begin giving the movement towards Socialism a rush of new 
momentum. In his words, such a development would "create 
the communist movement afresh" and initiate a "Cultural 
Revolution" which would undertake the key task in a revolu-
tionary social transformation, the supercession of the 
division of labour. 2 This meant the movement's goal would 
once again be to realize Marx's concept of a free as-
sociation of producers. 
Furthermore, Bahro was convinced that the forces which 
would be the motor force of this Cultural Revolution were 
alive and active within the system he was critiquing. Bahro 
made this clear in his August 23, 1977 interview in which he 
stated, 
In the countries of Actually Existing Socialism, there 
is a vast amount of what I term 'surplus consciousness' 
psychological energy and capacities which are no 
longer directly linked to the daily work-process and 
the normal working of the apparatus. This means there 
are strong emancipatory forces at work which are not 
organized and cannot therefore be used. 
To this Bahro adds, 
We must practically attempt 
civilization whose horizon we 
overcome, with an alternative, 
zation· 23 
to replace bourgeois 
have not been able to 
another type of civili-
The task of making this Cultural Revolution leading to 
a new civilization would belong to a movement of communist 
opposition formed into a 'League of Communists.' This 
organization would have to be formed across the East bloc 
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and achieve ideological hegemony wi thin it. Accordingly, 
Bahro cautions against any actions which would jeopardize the 
DDR's stability and points his strategic perspective towards 
Moscow. He states, "The case has to be won in Moscow. After 
the Czech experience we have to aim at change coming from 
there."24 Shades of Harich. Once again an SED dissident was 
banking on change within the DDR emanating from the USSR. 
In a somewhat similar vein Bahro never called into ques-
tion the system of rule by a one party state. He felt each 
East European society should find pluralistic expression 
wi thin one Communist Party which in turn would engage in a 
dialogue with the whole of society. In adopting this 
position Bahro sets himself clearly apart from the 
Eurocommunist acceptance of a broader form of political 
pluralism. 
Nonetheless, Bahro saw Eurocommunism as a positive 
phenomenon in the West. He believed it would act as a 
stimulus for real reform in the East and as an obstacle to a 
repetition of actions like the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. 25 Their political differences notwith-
standing, this view alone explains how it was poss ible for 
members of Czechoslovakia's Charter 77 civil rights movement 
to issue a statement in solidarity with Bahro on July 22, 
1978. 
Christa Wolf distinguished herself as the foremost 
female critic of the East German government in the 1960' s 
and 1970' s. Partly due to this she achieved a sort of un-
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declared status as the DDR' s foremost feminist. Wolf is 
also one of the SED's communist critics. She joined the 
Party in 1949 and was briefly a candidate member of ·the 
Central Committee in the 1960's. 
As a literary figure many of her conflicts with the 
DDR's political and cultural establishment naturally co-
incided with Wolf Biermann's. This was especially true in 
December 1965 when she too faced the wrath of Erich Honecker 
concerning cultural trends in the DDR. Christa Wolf's 
'errors' were to desire art which would raise questions 
"which the artist thinks he or she sees, even if he or she 
does not see how they can be solved" and to stress the 
importance of the subjective in the creative process. 26 And 
as noted, her public protest against the forced emigration 
of Biermann brought her expulsion from the Party and the 
Writers' Federation. 
It is small wonder then that Christa Wolf shared Stefan 
Heym's concern about the residue of Stalinism in the DDR. 
In her book A Model Childhood she addresses this problem by 
telling East Germans to come to terms with their history and 
cease pretending that parts of it do not exist. "What is 
past is not dead: it is not even past. We cut ourselves off 
from it: we pretend to be strangers.,,27 By issuing such a 
challenge Christa Wolf was calling upon the DDR to remove 
the skeletons from its closet with everything that such 
action would entail. 
By the 1980' s she was giving voice to her feminist 
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side. Although she is well aware of how substantial strides 
have been made in East Germany towards realizing social equa-
lity between the sexes and of how women in the DDR have the 
same opportunities as men Christa Wolf remained unsatisfied. 
She did not believe the real aspirations of East German women 
had been fully realized. Wolf made this clear in her reac-
tion to the feminist currents which appeared in conjunction 
wi th the rise of the autonomous peace movement. She thus 
said, "For the first time women are demonstrating their 
'otherness' and that they may wonder why they should assume 
roles which have done men such harm over the centuries.,,28 
Thoughts like these set her apart from Havemann and Heym 
but not Bahro who in his critique of 'Actually Existing 
Socialism' argued that in the societies with this system the 
process of women's emancipation had stagnated. Bahro went on 
to outline measures he believed were necessary to overcome 
the sexual division of labour in society.29 
Poet Reiner Kunze also carved out a unique place for 
himself wi thin the DDR' s diss ident milieux of this period. 
Kunze was different from the outset. Unlike those mentioned 
above he was not directly linked to the SED nor is there any 
indication that he shared these critics' initial approval of 
the DDR's system. The course of Kunze's political problems 
was rather different as well. In fact, he first clashed with 
authority in the DDR in a small way while working as a 
teaching assistant in Leipzig. 
30 because he wrote poetry. 
Kunze got in trouble simply 
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As time went on and he continued with his writing Kunze 
inevi tably came up against official censorship. He res-
ponded to these experiences by expressing his frustration 
through his works. Kunze later got into deep trouble for 
having a collection of his poems published in West Germany. 
This action led SED cultural spokesperson Max Schulz to 
attack him as a traitor at the Sixth Writers' Federation 
Congress in May 1969. 31 
Reiner Kunze's conflict with the Party peaked in the 
mid-1970's. In 1976 he had his short volume The Wonderful 
Years published in West Germany. The book, which reflected 
on the impact of East German life and the DDR's educational 
system on the young, drew on the experiences of his daughter 
and focused its criticism on what Kunze saw as the remnants 
of the Pruss ian Spirit in East Germany. The work earned 
this 'critical individualist' the treatment accorded an 
'Enemy of the State.' Kunze and his family were subjected 
to a systematic campaign of intimidation and harassment. It 
lasted until the authorities offered them an exit visa to 
leave the DDR which was accepted. Among the few who raised 
their voices in protest against the State's actions were 
Wolf Biermann and another critical writer, Jurek Becker. 32 
Aside from the official attacks on Kunze what made him 
so important was that portions of his sarcastically titled 
collection The Wonderful Years constituted an anti-
militarist critique of a social order ostensibly dedicated 
to eradicating militarism and achieving peace. The follow-
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ing two passages exemplify this relatively early expression 
of opposition to militarism in the DDR. 
Six-Year-Old 
He is piercing tin soldiers with pins. He drives 
the pins into their stomaches until their points 
come out at the back. He drives pins into their 
backs until they come out of their chests. 
They fall. 
"And why are you doing it to these tin soldiers?" 
"Don't you see? They're not ours." 
Eleven-Year-Old 
"I've been elected into the Group Council", says 
the boy as he thrusts his fork into pieces of ham. 
The man who ordered the meal for him is s ilen t • 
"I am responsible for Socialist Defence Training", 
says the boy. 
"For what?" 
"Socialist Defence Training." He is sucking 
macaroni from his lower lip. 
"And what do you have to do?" 
"I prepare maneuvers and so on."33 
By looking at the experiences and views of Robert 
Havemann, Wolf Biermann and Rudolph Bahro and, to a lesser 
extent, those of Stefan Heym, Christa Wolf and Reiner Kunze 
one can only sense the profound significance of the 1968 
Czech experience for the development of dissent and critical 
thought in the DDR. In particular, it is apparent that the 
fate of these critics and their aspirations were directly 
related to the fate of Dubcek's experiment in Prague. This 
was so because the fate of his experiment decisively 
effected the short term prospects for realizing an East bloc 
society invigorated by broad intellectual freedom and wide 
open public debate. 
It was equally true that the fate of Ulbricht's neo-
Stalinist rule was at stake in Czechoslovakia. This fact 
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underscored the intense hostility of the SED leadership 
towards Dubcek' s Prague Spring. In one respect the SED 
hierarchy saw Dubcek as a threat because the liberalization 
he initiated coincided with Bonn's Ostpolitik. Together 
they raised the spectre of Prague following the example set 
by Bucharest when Romania established formal diplomatic 
relations with Bonn in defiance of the state interests of 
the DDR. 34 In another respect Dubcek was a threat because 
the survival of his experiment could only encourage support 
for a similar 
access East 
course in the DDR especially in view of the 
Germans had to information concerning 
Czechoslovakia from west German television and from the 
holidays many of them take each year in that country. 
Ulbricht's acute sensitivity to the risks to his power 
inherent in the Prague Spring was demonstrated on July 23, 
1968. On that day, just as the official Soviet newspaper 
Isvestia announced an extension of Red Army maneuvers along 
the USSR's wes tern frontier, Ulbricht had a barbed wire 
fence erected on the frontier separating the DDR from 
Czechoslovakia. 35 Ulbricht's determination to see Dubcek's 
experiment hal ted was further demonstrated by the presence 
of the East German National People's Army (NVA) in the 
invas ion force. 
The Warsaw Pact intervention was as welcome to Ulbricht 
as the invasion of Hungary had been in 1956. It brought 
social and economic experimentation throughout the East bloc 
to a temporary halt. I t was also followed by a seemingly 
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reassuring tightening of Moscow's control over the foreign 
policies of all of the member states of the Warsaw Pact with 
the notable exception of Romania. A more self -confident 
Walter Ulbricht could similarly see how his political value 
to Moscow rose much as it had in 1953 and 1956. In 
addition, now that Czechoslovakia was more politically 
suspect, its role in the 'Socialist Camp' would be more 
circumscribed while the DDR's would be expanded as a result. 
Protests against the invasion within the DDR were minor 
and confined to small groups of rebellious East German 
36 youths. In a broader sense, the invasion crushed popular 
hopes for greater cultural freedom and political change. 
Many East Germans who were disillusioned by the abrupt 
termination of the Prague Spring experiment retreated into 
their private lives just as so many would in Czechoslovakia. 
In view of these responses it is not surpris ing that the 
first half of the 1970' s was marked by a distinct lack of 
dissident or independent political activity in the DDR. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE IMPACT OF THE POLISH CRISIS AND SOLIDARNOSC 
The Polish Crisis of the 1980' s would have a far less 
discernible impact on the development of dissent and criti-
cal thought in the DDR than the events in Czechoslovakia in 
1968 did. Still, the repercussions of the Polish Crisis 
were significant and merit attention. The public reactions 
of the East German authorities and the documented reactions 
of ordinary East Germans including members of the working 
class in particular make this clear. 
Animosity towards and expressions of fear concerning 
manifestations of social unrest and political change in 
Poland have been recurrent phenomena within the SED 
hierarchy since 1956. As noted earlier, the Poznan uprising 
inspired both alarm and hardened res istance to reform from 
within the SED leadership while Gomulka's ascent to power in 
October 1956 was clearly understood as an immediate threat 
to Ulbricht's continued rule in the DDR. Similar responses 
were forthcoming in the wake of the mass strikes by Polish 
workers during the winter of 1970-71. These caused 
Gomulka's downfall. The SED leaders interpreted the latter 
events as a warning which meant there could be no weakening 
of Party control and no relaxation in efforts to raise 
living standards, particularly those of industrial workers. 1 
The unrest similarly made East Germany's rulers more 
reluctant to engage in economic experiments even if this 
meant reduced rates of economic growth. 2 
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In one respect the SED leaders have been consistent. 
They have guided their responses to events in Poland with an 
eye toward securing political stability in that country. 
This desire underlay their benevolence under the newly 
assumed leadership of Erich Honecker immediately after the 
1970-71 worker unrest subsided. Specifically, East 
Germany I S leaders gave ordinary Poles ready access to the 
DDR where they could take advantage of its relatively 
abundant supply of consumer goods. Polish consumers seized 
on this generosity to such an extent that their purchases 
caused shortages in the DDR and led to an East German policy 
reversal amidst widespread popular complaints. Soon after-
wards official East German benevolence was replaced by a 
posture of quietly expressed fear and belligerence as Poland 
sank into renewed crisis. Consequently, in the wake of the 
June 1976 Polish strikes and the subsequent flowering of 
unofficial political activity, the SED began to apply 
discreet pressure on the Polish Party to take a tougher 
stance towards dissent. 3 
The SED adopted a somewhat different posture during the 
historic Polish strikes in the summer of 1980. It was one 
of uncertainty and even bewilderment because Honecker and 
his Party apparently did not know quite how to react. This 
uncertainty was reflected in the East German media which 
remained practically silent about the events just across the 
border which were holding the attention of the world. 
Indeed, this official silence was pathetic and absurd since 
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most East Germans could see what was taking place courtesy 
of west German television. 
The Party did not fully articulate its interpretation 
of what was happening in Poland until October 14, 1980. 
This was several weeks after the Gdansk Agreements were 
signed and more than a week after Solidarnosc was legally 
registered as an independent trade union organization. The 
SED's 'line' was laid down by Erich Honecker in a speech in 
Gera. Predictably, his position was tough and fully consis-
tent with the official Soviet view which contained warnings 
about 'counter-revolution I in Poland and the activities of 
'anti-socialist forces financed from abroad'. The SED 
leader also issued a stern warning. 
and remains a socialist country. 
friends, will make sure of that."4 
He stated, "Poland is 
We, together with our 
The actions of the East German government during this 
time revealed the obvious nervousness of its leaders in the 
face of the emergence of Solidarnosc. Whereas Ulbricht had 
waited until a month before the Warsaw Pact's tanks entered 
Prague to put up a barbed wire fence at the border with 
Czechoslovakia, Honecker showed little hesitation in taking 
similar action. Access to and from Poland was severely 
restricted beginning in the autumn of 1980. Furthermore, he 
did not confine his efforts to the border with Poland. Con-
tacts with West Germany were also frustrated. In particu-
lar, the minimum currency exchange required of West German 
visitors to the DDR was suddenly doubled. The DDR even 
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unsuccessfully demanded full recognition of DDR citizenship 
by the government in Bonn as a way to limit contacts between 
citizens of the two Germanies. 5 
Continuing bewilderment co-existed with this growing 
fortress mentality. For example, even as the Polish crisis 
resulted in economic dislocations in the DDR, the East 
German government extended new measures to aid the Polish 
economy and often stated its desire to see Poland sort out 
its own problems. Meanwhile, in the same time period, there 
were still more expressions of belligerence. 
This hostility reached a peak at a December 5, 1980 
emergency meeting of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow where only 
representatives of the Czechoslovak government were as rabid 
in their posture as the DDR's Minister of the Interior, 
Erich Mielke. He unleashed a scathing attack on Solidarnosc 
and the independent press in Poland and left no doubt about 
the DDR government's desire for a crackdown. 6 
Motivated by official fear, news coverage in the East 
German media became increasingly hysterical during 1981. In 
February 1981, for example, DDR radio claimed the leaders of 
Solidarnosc were deliberately provoking chaos and anarchy 
every day in Poland. On another occasion, it went so far as 
to allege that Solidarnosc leaders Zbigniew Bujak and Jan 
Rulewski had Nazi leanings. 
Jaruzelski's imposition of Martial Law on December 13, 
1981 was considered most welcome. East German approval of 
his crackdown was further demonstrated in August 1983 when 
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Erich Honecker became the first Warsaw Pact head of state to 
visit Poland since the summer of 1980. But despite such a 
public expression of approval the leaders of the SED 
continued to feel uneasy about the situation and 
particularly about Solidarnosc's survival as an underground 
organization. Consequently, as late as 1985, they let it be 
known to their Polish counterparts that the Polish Party 
should move to weaken the position of the Catholic Church in 
P 1 d d 1 d th . t . 7 o an an c amp own on e OppOSl lon. 
One can better understand the seemingly contradictory 
and less than consistent course of East German policy 
towards developments in Poland and the Polish Party's 
handling of them if one takes the situation of the DDR's 
workforce into account and recognizes that many East Germans 
felt considerable sympathy with the resistance movement in 
Poland. 
The June 1953 insurrection proved beyond any doubt that 
the DDR's workers are neither inherently passive or obedient. 
Their silence after June 1953 was an involuntary silence 
which the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution 
reinforced. The DDR's subsequent economic achievements 
after August 13, 1961 and their positive impact on workers' 
living standards have made their lives easier since. But 
this East German 'economic miracle' did not spell the end of 
hardships for many of the DDR's workers nor did it do 
anything to alleviate their political powerlessness in 
relation to the SED-dominated state. 
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To this day the needs of East German workers remain 
effectively subordinate to those of the State. This is in 
spite of official claims that real economic co-determination 
exists in the DDR. In fact the prevailing relationship 
between the workers and the State which administers 
virtually the entire East German economy is still remarkably 
similar to the relationship between Labour and Capital in 
the West. The simple fact that East German workers find 
themselves having to work long hours often in disorienting 
multiple shifts amply testifies to their wholly subordinate 
position in the production process. So does the fact that 
they endure this kind of hardship as a result of the State's 
drive for export-oriented production. 8 
The situation of East German workers is made 
considerably worse by their lack of authentic self-
organization. The only organizations available to them are 
the democratic centralist, Party-dominated member unions of 
the Free German Labour Union (FDGB). These are so 
thoroughly integrated into the state apparatus that the head 
of the FDGB is normally a member of the SED Pol i tbureau. 
East German workers acutely realize that they cannot legally 
work to replace these unions or transform them into truly 
representative bodies such as the Czechoslovak unions 
briefly became in the latter half of 1968. Consequently, 
few East German workers take the FDGB unions, to which 
almost all of them belong, seriously.9 
Two examples of worker dissent during the period of 
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Polish Solidarnosc's legal existence exemplify the true 
relationship of the DDR's workers to the FDGB trade unions. 
One involved a warehouse worker in Jena named Roland Jahn 
who went on to become a leading activist in the autonomous 
peace movement. In an interview following his later 
expulsion to the West, Jahn recounted how, 
I was supposed to become the union shop steward at 
work because I always stood up for the rights of my 
fellow workers, but the State intervened and I was 
not allowed to be elected to the post. I then re-
signed from the union and was immediately accused 
of wishing to form an independent union. 10 
The other incident involved a September 1980 strike by 
over 350 East German railworkers in West Berlin. Members of 
the FDGB, these workers were angry at being paid one third 
less than West German railworkers. They also complained that 
because of staff shortages they had to work between 100 and 
120 hours of overtime a month. During their strike they 
occupied railway signal towers only to be forcefully 
dislodged by East German rail police who were armed with axes 
and crowbars and who, in some cases, were accompanied by 
police dogs. The East German Railways administration had 
refused to enter into negotiations with the strikers. What 
support they got came from individual donations and 
collections at other workshops but not from the FDGB. 
In an interview following the job action one of the 
strikers made it clear that he was well aware of the 
successful strikes and workplace occupations which had just 
ended in Poland. Indeed, he envied the support the shipyard 
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workers in Gdansk had received. ll 
Ai though it is true that many East Germans, including 
workers, resented the negative impact of the Polish Crisis on 
the performance of the DDR's economy and the economic 
assistance extended to Poland, many others held entirely 
different views. Reports of strikes in mid-1981 and of 
clashes between police and young demonstrators who supported 
Solidarnosc clearly testified to this. 12 
Roland Jahn provides more evidence. He recalled how 
discussions took place among his workmates in the industrial 
centre of Jena where these workers favourably contrasted 
Solidarnosc with the FDGB. In a more general sense he also 
noted that, 
Most people were sympathetic but expressed 
themselves in different ways. Some happily at home 
watching it all on TV, some would come foreward at 
their own workplace much more confidently. That of 
course brought problems with it. 13 
These examples definitely indicated the existence of at 
least broad moral support for Solidarnosc. Consequently, it 
is no wonder the DDR's ruling elite wanted to see the 
situation in Poland 'normalized'. Likewise , it was logical 
in June 1982, once it was apparent Martial Law had only 
weakened Solidarnosc and forced it underground, for the DDR's 
Council of State to show continued official insecurity by 
calling on elected Party organizations to be more responsive 
to their constituents. The Council of State also repeated an 
earlier call by Honecker for better public relations work by 
these bodies. 14 
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All told it is clear that the Polish Crisis of the 
1980' s served to heighten the constant sense of insecurity 
prevalent within the SED hierarchy. The crisis also attested 
once again to the dilemma posed for the DDR's leaders by the 
daily presence of West German television programming in the 
homes of millions of East Germans. Due to the accessibility 
of information from this source official efforts to blacken 
the independent Polish workers' movement did little to 
diminish the appeal it definitely had for many East German 
workers. Workers in the DDR could plainly see how their 
Polish counterparts had successfully realized forms of 
authentic worker self-organization of a kind which had not 
existed in East Germany since the brief appearance of 
autonomous factory assemblies during the June 1953 
insurrection. 
Overall, the Polish Crisis and the struggles of Poland's 
workers were unique with respect to the development of 
dissent and critical thought in the DDR. They had a definite 
impact on the DDR I S ruling circles and, to a lesser extent, 
within East German civil society. Yet these effects did not 
directly alter the basic development of independent political 
activity in the DDR. Instead, issues and concerns arose to 
take precedence which were not directly linked to the 
workplace. To a certain extent, these issues even placed 
the ir prot agon i s t sat odds wi th the very na ture of modern 
industrial society. Furthermore, the emergence of activism 
focused on them revealed that developments in Western Europe 
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and, especially in west Germany, would exert much more of an 
influence on East German dissent and critical thought than 
events taking place in Poland. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE AUTONOMOUS PEACE MOVEMENT 
In East Germany today the clerics are now talking 
like revolutionaries while the functionaries are 
talking like priests. - Stefan Heym in 1982 1 
Militarism has always been unpopular with large numbers 
of young people in the DDR. This was clear in 1952 when a 
purge swept Eric Honecker's Free German Youth (FDJ) organi-
zations after they managed to recruit only one third of the 
expected quota of 'volunteers' for the DDR' s para-military 
forces. This distaste for the military was just as apparent 
following the formation of the National People's Army (NVA) 
in 1956 and the introduction of conscription six years later 
without any provisions for conscientious objection. Such 
provis ions were officially deemed unnecessary because, 
according to the SED, the DDR was by its very nature a 
'Peace State,.2 
Conscription was a response to the NVA's lack of 
success in recruiting volunteers. I t was also a policy 
which could not have been put into effect until after the 
erection of The Wall due to the SED's fear of accelerating 
the emigration of East German youth to the West and even 
then the introduction of conscription was accompanied by 
legal measures imposing a possible three year prison term 
for non-compliance. 
Yet despite this some 3000 young East German men 
refused to be conscripted during the first year this law was 
in force. What was truly astonishing, however, was the fact 
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that less than a dozen of these draft resisters actually 
went to prison. The SED also feared the potential 
repercussions of the East German 'Peace State' jailing 
thousands of youths for refusing to bear arms. 3 
The introduction of conscription was very significant 
in two other respects as well. In one respect it marked a 
decisive turning point in the process of the militarization 
of a soc iety which, in its infancy, had loudly proclaimed 
its opposition to militarism consistent with its 'anti-
fascist character' . In another, the initiation of 
conscription served as a catalyst for the development of an 
anti-militarist movement in the DDR. This would make issues 
related to peace principal focal points for the expression 
of dissent and critical thought. 
Conscription was met by opposition from two distinct 
but by no means mutually exclusive sources. One of these 
was youth as the number of resisters during the first year 
of conscription demonstrated. The other was the East German 
religious community. This Christian opposition was 
expressed through the East German Protestant Church in 
particular. 
The East German Lutheran Church exemplified such 
opposition early on by asserting that conscription amounted 
to a violation of the East German Constitution's guarantees 
of freedom of belief. Furthermore, in 1963, the Church 
issued a document entitled 'Ten Articles Concerning Peace 
and the Service of the Church' in which it saw itself as 
obliged to 
objectors. 4 
provide 
The Churches 
legal 
began 
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protection for consc ien t ious 
to apply sustained political 
pressure on the SED to change its conscription policy. This 
pressure combined with clear evidence of substantial youth 
opposition to forced military service yielded tangible 
results. On September 7, 1964 the DDR I S conscription law 
was amended not to fulfill the real goal of the Church, a 
civilian al ternative to military service, but to allow for 
the existence of construction brigades in the NVA. 
These military units were called 'Bausoldaten' and 
those who opted to be in them did not have to bear arms. 
However, these construction soldiers remained subject to 
mili tary discipline and military law. Furthermore, if one 
chose to join the Bausoldaten one still faced punitive 
measures. Members of these units were and still are stigma-
tized. It is common for them to be denied access to higher 
education and other career opportunities. 
Initially the number of conscripts who took advantage 
of this alternative form of military service was small. In 
part this was because many young East Germans did not know 
the Bausoldaten option existed. The government did nothing 
to publicize its existence. Nonetheless, word spread and 
during the 1970' s the number of unarmed construction sol-
diers in the NVA steadily increased. 5 
In the meantime, East German society was subjected to a 
process of increasing militarization. A great deal of this 
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was focused on the young. In this same period religious 
opposition to East German militarism continued and the 
political significance of the Bausoldaten grew. 
The FDJ was instrumental to the process of militarizing 
East German society. Utilizing it as well as the Young 
Pioneers and the East German Red Cross, the state expanded 
pre- and para-military training programs for the young in 
the mid-1960's. This entailed the inculcation of values 
designed to create a positive identification with the NVA 
and the USSR. In the latter half of the decade efforts to 
generate enthus iasm among the young for the military were 
stepped up as the FDJ formed 'Recruitment Collectives' which 
were sent into the DDR I S elite senior high schools. 
ever, these efforts were less than successful. 
How-
In 1973 these activities were extended into the general 
poly technical schools. But this measure provoked widespread 
parental and parish opposition. Later, at the start of June 
1978, DDR Education Minister Margot Honecker announced a new 
plan to introduce military education into the ninth and 
tenth grade curriculum. This would affect 15 and 16 year 
olds. The plan was put into effect on September 1, 1978. 
There was no advance consultation with representatives of 
the DDR I s churches even though Erich Honecker and Bishop 
Schonherr had reached their historic accord only six months 
earlier and despite long-standing concerns by the Church 
wi th respect to 6 such matters. Partly due to this Margot 
Honecker's introduction of 'Defence Studies' would evoke far 
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greater protest than the introduction of conscription had in 
1962. 
Three developments would serve to highlight how 
opposition by the Federation of Evangelical Churches or 
Kirchenbund to the increasing militarization of East German 
society was continuing. One was a declaration by the church 
leadership at a 1965 Kirchenbund conference in which it 
evaluated conscientious objection as a Christian witness for 
peace and non-violence. The church leaders declared that in 
a world dominated by the nuclear threat conscientious 
objection out of a Christian witness to peace should have 
priority over military service. The State demanded a with-
drawal of this declaration. The leaders refused but would 
modify their stand a year later to indicate that they were 
not making a judgement either for or against military 
. h 7 serVlce as suc • 
Another initiative came in 1971. The Kirchenbund 
responded to the FDJ's work in the schools in support of the 
NVA with concrete measures of its own. In particular, it 
floated a proposal for a mandatory peace education course 
for the grade schools and then proceeded to found the Church 
Office for Peace Research which became known as the Study 
Group for Peace Questions. The task of its members would be 
to, among other things, convey the results of scientific 
peace research to ecumenical groups. 
A third initiative was still more provocative. The 
Protestant Church facilitated the organization of regular 
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meetings of former and future military resisters. 8 These 
events in combination with the forging of personal bonds 
between members of the Bausoldaten were highly significant. 
They proved to be catalysts for the emergence of the 
autonomous peace movement of the 1980's. In fact, the 
participants in these phenomena made up what amounted to the 
autonomous peace movement in the DDR in its embryonic stage. 
Both observers and the East German activists themselves 
seem to agree on one very important point. Namely, the 
single most important stimulus for the emergence of the 
autonomous peace movement in the DDR as the most significant 
manifestation of social resistance there since June 1953 and 
the most durable to date, was the introduction of Defense 
Studies in the schools by the DDR's Education Minister 
Margot Honecker in 1978. 
The move, which effectively made military preparedness 
a subject in its own right, immediately provoked major 
protests. Both members of the clergy and many parents 
objected that military education for school children would 
contribute to an atmosphere of anxiety, foster a hatred of 
the 'enemy', contradictory to Christian teachings, and 
instill the belief that military action was an acceptable 
behavioral norm for conflict resolution. In particular, the 
Church sent a letter to all of its parishioners stating its 
strong opposition. Furthermore, even before the actual 
introduction of the Defense Studies Decree it had declared 
its willingness to support those parents and guardians whose 
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conscience would not allow them to have their children 
receive this kind of instruction. The Church also countered 
the State's move by setting up a number of loosely co-
ordinated Peace Education initiatives at parish and regional 
levels. 9 
The SED was not impressed by the opposition to the 
decree. It held to the view that military instruction and 
the credibility of its peace policies went hand in hand. It 
further maintained that the stability of the DDR and its 
readiness to defend itself was a contribution to preserving 
and securing peace in Central Europe. lO 
The impact of the immediate reactions to the Defense 
Studies Decree was accentuated by other developments at the 
end of the 1970's. All of these helped to facilitate the 
rise of autonomous peace activism because they made growing 
numbers of East Germans feel more threatened by the arms 
race than ever before and more motivated to do something on 
their own in response. Thus, the militarization of the 
school curricula roughly coincided with the extension of 
civil defense exercises in many cities across the DDR and 
the threat posed to Europe by the approaching Euromiss ile 
deployments. The former practice included the staging of 
blackouts and siren testing. This was also the approximate 
time period in which the West European peace movement began 
its meteoric rise making a strong impression on many East 
Germans, especially the young. 
In addition, since 1977 there had been widening 
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contacts between the East German Kirchenbund and the Dutch 
Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV). The IKV upholds a unila-
teralist stand on the arms race. This is expressed in its 
'self-disarmament model' which envisions the Netherlands 
setting an example for other nations by initiating 
unconditional disarmament measures. 
This type of thinking consequently had an impact in the 
DDR. In November 1981 the Synod of Protestant Churches in 
Saxony passed a resolution calling for unilateral disarma-
ment moves by the Warsaw Pact specifically reducing the 
b f . t t k d S 20 . . 1 11 num er 0 SOVle an s an S- mlSSl es. Similarly, 
just a few months later, young East German peace activists 
could be heard asking, "Shouldn I t we begin with our own 
12 
rockets?" 
In the 1980 I s the interaction between the Kirchenbund 
and the IKV was in large part centred around exchange visits 
during their respective 'Peace Weeks I or Friedensdekaden. 
In East Germany these Peace Weeks also coincided with Peace 
Weeks in the Federal Republic effectively giving them an 
all-German character. 
The first took place in November 1980. It culminated a 
year in which internal discussions about peace assumed great 
importance wi thin the Kirchenbund. The mot to adopted for 
the week I s events was I Make Peace Without Weapons I • A 
special bookmarker bearing these words together with the 
words 'Swords to Ploughshares I and an accompanying emblem 
was produced to serve both as an invitation to the week IS 
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events, as an aid to discussion and meditation and as a 
. 13 
souvenlr. 
The motto 'Make Peace Without Weapons' 
rallying cry for the autonomous peace movement. 
became a 
The 'Swords 
to Ploughshares I emblem became its symbol and a means by 
which those who supported it could identify each other. 
Both illustrated how the Church had, in the context of 
rising peace activism across Europe, served as a midwife for 
autonomous peace activism in the DDR. This, in turn, was a 
direct result of the unique degree of institutional indepen-
dence the Church had secured for itself wi thin East German 
society. 
The I Swords to Ploughshares I symbol also became the 
source of the first major confrontation between the Party, 
supported by the official DDR Peace Council and the FDJ, and 
the burgeoning autonomous peace movement. Literally, thou-
sands of young East Germans had snapped up the cloth badges 
produced by the Church bearing this symbol. Despite the 
fact that the symbol replicated the USSR's memorial statue 
erected outs ide the UN building in New York City the State 
came to regard it as subversive. This was because the 
symbol came to be recognized as the visible trademark of an 
uncontrolled, implicitly political movement which in the 
words of peace activist Roland Jahn, "arose from the 
contradiction between the officially-proclaimed desire for 
peace and social reality, characterized by growing rearma-
ment and the militarization of society."14 
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Consequently, the East German 'Peace State' began to 
crack down on this widely expressed manifestation of 
indigenous pacifism. Part of the official attack was propo-
gandistic. For example, Heinz Hoffmann, the commander of 
the NVA and the DDR I S Defense Minister was suddenly heard 
proclaiming that, "East Germany needs both ploughshares and 
swords. " Meanwhile the 1982 NVA recruiting campaign slogan 
turned out to be "Peace must be defended: peace must be 
armed."lS 
The State's repressive measures constituted a more 
serious problem. Many youths simply had the police or 
school authorities forcefully remove the patch from their 
clothing or belongings. Others were expelled from school or 
briefly jailed. Wearing the symbol in public was officially 
banned in March 1982. The authorities even went so far as 
to amend the law requiring official authorization for all 
printed materials to cover 'cloth emblems'. 
The authorities hostility had an effect. In a move 
clear ly des igned to 
face with regard to 
appease them the Church did an about 
the symbol by calling on young East 
Germans to stop wearing it. This advice was not appreciated 
by many of the young peace activists and their displeasure 
showed a willingness to go further than the Church deemed 
prudent. 
By this point 
exemplified why the 
Ploughshares symbol 
in time four things had occurred which 
State had come to view the Swords to 
as subvers i ve . One involved the now 
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long-standing Church demand for a fully civilian alternative 
to conscription. Specifically, a campaign to realize this 
goal was launched in May 1981 by groups of youths in 
Dresden. It centred around a petition campaign directed at 
both the Church and the Volkskammer. In relatively little 
time the petition attracted the signatures of over 6000 
young people. The exact demand was for the right to perform 
work in hospitals or other public health facilities. This 
The option was in West Germany. 
petitioners 
already 
further 
available 
contended that "those undertaking 
I Social Service for Peace' should enjoy the same rights as 
those undertaking military service" and that, "those 
undertaking Social Service for Peace shall receive regular 
political instruction, with particular emphasis on: 
maintaining peace, disarmament and non-violent resolution of 
conflict. 1 16 
Christians in large numbers from across the DDR came 
out in support of the proposal made by the youth and urged 
the Church to lend its direct support. By late November 
1981 all of the DDR's Evangelical regions had responded 
affirmatively by welcoming the initiative. Consequently, 
the issue of the civilian alternative to military service 
rose to become the primary focus of autonomous peace 
activity at the time and it remains a foremost priority to 
this day. 
Being consistent, the SED was not favourably impressed 
by the depth of support for this demand either. The Party 
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responded by flatly rejecting it. Werner Walde, a candidate 
member of the Party's Politbureau, firmly set out the SED's 
position by rejecting the concept of social peace service as 
"anti-peace, anti-socialist and anti-constitutional." Walde 
further warned that those who pursued this demand risked the 
danger of confrontation with the state authorities. 17 
A second development highlighted the close relationship 
between the rising tide of autonomous peace activism and the 
aspirations of leading members of Eas t Germany's cr i tical 
intelligentsia who had risen to prominence during the 1960 l s 
and 1970' s. It occurred December 13-14, 1981. The event 
was the SED-sanctioned Berlin Writers' Gathering held in the 
Grand Hall of the Hotel Stadt Berlin. The meeting uninten-
tionally turned out to be a forum for political critics on 
both sides of the Berlin Wall. 
The event was also referred to as 'The Berlin Meeting 
for the Promotion of Peace'. Yet the proceedings revealed a 
sharp split over the question of how exactly the cause of 
peace should be promoted. A majority of those present were 
unwavering adherents to the official East German line on 
such matters. But many of the others clearly were not. As 
a result, when the question of whether independent initia-
tives for peace in the DDR were worthy of support or not was 
broached the latter group clashed with those who upheld the 
SED's line. 
Stefan Heym was present. He was predictably very 
outspoken in this regard. Among other things Heym called 
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for a joint demonstration by both East and West Germans 
against nuclear weapons. He proposed holding the event in 
East Berlin's Alexanderplatz and even suggested that Erich 
Honecker participate. Ever the heretic, Heym also took on 
the Party by openly condemning the planned Cruise and 
Pershing 2 missile deployments in Western Europe and the 
presence of Soviet 55-20 missiles in Eastern Europe. Else-
where, another critical writer from the DDR, Gunter de 
Buryn, spoke out in favour of the demand for a social peace 
. 18 
serVlce. 
Statements of this sort from the likes of Stefan Heym 
undoubtedly accentuated official East German anxiety over 
and suspicion towards the rapid spread of autonomous peace 
initiatives in the DDR. Regardless, just weeks later a more 
stunning example of continuity between the intellectual 
dissent of the 1960' sand 1970' s and the autonomous peace 
movement appeared. It took the form of a document entitled 
'What Leads to Peace?'. The tract subsequently became 
commonly known as 'The Berlin Appeal'. 
The Berlin Appeal effectively amounted to a manifesto 
for the autonomous peace movement. One of its two authors 
was none other than Robert Havemann. This was not sur-
prising because the final two years of Havemann's life were 
marked by work focused on what he correctly recognized as a 
growing German peace movement active both in the Federal 
Republic and in the DDR. Havemann, who had been a founder 
of the official DDR Peace Council, was accordingly pleased 
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to see the new peace activism in East Germany. He felt, "a 
free peace movement in the DDR will provide a strong 
international impulse to help the forces of peace to 
victory and save us all from annihilation. ,,19 
The other author of the Berlin Appeal was a defiant 
young Protestant Pastor and a former member of the 
Bausoldaten, Rainer Epplemann. Pastor Epplemann had clearly 
placed himself at the forefront of the autonomous peace 
movement by the time of the release of the Berlin Appeal on 
January 25, 1982. He did this by staging uBlues Services' 
in his East Berlin church. These happenings were, according 
to Havemann, instrumental to the growth of the autonomous 
peace movement. They were as much cultural events with 
anti-mili tarist political overtones as they were religious 
services. The State branded them 'political cabarets.' 
In any event Rainer Epplemann' s Blues Services were 
immensely popular with young East Germans including many who 
were not even religious. At times the turnout was so large 
the crowds had to be accommodated in as many as four shifts. 
This popularity was in large part a direct result of their 
offering 'space' where the young people in attendance could 
openly express without fear their desire for peace and 
opposition to militarism. 
Epplemann also extended his work for peace into his 
more conventional services. At these garbage cans were 
placed before the alter. This enabled his parishioners to 
dump their children's war toys "where they belong. u20 
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Whereas Havemann evoked the wrath of the State for his 
political defiance, Rainer Epplemann managed to provoke both 
the hostility of the State and the disdain of the Church 
hierarchy. The latter considered him politically 
provocative and was at pains to distance itself from 
Epplemann. Recognizing this, the SED tried without success 
to get the Church hierarchy to stifle him. Subsequently, in 
February 1982, the State took action on its own by arresting 
Epplemann for allegedly 'de-dignifying public authorities.' 
The SED leadership showed just how seriously it took 
the defiant pastor when Erich Honecker sent telegrams to 
other leading DDR officials informing them of the arrest 
before they learned of it from non-official sources meaning 
West German television. The action by Honecker was without 
precedent in the history of the DDR.21 
The Church reacted to the arrest by intervening to 
obtain Epplemann' s release. As a result, he was let go 
after only two days. 
making him a martyr. 
In all probability the SED feared 
Holding him in prison was also prob-
lematic because it would have revealed the hypocrisy of the 
Party I s ceaseless praise for actions like Epplemann I s by 
peace activists in the West. 
Although the Church acted to obtain the pastor's 
release it was far from supportive of the Berlin Appeal 
which he had co-authored. The contrast was symptomatic of 
the developing rift between the church hierarchy and the 
autonomous peace movement. This separation had also become 
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quite apparent with the furor over the Swords to Plough-
shares patch. 
The leaders of the Church reacted very critically to 
the contents of the Berlin Appeal and openly opposed people 
attaching their signatures to it. According to them, the 
Appeal provided "a dis torted picture of those in political 
responsibility." The church leaders further argued against 
the positions set out in the Berlin Appeal maintaining that 
the document needed to consider the existing "political and 
military constellation with more precision." 
Both the text of the Berlin Appeal and its impact more 
than sufficiently explain why the church hierarchy made 
these criticisms and why a rift was developing between the 
autonomous peace movement and the leaders of the very 
institution which had been instrumental to the movement I s 
emergence. 
The Berlin Appeal in part repeated the foremost objec-
tive of the West European peace movement as it was expressed 
in the 1980 Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament or END 
Appeal initiated by the Bertrand Russell Foundation. It 
called for the realization of a Europe free of nuclear 
weapons. The Berlin Appeal linked this call to demands 
which effectively re-opened the German Question. In parti-
cular, the Berlin Appeal proposed negotiations between the 
two German states about the removal of all nuclear weapons 
from Germany. It went on to address the division of Germany 
by calling for "the former allies to withdraw their 
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occupation troops from Germany and come to an agreement on 
guarantees of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
22 the two German states." 
Proposals like these were political dynamite in the 
DDR. They challenged the official claim that there were now 
two German nations not one: they implicitly questioned the 
very existence of the East German state and they directly 
challenged the DDR' s relat ionship with the USSR. It is no 
wonder the Church hierarchy was unenthusiastic about 
Epplemann and his views. It was widely believed, and 
logically so, that Havemann was mainly respons ible for the 
document's focus on the German Question. Only months before 
he had written an open letter to Leonid Brezhnev. This 
document, which became known as 'The Havemann Initiative,' 
covered the same political terrain. It similarly called for 
the removal of all foreign troops and nuclear weapons from 
Germany and went on to raise the possibility of German re-
unification outside the two military blocs. 23 
Significantly, Havemann's 1981 letter attracted the 
signatures of over 200 DDR citizens. It was also circulated 
in West Germany where more than 20,000 people signed it most 
of whom were active in the peace movement. 
The influence of Rainer Epplemann was more evident 
elsewhere in the Berlin Appeal. Consequently, much of the 
remainder of the text focused on what were the clear 
priority issues for the autonomous peace movement at the 
time. Specifically, the appeal took the increasing 
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militarization of East German society to task by citing the 
production, sale and import of war toys and the widespread 
use of civil defense exercises. The document also repeated 
the call for a Soc ial Peace Service and advocated "a great 
debate about questions of peace to be conducted in an 
atmosphere of tolerance and recognition of the right to free 
expression." The text went on to state, "every spontaneous 
manifestation of the desire for peace should be approved and 
24 
encouraged." 
Once again the focus of concern was on the contra-
diction between official words and official deeds which 
Roland Jahn has cited as the autonomous peace movement's 
reason for existence. What is more, the demand for peace 
was, for all practical purposes, implicitly placing the 
issue of human rights on the agenda for social and political 
change in the DDR. This constituted yet another reason why 
the Berlin Appeal was problematic for the hierarchy govern-
ing 'The Church within Socialism.' It had simply gone well 
beyond the limits which leaders of the Church felt they 
could go. 
Rainer Epplemann no doubt appreciated that the 
hierarchy was placed in an awkward situation. But he was 
unmoved. The defiant Protestant Pastor illustrated this 
when he remarked that the Church has "a disastrously timid 
mentality when it comes to relations with the State." 25 
This indicated that there was also a division between the 
church hierarchy and some of its lower clergy with respect 
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to dealing with the authorities. 
If the text of the Berlin Appeal was enough to develop 
a rift between the church leadership and the autonomous 
peace movement the same was at least as true concerning its 
political consequences. Epplemann's arrest was only one 
also other incidences of repres-consequence. There were 
sion. Thus, the first seventy persons to respond to its 
appeal for signatures were subjected to police harassment. 
Despite this only seven signatories withdrew their names. 
Subsequently, many others stepped forward to sign. 
tually over 2000 East Germans signed the appeal. 
Even-
The Berlin Appeal, like the Havemann Initiative, was 
circulated in the West where it received the endorsement of 
many West European peace activists revealing for a second 
time a new and disturbing phenomenon for the DDR's leaders. 
This was the formation of links between independent peace 
activists in both parts of Europe and in East and West 
Germany in particular. This innovation would be very sig-
nificant for the development of dissent and critical thought 
in East Germany in the 1980's. 
Given phenomena like these the Church was forced to 
disassociate itself from the appeal. To fail to, would risk 
being linked to a major expression of popular political 
protest in the DDR. Furthermore, this was a protest that 
focused on the German Question and came to involve clear 
links to protest activity outside East Germany. This, in 
turn, risked allegations of complicity with externally 
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inspired subversive activity directed against the DDR. 
Moreover, the Berlin Appeal articulated the concerns of 
a potentially irrunense social movement in the DDR. This 
became clear on February 13, 1982 when the 'Dresden Forum' 
revealed to the world the existence of a very significant 
autonomous peace movement in East Germany. 
Every year on February 13th the DDR's official Peace 
Council, which strictly adheres to the political line of the 
SED, stages a large outdoor ceremony in Dresden corrunemorat-
ing the anniversary of the city's destruction during the 
war. But in 1982 two events were planned to mark the 
anniversary instead of one. 
Months in advance, a group of young East Germans 
circulated a leaflet calling for an unofficial march to be 
held the same day as the official ceremony. The leaflet was 
circulated widely across the DDR. This was apparent when 
some 5000 youths converged on Dresden from all parts of East 
Germany despite police attempts to suppress the advance 
publicity and the deliberate disruption of train service to 
keep people away. 
The authorities panicked in response to the huge 
turnout. Seeing this reaction and fearing a major confron-
tation the Church assumed a mediating role. It intervened 
by hastily making Dresden's Church of the Cross available as 
the site for a 'Peace Forum' believing this would bring the 
arriving demonstrators off the streets. 26 
The Dresden Forum turned out to be a spectacular peace 
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event, bearing remarkable similarities to peace actions in 
the west. The trappings of the Western counter-culture were 
evident throughout the church as were Swords to Ploughshares 
patches. The forum's slogan was the motto 'Make Peace 
Without Weapons.' 
expressed. 
Unilateralist sentiments were widely 
Two topics received the most attention. One, was the 
persecution of people either at work or at school for 
wearing the Swords to Ploughshares patch or emblem. The 
other, was the Berlin Appeal. Indeed, interest in the 
appeal was pervasive among the roughly 5000 participants in 
the Dresden Forum and support for Rainer Epplemann was 
overwhelming. Consequently, when Protestant Church 
President Kurt Domsch spoke to the crowd and referred to the 
Church's disagreements with the Berlin Appeal he faced 
whistles and boos. The young audience wanted to have the 
text of the appeal read out but the church authorities 
present did not meet their demand. 
Later, at 10:15 pm the exact moment the allied 
bombing had begun 37 years earlier some 3000 of those 
present abruptly rose and proceeded to stage a candlelight 
demonstration through the streets. The marchers sang, "We 
Shall Overcome." The police did not intervene to stop them. 
Nonetheless, 80 participants were questioned by the police 
the next day. Of the ones questioned three turned out to be 
the children of SED officials. 27 
News of the Dresden Forum and the unofficial 
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demonstration spread across the DDR due in large part to the 
accessibility of West German television in most of the 
country. Western news services gave the events inter-
national coverage. The resulting impact in the DDR was so 
profound that the FDJ congress which was held just ten days 
later countered the slogan of the Dresden Forum with the 
slogan 'Peace Must Be Armed.' 
The contrast between the official line on peace and 
that of the autonomous peace movement could not have been 
made more clear than it was by the FDJ. In this context, 
neither reconciliation nor even the kind of short-lived 
tolerance which marked the relationship between the official 
and unofficial peace movements in Hungary during 1982-83 was 
conceivable. This was the case, despite the frequent 
insistence by activists in the autonomous peace movement 
that they did not disagree with the stated goals of the 
official DDR Peace Council. 
There is no question that the Berlin Appeal articulated 
the sentiments of a great many East Germans. It also 
facili tated an increased polarization between this segment 
of civil society and the State. More precisely, the Berlin 
Appeal and the movement associated with it comprised signs 
f . dl d . .. t f . t . 28 o a rapl y sprea lng splrl 0 OppOSl lone The proli-
feration of autonomous peace actions in the wake of the 
Dresden Forum would provide unequivocal proof of this. In 
addition, the wide range of societal concerns which would 
find expression in the process would show that the autono-
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mous peace movement, like Poland's Solidarnosc, was 
implicitly revolutionary in character. Just as Solidarnosc 
could never have been s imply a trade union the Eas t German 
autonomous peace movement could not help but become a focus 
for much more than strictly peace issues. It was an opening 
through which civil society could assert itself against the 
all-pervasive state apparatus. Perhaps no one in the DDR in 
1982 understood this more acutely than the leaders of the 
SED. It is their hold on power which such a movement calls 
into question in a very fundamental way. 
A great deal of activity followed soon after the 
Dresden Forum. In June an estimated 3500 people took part 
in an unofficial peace action in Potsdam and some 10, 000 
teenagers attended a peace-oriented religious festival in 
Eisenach. At the Eisenach festival East German Bishop Forck 
and other clerics contradicted the Church's earlier stand on 
the Swords to Ploughshares patch by declaring that the 
Church would continue to use the forbidden patch despite the 
state-imposed ban on it. 
Elsewhere, an action in Werdau focused on the regular 
civil defense exercises. During one of these some local 
residents refused to black out their windows with paper as 
required. 
29 peace. 
Instead, they put up cutouts of Picasso's dove of 
Legislation passed on March 25, 1982 known as the 
Mili tary Service Law sparked one of the most significant 
manifestations of popular protest in the history of the DDR. 
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The law was designed to empower the State to conscript any 
women between the ages of 18 and 50 for unarmed military 
service in the event of war. Its effect was to give birth 
to an autonomous women's peace movement and to place the 
emancipation of women on the agenda of much of the autono-
mous peace movement radicalizing it in the process. 
The focal point of this protest was a lengthy open 
letter to SED First Secretary Honecker from women opposed to 
the Military Service Law. The letter appeared in October 
1982 and soon after was published in a West Berlin leftist 
daily Tagezeitung. Its contents expressed a fusion of 
feminism with anti-militarism as the following excerpt indi-
cates. 
We women want to break the circle of violence and 
refuse our participation in all forms of violence 
as a means of solving conflicts. We women con-
sider army service for women not as an expression 
of equality but in contradiction to our being 
female. For us, equality with men does not mean 
standing alongside men who take up arms, but to be 
with those who have realized like us that abstrac-
tions such as 'enemy' and' opponent' really mean 
the extermination of human life, which we reject. 
For their demands, the women called for a public debate 
of the law before its enactment and specifically asked 
Honecker "to give us the opportunity for an open dialogue." 
The women also demanded "a legal right to conscientious 
objection."30 
Initially the women's letter had 150 signatures. This 
number subsequently grew to several hundred despite police 
repression and efforts to trivialize the protest. Some of 
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the women were taken in for questioning and subjected to 
threats. In one instance, a signatory's husband was called 
in and told to keep his wife under control. 31 Officially, 
there was silence in response to the letter for quite some 
time. This lack of a reply later moved one of the women to 
comment that, 
Temporary arrests have been the only reaction. 
Apparently the men need so many weapons because 
they have no courage. No courage to speak to us, 
no courage to explain their policies, to confront 
our questions. But we want to talk about it, and 
with them, too. For we are the victims of their 
policies' 32 
In an interview, one of the women, Katja Havemann, 
stated that the open letter "found a large echo among DDR 
women. " Indeed, the letter was a catalyst. Women in many 
parts of the DDR came together to discuss the effects of the 
conscription law. Some formed women's circles. For many, 
this was the first time they had met in a women-only-group 
and found the space to discuss their own self-image and 
their perception of their role in East German society. In 
the process their perspectives widened. One of the result-
ing aims of the women was to assist the wives and children 
of men who were in prison for refusing conscription. Some 
of the women asked women from the British-based European 
Nuclear Disarmament (END) campaign to send express ions of 
34 
solidarity to the women demonstrating at Greenham Common. 
The open letter and the activity which developed around 
it were just the beginning for an emerging women's peace 
movement in the DDR. It was a phenomenon distinct, but by 
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no means separate from the autonomous peace movement as a 
whole. 
This was apparent in the specifically women's actions 
initiated during 1983. The largest women's event occurred 
on September 19th, in an East Berlin Church. The 'Women for 
Peace Day' attracted some 4000 participants although many 
were linked to the official peace organizations and these 
people expressed views consistent with the SED's line on 
peace. 
Other, 
character. 
smaller events were strictly unofficial in 
One, in early September, consisted of an 
unsuccessful attempt to form a human chain linking the U.S. 
and Soviet embassies. Another, on October 16, saw about 
three dozen women dressed from head to foot in black, hand 
in statements of non-compliance with the Military Service 
Law at the main post office on Berlin's Alexanderplatz. 35 
Both actions were initiatives by "Frauen fur den 
Freiden' or Women For Peace, a grouping based in East 
Berlin. Highly activist in character, this feminist peace 
organization focused much of its early work on seeking con-
scientious objector status for women and on opposing the 
growth of militarism in East German society. The group also 
demonstrated a strong interest in the relationship between 
the arms race and Third World hunger and sought links with 
the Western peace movement whose opposition to Cruise and 
Pershing 2 missile deployments it shared. 
One of the most outspoken activists in Women For Peace 
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has been Barbel Bohley, a lecturer in Eas t German women's 
literature who developed a revulsion against war as a result 
of her experiences amidst the devastation in Germany im-
mediately following the war. Another prominent activist in 
the group is her friend Ulrike Poppe. 
The prominence of these women did not escape the 
attention of the East German authorities who had them 
arrested on December 12, 1983. 
"treasonous divulging of information." 
The charge laid was 
The possible penalty 
for this alleged crime was twelve years imprisonment. 
The state's action was a direct result of Poppe and 
Bohley's contacts with west European peace activists, 
including members of the West German Green Party who have 
regularly brought peace literature into the DDR,for use by 
the autonomous peace movement. All of this indicated that 
the types of repressive measures initiated in the 1970's, 
were still very much in effect, as well as the determination 
of the authorities to thwart unofficial contracts with 
western activists. 
The State's repression was not limited to these 
charges. It also moved to shut down an independent day-care 
centre operated by Ulrike Poppe and other members of Women 
For Peace. These women had set up this facility as an 
alternative to the state-run day-care centres and the public 
schools where children are strongly encouraged to play with 
war toys. 
To the surprise of the SED the arrest of Ulrike Poppe 
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and Barbel Bohley provoked international protests. These 
included a large protest demonstration at a West Berlin 
meeting of the pro-Soviet World Peace Council. Besides 
this, a letter of concern was sent to Erich Honecker by a 
dozen organizations present at the International Peace Co-
ordinating Conference held in Stockholm in January 1984. 36 
Due to actions like these both women were suddenly released 
and all charges were dropped in February 1984. 
The arrest and subsequent release of these two feminist 
peace activists were not exceptional events. They were 
indicative of a pattern evident throughout 1983 of increas-
ing repression directed against the peace movement. This 
assault was only constrained by the solidarity actions 
organized by the western peace movement. Developments in 
two principal centres of autonomous peace activism high-
lighted this trend and posed a key dilemma for the move-
ment's activists, one which has a maj or bearing on the 
possibilities for independent political activity in general. 
One of these activist centres was Jena where what amounted 
to a wave of repression aimed at crushing autonomous peace 
activism there began on Christmas Eve in 1982. 
Jena was a natural place for autonomous peace activism 
to flourish. It had a reputation as an intellectual centre 
with a very active network of counter-cultural groups, loose 
circles of avant-garde artists, Evangelical peace groups and 
young people who find themselves outside the official 
framework of both Party and Church institutions. 37 
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Two weeks prior to Christmas local activists from the 
Jena Peace Community decided they wanted to do something 
publicly to demonstrate their desire for a "real peace with-
out weapons." They made plans to gather in Jena's Central 
Square near the Church of Peace to observe a minute's 
silence. Publicity for this action was simply by word of 
mouth. 
When the authorities learned of these plans they 
panicked. In doing so they once again revealed their 
chronic sense of insecurity. Furthermore, they had even 
begun to envision the planned action turning into "a 
national demonstration with church leaders taking part." As 
a result of this official paranoia Jena peace activists were 
interrogated in the days leading up to the planned moment of 
silence. People were warned to stay out of the city centre 
on Christmas Eve. Factory meetings were even held where 
workers were warned against engaging in subversive activi-
t . 38 leSe 
On December 24th the security apparatus was mobilized 
en masse. The authorities went so far as to place the para-
military Working Class Combat Groups on alert for 'a major 
action against the class enemy.' 39 Yet, in spite of a huge 
police operation on the 24th approximately 200 people 
managed to evade the police and gather in the square. Once 
there they were surrounded by the police and photographed 
continuously while observing the minute of silence. Four-
teen of those who took part were later arrested. Two of 
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these people got three year prison terms. 
Protests by many West European peace activists, 
including Petra Kelly of the Greens, followed in response. 
The names of the fourteen peace prisoners became known 
across Europe much to the displeasure of the East German 
government which would not even acknowledge that anyone had 
been arrested. Here again, pressure worked. Not only were 
all fourteen released in February 1983 but they were also 
reinstated in their places of work. 
Very significantly, there had not been any protests on 
behalf of the Jena 14 from the local church. This silence 
incensed peace activists in the city. Eighteen activists 
expressed their indignation in a letter to the Church which 
in part stated, 
guilt. Already 
"There is a border beyond which silence is 
in recent German history Christians were 
confronted by this painful choice." The letter was new 
testimony to the serious differences now apparent between 
the autonomous peace movement and the Church. 
Jena's Peace Community, consisting of an estimated 200 
activists, would face much more damaging repression a few 
short months later. Despite the State's hasty retreat under 
pressure in February and a letter to Erich Honecker protest-
ing local police repression signed by many of Jena's 
activists, a process of 'decapitation' began. This involved 
the expulsion to West Germany of nearly the entire activist 
core of the Jena Peace Community. 
The most famous expulsion involved one of the Jena 14, 
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Roland Jahn, who after being roughed up by the police was 
locked into the last compartment of a train to west Germany. 
The date of his involuntary arrival was June 7, 1983. In 
addition, 
men, women 
in the three weeks prior to that date twenty-two 
and children from Jena had also been expelled. 40 
The effect of these actions seriously impaired the movement 
in Jena. However, later reports of leaf letting by those 
activists who remained, indicate that the authorities did 
not succeed in crushing it. 
The city of Weimar was another focal point of the 
State I s onslaught against the autonomous peace movement in 
1983. The appearance of provocative peace and other 
political slogans spraypainted on the city I s walls late in 
the year served as a welcome excuse to smash ongoing peace 
and environmental activities not sanctioned by the Party. 
The slogans included "SS-20's, No Thanks," "Long Live 
Solidarnosc" and "Make Pickle Salad Out of the State." In 
the repression which ensued six local peace activists 
received prison sentences of up to eight months. 41 
The events in Weimar and Jena posed a key strategic 
dilemma for the movement concerning the limits to official 
tolerance of autonomous peace activism. They showed above 
all else that activity which goes outside the protective 
confines of the one independent institution in the DDR, the 
Church, is destined to provoke naked state repression. This 
repression, in turn, could only be constrained or alleviated 
by intervention from the Church, which was now less likely, 
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or by overt protests from supportive peace activists in the 
West, i.e. sections of the Greens or members of END. 
The situation in Jena epitomized all of this. It was 
there where the most intense repression had occurred and 
this was not by coincidence. The Jena Peace Community had 
constituted a particular irritant with its bold public 
initiatives which, worse still, attracted media coverage in 
the west. 42 The State no doubt was also well aware of the 
Church's reluctance to be associated with the activists in 
Jena. Both factors served to make them a primary target for 
repression. 
But at the same time if the Jena activists had shown 
more restraint and were careful to stay within those limits 
which the Church would accept they risked being ineffectual 
and completely marginalized. Roland Jahn keenly appreciated 
this danger. Consequently, even after his expulsion he 
remained emphatic that the Jena Peace Community was right to 
engage in street actions even if they led to arrests. Jahn 
maintained that such activities were effective because the 
43 
whole town would know they had taken place. 
In effect, these activists were confronted with a tough 
choice. They could engage in what were, in the context of 
the DDR, spectacular actions and be very effective or they 
could adopt a safer, more cautious approach and almost 
certainly effect much less of an impact. 
Probably at no time was this dilemma more acutely 
apparent than when, 
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On October 24 the official news agency ADN 
announced that preparations had begun for the 
deployment of 'operative-tactical missile com-
plexes' on the territory of the DDR in response to 
the imminent arrival of Cruise and Pershing 2 
missiles in Western Europe. 44 
wi th this announcement the DDR I S peace movement was 
confronted with an issue not at all unlike the ones which 
had motivated millions of West Europeans to take to streets. 
But it was also an issue which touched on the fundamental 
aspects of the DDR's relationship with the Soviet Union and 
as such it constituted a potential minefield. 
The dilemma was heightened by unmistakable evidence of 
silent but massive East German opposition to the deployment 
of these medium-range Soviet missiles on the DDR IS terri-
tory. For example, even before the official announcement 
was made a national Synod of the Protestant Churches held in 
September stated its opposition to the deployment of any 
missiles in East Germany. This stand was repeated several 
weeks later by the Synod of the Mecklenburg District Church. 
Elsewhere, the SED ini tia ted a petition campaign in the 
factories supporting the deployments and declaring a readi-
ness to work an extra day a month to help pay for the new 
weapons. Refusal to sign was so widespread the SED aban-
doned circulating the petitions. 45 
Non-support was even apparent at the official level. 
Letters opposing the deployments were allowed into the 
official press. Honecker's public pronouncements also 
seemed to reflect the widespread apprehension when he stated 
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that the decision to deploy the missiles "produces no 
. .. . E t G "46 re]Olc1ng 1n as ermany. 
The escalation of repressive actions against the 
autonomous peace movement was without question the main 
reason why expressions of opposition turned out to be 
relatively few in number despite this strong anti-missile 
sentiment. Nonetheless, the manifestations of opposition 
which did occur were varied in nature and still very 
significant. One was the appearance of the anti-SS-20 
slogans in he streets of Weimar. Another, 'The Rostock 
Appeal,' took the form of a petition signed by over 100 
people. It was issued on November 11, 1983. Proclaiming 
that, "There is too much at stake for us to leave the 
decision over life and death to the politicians and military 
people alone.", the appeal vigorously protested the deploy-
ment decision. Those who signed also stated their agreement 
with the stand of the Church on the issue and demanded of 
the DDR' s National Defence Council "an immediate annulment 
of the decision made."47 
The most important public response did not come until a 
full year later. It was a joint, open letter signed by 
thirteen East German peace activists and sixteen civil 
rights activists from Czechoslovakia who were associated 
wi th Charter 77. New Soviet missiles had been deployed on 
Czechoslovakia I S terri tory simultaneously with the deploy-
ments in the DDR. Among the thirteen East German signa-
tories were Ulrike Poppe and Barbel Bohley. 
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This unprecedented and historic declaration of protest 
was issued simultaneously in Prague and East Berlin. It 
opened by saying, 
It is now a year since in both our countries 
new Soviet missiles were deployed. This step was 
alleged to contribute to balancing the nuclear 
strength of both superpowers. The official justi-
fication maintained that peace had thus been 
strengthened. In reality, peace was even more 
endangered and the arms race continues. 
The joint declaration went on to state, 
We therefore protest anew against the siting and 
extens ion of nuclear complexes on our territory. 
We are thus in solidarity with the peace movements 
in the West which, in their own countries, protest 
against militarism and nuclear armament. 
The signatories concluded by calling on "independent 
peace movements to join this declaration."48 Astonishingly, 
there is no evidence of significant East German police 
action having been taken in response. Furthermore, four of 
the women who signed this declaration went on to sign 
another open letter dated March 8, 1985. The latter docu-
ment was also signed by women peace activists from 
Czechoslovakia, Italy, West Germany and Britain. All of 
these countries were the locations for recently deployed 
medium-range nuclear missiles. The letter itself was 
explicitly feminist in content and politically non-aligned, 
meaning it expressed loyal ty towards neither s ide in the 
East-West confrontation. Its title was "For Detente from 
49 Below, for the Denuclearization of Europe. I 
The fact that those who signed the women I s statement 
and the j oint Czechoslovak-East German letter escaped any 
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significant repression as a result indicates that the 
apparent caution shown by the autonomous peace movement in 
response to the announced deployments was a misjudgement. 
More numerous and pronounced protests were probably 
possible. This seems particularly so given both the depth 
of anti-missile sentiment within the DDR and the 
government's defensiveness as reflected in Honecker's state-
mente Furthermore, had there been repression massive 
protests from Western peace activists would certainly have 
followed. The open support of British, Italian and West 
German peace activists for the women I s letter alone makes 
this absolutely clear. I t also indicates how their colla-
boration expanded the political space available to their 
counterparts in the DDR. 
The women's letter appeared shortly before the 4th 
convention of the European Nuclear Disarmament campaign. It 
took place July 3-6, 1985 in Amsterdam. The event marked a 
watershed in the development of an increasingly supportive 
and close relationship between most of the principal organi-
zations of the West European peace movement and the 
independent movements for peace and civil rights in the East 
bloc. The DDR's independent peace activists have 
consistently expressed a strong identification with this 
process based principally on dialogue and expressions of 
mutual support on numerous issues related to the achievement 
of a durable peace in Europe. 
The process is commonly referred to as I Detente From 
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Below' or 'People's Detente.' Spokespersons for the offi-
cial East bloc peace organizations are intensely hostile 
towards it. Their hostility reflects an unmistakable fear 
on the part of East bloc governments, including the DDR's, 
concerning the potential domestic consequences of this 
process. 
There is abundant evidence indicating the importance of 
this phenomenon to the development of dissent and critical 
thought in the DDR. In a sense one can trace its signifi-
cance back to the western protests against the persecution 
of Bahro and Biermann. This can be said to be the case 
since their ideas and actions were objectively ground-
breaking for the autonomous peace movement. Regardless, the 
process was clearly evident at the Berlin Writers Gathering 
where critical writers from both German states spoke out on 
peace issues and where support for autonomous peace activism 
was expressed in a highly public manner by persons from each 
of the two German states. 
Subsequently, the convergence process was exemplified 
by the western support given to the Havemann Initiative and 
the Berlin Appeal. The same was true of the protests in 
defense of the jailed activists in Jena, in the case of 
Poppe and Bohley as well as with respect to the March 8, 
1985 open letter. 
It is especially significant that this phenomenon has 
reached directly into the public places of East German 
cities as well as into the churches and homes of the autono-
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mous peace activists. In this respect supportive west 
German Greens and the END have played a particularly notable 
role. 
In view of the anti-statist and ecological politics of 
the Greens and of the fact that Bahro became attracted to 
them after his release to the West support from within their 
ranks for the autonomous peace movement was quite logical. 
So were the resulting conflicts between these Greens and 
East German state. 
The most famous example of this friction occurred in 
early May 1983 when five prominent members of the Green 
Party, including Petra Kelly, went into East Berlin and 
unfurled two banners in Alexanderplatz. These read II Swords 
to Ploughshares" and "Disarmament East and West." The East 
German police attacked them, ripped up their banners and 
swiftly threw them back to West Berlin. 50 Later, after it 
became apparent that the police had attached members of the 
West German Bundestag, Honecker publicly expressed his 
regret over the incident. Kelly was then invited back to 
East Berlin to meet Honecker and came wearing a shirt with 
the banned Swords to Ploughshares symbol and slogan on it. 
This conciliatory gesture notwithstanding, a more or 
less total ban on entry to the DDR was imposed on all known 
Green activists. This followed Bonn's decision to deploy 
American Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles on West German soil. 
One can assume the East German leaders no longer attached as 
much importance to the Greens following this decision and 
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considered them an intolerable nuisance given this propen-
sity to visit and solidify links with activists in the DDR's 
autonomous peace movement. Petra Kelly is a case in point. 
She made it a normal practice to use the diplomatic 
privileges accorded her as a Bundestag member to enter East 
Berlin with her briefcase full of anti- nuclear and other 
political literature destined for her friends in the autono-
51 
mous peace movement. 
END's role is not as direct but it has been and 
continues to be s ignif icant nonetheless. The relationship 
between END and the autonomous peace movement has in large 
measure consisted of discreet visits to the homes of the 
East German activists and contacts centred around prepara-
tions for END's annual conventions. END's 'DDR Working 
Group' has played a major role in both respects. 
With respect to links centred around preparations for 
the annual conventions of the END campaign the one held in 
West Berlin in May, 1983 was very significant. Many East 
German peace activists wanted to attend and END desired 
their participation since it always invites both official 
and unofficial peace representatives from East bloc states. 
In particular, a group of activists from Jena publicly 
declared their desire to attend the convention in West 
I , 52 Ber In. Not one activist was allowed to go. 
In response to this ban fifteen Western peace activists 
attending the convention crossed into East Berlin separately 
on the evening of May 11 and met fifteen East German 
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activists at a private home. A meeting was held focusing on 
ways the Western peace activists could help their counter-
parts in the DDR. Furthermore, 
During the meeting the East Germans attacked the 
East Berlin government for stopping them from 
attending the conference, the participants said. 
The East Germans urged a complete ban on the 
stationing of new nuclear missiles in Eastern or 
Western Europe and called for the establishment of 
a common anti-nuclear movement in the East and the 
west· 53 
Similar events have followed in the years since 
although not all were associated with END. One, in early 
1985 involved members of the European Network for East-West 
Dialogue. It includes exiled members of Charter 77 and 
Poland's Solidarnosc. In this instance these persons 
actually crossed in disguise into East Berlin for the 
meeting with the East German peace activists. 
East Germany's autonomous peace activists have expres-
sed their desire to attend every END convention since the 
one held in West Berlin in 1983. They met with no success, 
with the exception of the 1985 Amsterdam convention where 
one activist managed to be present and even appeared on a 
panel during one of four plenary sess ions. In addition to 
his presence, there was that of the exiled Roland Jahn and a 
written submission by Werner Fischer, a prominent activist 
in East Berlin. The document was the text of a letter he 
wrote to Prof. Dr. Drefahl, the President of the official 
Peace Council. In his letter Fischer took the positions and 
activities of the official body to task and reiterated 
several key demands of the autonomous peace movement, 
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calling on Drefahl to support them. 54 
The END convention held in Perugia, Sicily in 1984 was 
also very important for the autonomous peace movement. The 
entire proceedings of this convention were overshadowed by a 
dispute over who truly spoke for the cause of peace in the 
East bloc. Was it the official peace councils whose 
representatives were present in force at Perugia or the 
unofficial activists who, for the most part, were prevented 
from leaving their countries so they could attend? Inevi-
tably, part of the discussion centred around this question 
focused on the unofficial East German activists, none of 
whom were present. 
Despite the physical absence of these people they made 
an impact on the convention by having their ideas present. 
Three documents were brought out of the DDR for presentation 
at the convention. Significantly, their contents revealed 
that these statements were among the most theoretically 
developed and politically sophisticated tracts ever to have 
emerged from the autonomous peace movement. These documents 
were also very important because they revealed how the 
political perspectives of the peace movement were evolving, 
how many of its activists were re- thinking its strategies 
and, most importantly, the way much of the movement was 
undergoing a profound transformation in the wake of the 
setbacks it had endured as a result of the State's stepped 
up repression beginning with the events of December 24, 1982 
in Jena. 
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One document detailed the history of their movement. 
Another prepared by a group of activists from East Berlin 
enti tIed, 'Fundamentals of a Peace Strategy' hinted at the 
kind of change which was occurring wi thin the East German 
movement by noting the kind of changes it saw taking place 
wi thin the European movement. In this respect the East 
Berlin activists proclaimed, "The peace movement is 
increasingly becoming a broad survival movement in which 
ecological, emancipatory and social questions are involved." 
The authors of this document also took what was an 
unprecedented step for East Germans in openly considering 
the possibility of the movement going beyond protest to 
resistance. They specifically stated, 
Equally we have to discuss within the peace 
movement the forms of resistance. Resistance must 
not only be discussed abstractly on the basis of 
ethical and moral principles but also on the basis 
of its political practibility and in the context 
of a given situation. 55 
The other document submitted to the END convention in 
Perugia was headed 'On the Question of the Autonomy and 
Ideological Independence of the Peace Movement in the East 
and West.' In this commentary on the global movement, the 
anonymous East German activists who wrote it argued that 
"the peace movement, if it wants to have any impact must 
become a movement for emancipation in the broadest sense." 
Continuing in a vein quite like the other document they 
contended, 
The peace movement must become a social movement 
itself, must not confine itself to questions of 
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disarmament, but must regard the many different 
forces of emancipation (Third World, environ-
mental, women's, human rights movements) all as 
coming within the movement. At the same time it 
must remain a decentralised, grass-roots movement. 
The authors also made a politically consistent case for 
non-alignment in relation to the two superpower-dominated 
military blocs stating how the peace movement, 
... must therefore enjoy autonomy from the 
established political systems and must not be 
susceptible to being taken over by them. It must 
also enjoy autonomy from the two superpowers, and 
from those who represent their interests, and this 
is in itself a reason why the movement must 
transcend the two blocs. 56 
If one considers the orientation of the West German 
Green Party which integrates anti-nuclear policies with 
feminism, ecological activism and varying degrees of support 
for the independent movements of the East bloc and END's 
resolutely non-aligned approach to peace activism, these two 
documents definitively illustrate the strength of the 
relationship which the autonomous peace movement has deve-
loped with these organizations and how they have had a very 
substantial influence on the evolution of its politics. In 
another respect, these documents also demonstrate how the 
most vocal and articulate activists in the movement were 
becoming more bold in their objectives and more radical in 
their critiques. 
Consequently, it is little wonder that the DDR's rulers 
have not only continued to restrict access by western peace 
activists to the DDR but have steadily widened the net by 
increasing the number of persons who they will not let in. 
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In addition, the East German authorities have also moved to 
restrict the movement of the autonomous peace activists by 
making it harder for them to visit countries such as Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia. Previously, they had relatively free 
57 
access. 
This new step must be seen as a response to their 
widening efforts, aided in 
activists who frequently 
large measure 
function as 
by western peace 
go-betweens, to 
collaborate with independent political activists in other 
East bloc states. The j oint East German-Czechoslovakian 
anti-missile declaration can be identified as the first 
clear public expression and result of such efforts. 
Numerous other examples of collaboration have followed. 
Some, like the March 8, 1985 women's letter, involved 
western activists as well. Others have involved only 
persons from member states of the Warsaw Pact. 
One of the most important and recent examples of this 
collaboration among East bloc activists, including East 
Germans, was an October 23, 1986 statement on the 30th 
Anniversary of the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution. 
Sixteen key East German activists were among the 91 
signatories from the DDR, 
Hungary. Many of the others 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
were leading spokespersons for 
Solidarnosc, Charter 77 and the democratic opposition in 
Hungary. 
The short but concise text of this historic statement 
read as follows: 
136 
On the day of the anniversary we appeal to our 
friends around the world to join us in commemo-
rating the 1956 Revolution in Hungary. We declare 
our joint determination to struggle for political 
democracy in our countries, pluralism based on 
principles of self-management, peaceful reunifica-
tion of divided Europe and its democratic 
integration, as well as for the rights of all 
minorities. 
We emphasize support for one another in our 
current attempts for a better, free and decent 
life in our country and the whole world. 
The tradition and the experience of the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956 remain our common 
heritage and inspiration. 58 
The statement highlighted two multifaceted developments 
in the autonomous peace movement in East Germany. One, was 
the way in which the movement was in the process of closing 
ranks in a practical way with the forces of political 
opposition active elsewhere in Eastern Europe and in a 
manner complementary to the continuation of its ongoing 
links with peace and ecological activists in Western Europe. 
The other development has been the growing inclination of at 
least a large and influential section of the autonomous 
peace movement to evolve into a consciously oppositional 
force within the DDR. This force has shown itself to be one 
which openly aspires to both a radical democratization of 
the DDR I s political system and the far-reaching transfor-
mation of East German society. 
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CHAPTER VII 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECOLOGY: THE NEW OPPOSITION 
In the past couple of years two things have occurred 
which have been especially conducive to the expansion of the 
focus of contemporary dissent and critical thought in the 
DDR and to the emergence of a consciously oppositional 
force. One has been the relative downturn in the strength 
and level of activity of the autonomous peace movement 
which, in turn, has prompted a period of reappraisal within 
it. The other related development has been the increase in 
prominence given to ecological and explicitly human rights 
demands by prominent activists wi thin the movement. Both 
have had the effect of helping to facilitate the formulation 
of a deeper, more incis ive critique of East German society 
by this emerging opposition. 
The intensified repression which commenced with the 
crackdown in Jena continued through into 1986. Peace 
activists continued to be deported and sent to prison. The 
activity of autonomous peace groups was disrupted by police 
infiltration. 1 In Jena itself, the autonomous peace activism 
of four years ago was all but extinguished leaving only 
sporadic events held within the confines of the Church. 
A degree of demoralization also set in after the Soviet 
missiles were deployed marking a notable parellel with 
developments in Western Europe. The net effect of both the 
repression "and this demoralization has been to significantly 
reduce the number of autonomous peace groups. In addition, 
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a great many of those which have survived feel compelled to 
do what has been done in J ena and rely much more on the 
protective umbrella of the Protestant Church. Such 
developments have been coupled with the dampening effects of 
recent Soviet bloc peace initiatives. In particular, these 
have encouraged greater stress on personal actions.2 This 
seems to indicate that Mikhail Gorbachev I s skill at public 
relations may have swayed the opinions of many wi thin the 
autonomous peace movement in East Germany. 
All of these trends were in evidence during the 
Protestant Church's 1986 Peace Week where participation was 
down from recent years. The 1986 theme was "Peace Be with 
You" and in Jena one of the workshops held was about the 
Gorbachev style "new thinking." This topic was necessarily 
raised with care since the ruling SED has shown more than a 
distinct lack of enthusiasm concerning Gorbachev's moves 
towards a more open and slightly more democratic system in 
the USSR. The SED leaders have gone to the length of 
restricting media coverage about this subject to censored 
TASS reports issued without comment. 3 
Yet, as many groups have adjusted to the present 
domestic situation by withdrawing deeper into the protective 
confines of the Protestant Church, others have increasingly 
shifted their focus to new issues, including human rights 
issues. These groups tend to include the most articulate 
and high profile activists. What is more, this shift 
coincides with the intensification of the political debate 
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concerning what the future course and orientation of the 
movement should be. In this regard Gunter Minnerup has 
noted how, 
East Berlin, with its relatively well-developed 
alternative organizational and communication 
structures centred around Pastor Rainer Epplemann 
and its close links with West Berlin and the East 
German activists exiled there, has been at the 
forefront of the political debates. In the search 
for possible new avenues of political activity 
some have looked towards the Wes t German Green 
Party as a model, some towards other East European 
movements such as Charter 77. 4 
In Eastern Europe, human rights activity and the work 
of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia are synonymous. According-
ly, recent indications of heightened East German interest in 
the example set by Charter 77 have coincided with greater 
concern for explicitly human rights issues and in particular 
with the crystallization of an organized human rights 
initiative within the framework of the autonomous peace 
movement. 
I ts name is the Ini tia ti ve 'Peace and Human Rights. I 
This name alone demonstrates the group's affinity with 
Charter 77 which has consistently maintained that peace and 
human rights are indivisible issues. There are three recog-
nized spokespersons for the Initiative 'Peace and Human 
Rights. ' The most vocal of these is Wolfgang Templin, an 
activist in the autonomous peace movement and a Marxist who 
resigned from the SED in 1983 over disagreements with its 
policies. 
In a recent essay Templin put this new organization in 
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an historical context citing how there has been a distinct 
absence of human rights initiatives in the DDR. Human 
rights was, until very recently a topic which could be dis-
cussed, but in his words, it "was not admitted as a problem 
of action in solidarity." Templin further argues that the 
lack of democracy in the DDR "remained largely uncon-
sidered." He attributed this to "the influence of church 
policies and the well-meaning naivety of many activists." 
Templin also considered human rights issues as they 
related to the Helsinki Agreements. He noted how the 
agreements were not utilized by anyone in the DDR to promote 
human rights as Charter 77 had done. Instead, he correctly 
observed that the Helsinki Agreements were seized on as a 
5 
means to gain the right to legally emigrate to West Germany. 
These observations imply that the bitter experiences of 
the autonomous peace movement in being the object of 
repression by the State were conducive to and a prerequisite 
for the initiation of concerted human rights activity in the 
DDR. This perception is also evident in the following 
observation by Wolfgang Templin with reference to the Warsaw 
Pact countries. 
Any independent social activity in our 
countries, if it reaches a certain level of 
determination and commitment, is soon confronted 
with the totality of domination and repression 
which embraces all spheres of our society. If the 
reaction then is not to be the resignation of the 
flight into private life or the other Germany, the 
question of one's ability to act and of the 
prospects for social change are posed. 6 
Three very recent documents explicitly illustrate what 
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the practical results of Templin's analysis have been and 
the way in which human rights issues have risen to 
unprecedented prominence in the process. One of these 
documents contains a programmatic statement including a set 
of human rights demands. Another was a letter circulated by 
the Initiative among the autonomous peace groups. The third 
and most recent document was a declaration of solidarity 
addressed to Charter 77. 
The programmatic document was issued on January 24, 
1986. It appeared in the form of a letter addressed to 
Erich Honecker signed by the three public spokespersons 
for the Initiative 'Peace and Human Rights' and Rainer 
Epplemann, leaving no doubt as to the group's close associa-
tion with the autonomous peace movement. The letter opened 
by noting that the UN had declared 1986 the 'Year of Peace' 
and then focused on what the authors saw as the issue of 
in ternal peace. The views they expressed in this letter to 
Honecker again showed the strength of the affinity of their 
views on peace with those of Charter 77. For example, they 
stated, 
We feel that only a state which is at internal 
peace with itself can play a convincing role in 
the search for global peace. For us, internal 
peace means the guarantee and practical realiza-
tion of the basic rights contained within the 
general declaration of human rights. 7 
The demands set out in the letter to Honecker included 
calls for unrestricted freedom to travel for all citizens, 
the nomination of independent candidates for municipal and 
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parliamentary elections and freedom of assembly and 
association unless those involved "have fascist, militarist, 
racist or terroristic aims." Epplemann and the Initiative 
spokespersons coupled these demands for greater political 
democracy in the DDR with others typical of the autonomous 
peace movement. Notably, the letter demanded, "The legali-
zation of conscientious objection, through the creation of 
an alternative civilian service independent of all military 
structure" and "The abolition of military education at 
polytechnic high schools." The document concluded by chal-
lenging Honecker' s government to engage in a dialogue with 
people of different opinions as a prerequisite for achieving 
internal peace and initiating a process of constructive 
8 
change. 
The Initiative I Peace and Human Rights' letter which 
was circulated early in 1986 among the autonomous peace 
groups was signed by Templin and the other two group 
spokespers ons. I t addressed the peace groups saying, "The 
recognition of a need to link peace with human rights is 
growing within the peace movement." and that this was 
happening because "Many of the experiences of the past few 
years have shown how the aims of peace work are dependent on 
the realization of basic democratic rights and freedoms." 
The letter included a recollection of the brief history 
of the Initiative tracing it back to the summer of 1985 and 
noting 
Berlin 
how 
peace 
the organization involved 
groups. Significantly, 
people in 
the letter 
various 
was very 
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critical of the Church in Berlin for having cancelled a 
human rights seminar and it strongly condemned both sides in 
the arms race asserting, 
The two great blocs continue to arm themselves 
without any consideration for the victims. 
Negotiations take place behind closed doors; peace 
activists are increasingly persecuted and 
sometimes criminalized. The 'Western democracies' 
are no better in these matters than our own 
rulers. 9 
Towards its conclusion the letter expressed the Initiative's 
desire to extend its peace and human rights activity across 
the DDR and sought the cooperation of the other autonomous 
peace groups in this regard. 
This past year's Initiative I Peace and Human Rights I 
declaration of solidarity with Charter 77 was its way of 
marking the Czechoslovak human rights group's tenth year in 
existence. The declaration was signed by thirty persons 
from either the Initiative group or other peace groups. It 
cited Charter 77 as a "source of inspiration." 
The declaration contrasted human rights activism in the 
DDR with such work in Czechoslovakia noting how, "In East 
Germany human rights activity emerged as a distinct 
component of a broad, independent peace movement." It went 
on to express the signatories support for pluralism and the 
democratization of their respective societies. 10 The 
statement concluded by appealing to Charter 77 "for a closer 
collaboration in solidarity despite the frontiers which are 
almost sealed for us." 
Prior to the 1980's oppositionists in the East bloc 
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preoccupied themselves with either human rights issues or 
the struggle for national self-determination in their 
respective countries or with both. In the current decade 
these concerns have been complemented by ones over the 
rights of workers, the threat of nuclear annihilation and, 
increas ingly, the devastation of the ecology. The last of 
these has been complemented by the birth of significant 
ecological activism in the DDR, Poland, Hungary and, to a 
lesser extent, in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, this pheno-
menon has gained major political significance and has been 
infused with a greater sense of urgency as a direct result 
of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster which sparked significant 
protest actions in the region. These things were reflected 
in large measure in the DDR further revealing how the 
political activities which have been spawned by the rise of 
the autonomous peace movement are calling into question the 
very nature and direction of contemporary East German 
society. 
The Protestant Church has played a midwife role with 
respect to the birth of the autonomous ecology movement I 
effectively duplicating its role in relation to the peace 
movement. The existence of this parallel stems in part, 
from the close inter-relationship between the peace and 
ecology movements. It is also a clear result of the way the 
Church has offered a protective shield to both, given its 
institutional sovereignty. 
Church-based ecological activism can be traced back to 
149 
November 1979. In the town of Schwerin fifty members of a 
church-based youth group, in co-operation with a local firm, 
planted trees and bushes along a new tram line. They 
repeated this action twice in 1980. More people got 
involved and the group received reports of interest and 
support from elsewhere in the DDR.11 Soon such tree plant-
ing was a country-wide phenomenon designed as a protest 
against "the soulless concrete wastes of new building 
developments." 
Informal bicycle demonstrations were another form of 
protest. In Schwerin these were held to oppose the 
construction of a new motorway through a popular local 
recreation area. In Halle, bicycle demonstrations were held 
as a way to focus attention on the pollution of the atmo-
sphere by the local chemical works. Elsewhere, church-based 
ecology groups in weimar engaged in a variety of activities. 
These included unauthorized efforts to clean up streams, 
improve playgrounds and tree planting. 
Although such initiatives were not openly political 
they were uncontrolled and managed to attract a lot of local 
support. Consequently, they set precedents which would 
likely lead to more unauthorized activity and progressively 
undermine the SED's control of civil society in the process. 
In effect, these novel ecological protest actions 
consti tuted a form of social resistance. This is why the 
authorities reacted by either forbidding or at least 
hindering 12 them. That also partly explains why the 
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authorities' responses to them tended to be conditioned by 
whether they were carried out within the framework of the 
Church or not. The late 1983 crackdown in Weimer directed 
against both peace and ecology activists was a case in point 
since these had been actions staged clearly outside this 
framework. 
Overall, the surge of ecological activism was 
significant for the DDR as a whole. This became evident in 
April 1983 when the first DDR-wide meeting of ecology groups 
was held in Wittenburg attracting representatives of 
interested groups from dozens of cities and towns. 13 It was 
also apparent in the attention given to ecological issues by 
the Church during discussions with the government and has 
likewise been demonstrated by the autonomous peace groups 
whose events have often included discussions about ecology. 
Indeed, many ecological activists have also been autonomous 
peace activists and vice-versa. 
The issue of nuclear power has been instrumental in 
placing ecological concerns at the forefront of oppositional 
activity in the DDR and, more generally, in giving them 
added political weight within East German society. Concerns 
about nuclear power were first raised by the Church which 
expressed these in statements it made about ecological 
issues and during its discussions with the State in 1980. 
In this respect, the Church was in advance of the ecology 
groups whose focus was on the kinds of local issues noted 
above or on issues like domestically-produced sources of air 
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pollution and the acid rain threat to East Germany's 
forests. The Chernobyl disaster abruptly altered their 
priorities. 
The SED is clearly, if reluctantly committed to nuclear 
power. At the time of the Chernobyl accident it accounted 
for approximately 12 % of the DDR' selectric i ty and there 
were two nuclear plants in operation. Another six are 
scheduled to go into operation by the mid-1990's. 
Furthermore, East Germany is energy poor and, according to 
Honecker, the use of brown coal as an energy source has led 
to "great environmental problems." 14 The DDR is also bound 
by the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance's (COMECON) 
firm commitment to the rapid expansion of nuclear power 
generation in the East bloc. 
These facts together with the uncritical acceptance of 
modern technology, which is an inherent part of the ideology 
of the SED, underline this official support of nuclear power 
development. They also accentuate the profound nature of 
the challenge to the East German social order inherent in 
manifestations of opposition to reliance on this energy 
source. 
The East German authorities initially responded to the 
accident at Chernobyl by having the official media give it a 
low profile. This was futile since East Germans were 
watching west German television. So the official posture 
was forced to shift. The media started playing down the 
role of nuclear power in meeting the DDR's energy needs and 
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stressing that East Germany's reactors were different from 
the ones used at Chernobyl. Such claims did not change the 
fact that public confidence was undoubtedly shaken nor did 
they prevent an unprecedented public debate from taking 
place over whether to continue to use nuclear power. 
The Church adopted a high profile in this debate. 
Protestant Church leader Bishop Gottfried took the Soviets 
to task for the initial lack of information about the disas-
ter and asked, "whether all nuclear power plants would 
always constitute a grave threat to humanity, no matter how 
good the safety precautions." The Synod of Evangel ical 
Churches was more specific in issuing a unanimous call for a 
public discussion about its phase-out and about developing 
soft energy sources, reducing energy 
changing lifestyles in the DDR. 15 
consumption and 
At the grass-roots level one church-based group went so 
far as to send a protest letter to the Soviet Embassy. The 
Soviets responded by giving the group an official audience 
at the building. By contrast, the DDR's authorities would 
not prove to be as accommodating to expressions of concern 
about nuclear power coming from East German citizens. This 
was undoubtedly the case because these were initiatives 
launched by activists from the autonomous peace and ecology 
groups. These people did more than merely question the 
wisdom of East Germany's reliance on nuclear power. 
There were two major initiatives. One was a June 1986 
petition organized by two activists, including Initiative 
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'Peace and Human Rights' spokesperson Ralf Hirsch, and 
signed by over 1000 persons. This short document called on 
the Volkskammer to use the constitutional power it theore-
tically possesses to hold a referendum on the continued use 
of nuclear energy. The petition also stipulated that, "It 
is absolutely necessary that there be both wide discussion 
and the provision of comprehensive information about the 
advantages and dangers of nuclear energy." The petition's 
signatories further asserted their belief that, "This dis-
cussion should result in alternative concepts being put to 
the vote alongside the already existing ones.,,16 
By duplicating the' Church's call for an open public 
debate, in addition to making the call for a referendum, the 
signatories were effectively advocating a major step towards 
the political democratization of the DDR and thus were also 
consistent with the objectives of the Initiative 'Peace and 
Human Rights.' Rainer Epplemann and Robert Havemann had 
done essentially the same thing in calling for free expres-
sion concerning peace issues in the text of the Berlin 
Appeal. However, Havemann and Epplemann had not been onside 
with the Church in their implicit advocacy of freedom of 
speech. Nor did their suggestion coincide with the 
appearance of explicit human rights proclamations as was the 
case in the first half of 1986. The differences in the 
situations stemmed from the fact that there was now at least 
a momentary convergence of the concerns and explicit demands 
be ing made by the critical voices in East German society. 
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Furthermore, this difference in part testified to just what 
a profound impact Chernobyl was having in the DDR. 
Whereas the petition for a referendum confined itself 
mainly to calling for a full public debate and to laying out 
a general framework within which it could occur as a lead-up 
to a referendum the other major initiative amounted to a 
vital contribution to the growing unofficial debate on 
nuclear power. "Chernobyl Is Everywhere" was the title of 
this initiative which was described as an "Appeal to the 
Government and People of the DDR from the Independent Peace 
and Ecology Movement and Other Concerned Citizens."17 
The appeal highlighted the way in which the accident 
gave activists in the autonomous groups a new issue to unite 
around. In so doing the disaster galvanized many groups 
which had been succumbing to feelings of resignation and 
disillusionment. Chernobyl also gave them an unprecedented 
opportuni ty to challenge the growth-oriented character of 
the SED's economic policies and to articulate an East German 
variant of 'Green Politics' as an alternative. 
"Chernobyl is Everywhere" was a hard hitting statement 
issued in mid-1986 and signed by 141 persons. In one res-
pect it sharply criticized the East German authorities for 
the official secrecy surrounding the development of nuclear 
power and their deliberate stifling of public discussion 
concerning its desirability. The text stated, 
The real dangers of running 
been underestimated in the 
and, espec ially in the DDR, 
these reactors have 
socialist countries 
blatantly minimized 
155 
and swept under the carpet in order to avoid pub-
lic discussion. Critical voices were hardly able 
to make themselves heard: sceptics were hardly 
able to gain sufficient information. 
The authorities seemingly blind faith in "growth for 
growth's sake" without regard for the consequences was 
cri ticized, highlighting the signatories concern over the 
prevalence of an exploitative relationship toward the 
environment. The signatories also expressed their support 
for views very similar to those of Bahro and seemed to share 
his goal of realizing a model of East German Socialism which 
would be qualitatively different from and superior to the 
advanced capitalist societies of the west. 
The competition between the two systems should not 
be predominantly about a competition of growth for 
growth's sake, whilst ignoring the incalculable 
growth in the resulting hazards and long-term da-
mage. 
Similarly, 
The development of Socialism means to us the 
application of different concepts of the terms 
progress and growth and not to use the insanity of 
capitalist wastefulness as our own yardstick. So-
cial progress and growth are not only expressed in 
the increase in production of consumer goods but 
can also be shown in the reduction of the working 
week and working life, in the increase in the 
amount of yearly holiday or the introduction of 
educational sabbaticals from work. Growth does 
not have to mean "more cars" but can be a radical 
improvement of public transportation, making it 
free for all, even in rural areas. There are many 
more examples which one could add. 
The persons who attached their name to "Chernobyl Is 
Everywhere" went much farther in their demand than those who 
backed the petition for a referendum. This statement 
explic i tly called for "the decommiss ioning of the DDR I s two 
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existing reactors and the abandonment of its ambitious 
a tomic energy program." They likewise demanded a debate. 
But in this respect too, these people were more radical and 
stated, 
But what above all will be necessary is a wide 
public discussion about the quality of life and 
expectations in a socialist society so that those 
concerned in the future will be able to consider 
and determine what sort of progress they are 
prepared to accept and at what price'18 
By making such statements both the authors and the 
signatories were for all intents and purposes expressing 
their desire for both freedom of expression in the DDR and 
radical changes in the nature and direction of East German 
society. Significantly, the 141 people who signed 
"Chernobyl Is Everywhere" included activists from the 
Initiative 'Peace and Human Rights' and the Women For Peace 
group in East l ' 19 Ber In. Their involvement provided clear 
evidence of how the autonomous peace movement in that city 
has been pivotal to the emergence of a consciously opposi-
tional force in East German society. 
Two other recent and very important documents have 
pointed out this same phenomenon. One was a formal reply, 
issued on June 8, 1985, to Charter 77's Prague Appeal. The 
Charter 77 document had appeared earlier in 1985 in antici-
pation of the END convention in Amsterdam. The Prague 
Appeal outl ined Charter 77 I s vis ion of a united European 
continent freed from the confrontation between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. The East German reply to it was signed by 
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twenty-one activists including Ulrike Poppe, Barbel Bohley, 
Ralf Hirsch, Werner Fischer and Rainer Epplemann. The reply 
commented on Charter 77's views on Europe and broadly 
defined the kind of social and political transformation 
these activists hoped to see in both the DDR and 
Czechoslovakia. As such it set a precedent for the 1987 
declaration of solidarity with Charter 77 by the Initiative 
'Peace and Human Rights.' 
In their reply the East Germans expressed agreement 
wi th the goals of removing all foreign troops from Europe 
and dissolving the military blocs. They also welcomed 
Charter 77's discussion of the German Question in the Prague 
Appeal and called for its solution as "part and parcel of a 
treaty encompassing all of Europe." The East Germans fur-
ther asserted that the realization of a peaceful and united 
Europe required the transformation of the prevalent social 
and political relations in the DDR and Czechoslovakia. 
This document repeated the call made a year earlier for 
the peace movement to become "an emancipation movement in 
the broadest sense." The East Germans also broke new ground 
by addressing what they saw as the goals of the workers I 
movement. These goals were "the elimination of stupefying 
work and the extension of self-determination in the work-
place." Most important of all, the East German activists 
outlined the kind of social system they desired to achieve. 
It would be, 
A form of Democratic Socialism, freed by means of 
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socialization and decentralization from the system 
of growth at any price and oriented towards an 
ecological humanism. 20 
The other document to come out of East Berlin was the 
most comprehensive and incisive critique of East German 
society ever advanced by a group in the DDR. This was an 
open letter to the Eleventh Congress of the SED held in 
April 1986. Many of the persons who signed the reply to the 
Prague Appeal were among the twenty-one who signed this 
document. However, one especially notable new person 
attached her name to the open letter to the SED Congress. 
This was Robert Havemann's widow, Annedore. 
Virtually every major area of public concern in East 
German society was at least touched on. At its outset the 
letter delivered a sweeping broadside against the ruling 
party. The document attacked the SED for its political rep-
ression, closed nature, ideological dogmatism and the way it 
has excluded the population from decision-making by for-
mulating policy "over their heads." Essentially the same 
criticism is made with respect to economic policies. 
Decisions about particular branches of the 
economy, about the distribution of investment, 
about the nature of production, about variations 
on and alternatives to the plan, are not up for 
discussion , neither inside or outside the enter-
prises. Even economic functionaries, planners, 
designers and technicians are left with only the 
details of execution; at best, they can make only 
cosmetic corrections. 
Quite predictably the question of the devastation of 
the ecology in the DDR was also raised. The Party's critics 
branded the DDR "Europe's leader in air and water pollution 
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and in the destruction of the soil." In addition, they 
scolded the SED for failing to openly recognize how nature 
can be irreparably damaged and for maintaining that "tech-
no logy can repair the damage." 
The SED's housing and development policies were taken 
to task as well together with the general policy directions 
guiding East Germany medical care. With respect to the lat-
ter one of the charges made is that, 
The maintenance of the workforce is given priority 
over general health care for the population, in 
particular for pensioners, who appear at best to 
be a marginal concern for medical care and for 
social policy as a whole. 
Official policies relating to women are also subjected to 
criticism for often frustrating progress towards achieving 
equality between the sexes. 
Substantial attention is directed toward the problems 
encountered by scientists. In one very important respect 
the letter to the SED Congress notes that "the criteria of 
cadre politics usually replace those of competence." Essen-
tially the same charge is repeated with respect to cultural, 
educational and youth policies in what amounts to a barrage 
of criticism aimed at the stranglehold which the SED 
exercises over civil society in the DDR. In relation to 
youth policies the authors of the open letter singled out 
the Free German Youth for harsh criticism due to the way it 
dominates leisure activities for young people. Elsewhere, 
in a more general condemnation of the SED I s youth policies 
these critics state, 
160 
These practices restrict creativity and activity. 
One can see that many young people retreat, at an 
early ages, into petit-bourgeois family life and 
consumerism. 
The twenty-one activists from East Berlin devote the 
latter part of their open letter to the Party Congress to 
chronicling three years of political repression directed at 
the autonomous peace movement and to a critique of the DDR's 
peace and security policy. With respect to the latter the 
DDR's recent disarmament proposals are given credit as 
indications of "a serious desire to end the arms race." But 
such proclamations are described as empty II if at the same 
time the DDR continues to participate in the arms race." 
The letter goes on to criticize the East German leaders "for 
clinging to the spirit and logic of deterrence" and for "the 
permanent militarization of society" with the "aim of 
creating discipline in order to maintain the political 
status quo." 
Several of the standard concerns of the autonomous 
peace movement were raised once again. So were the SED's 
policies designed to prevent, 
members of the West German Greens or 
representatives of other significant peace organi-
zations in Western countries from entering the DDR 
and thus from talking with members of the DDR IS 
peace movement. 
In making this point the activists from East Berlin clearly 
insinuated that the Party's actions in blocking such con-
tacts were contradictory to the genuine pursuit of peace. 
Although most of the open letter is a critique of SED 
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policies there were some specific proposals set out and 
these were quite daring. For example, the critics called 
for "a policy aimed at the medium term withdrawal of the DDR 
from the Warsaw Pact to encourage the process of military 
disengagement from Central Europe." They also came out in 
favour of the signing of peace treaties with both German 
states formally ending World War II. This would have the 
effect of facilitating "the complete sovereignty of the 
DDR. " 
Towards the conclusion of the document one very 
significant proposal for institutional change is made. This 
called for the formation of an independent peace council to 
co-exist with the official one. The purpose of this new 
council would be to "co-ordinate theoretical and practical 
initiatives on the theme of peace with the aim of harmo-
nizing the interests of State and society.,,21 
The 21 East Berlin activists did not openly acknowledge 
it in their letter to the SED Congress, but there can be no 
doubt, given the text of other statements which appeared in 
roughly the same time period and the Hungarian Appeal which 
appeared several months later, that they understood what 
could result from the creation of an independent peace 
council. Namely, it could open an unprecedented breach in 
East German society through which the suppressed aspirations 
of the population could be expressed. This would effec-
tively mean allowing all the latent forces of social 
pluralism to be unleashed in a way not so different from 
what happened in 
right to form an 
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Poland when the government conceded the 
independent trade union organization to 
the Polish workers. 
An independent peace council could similarly have the 
kind of effect Bahro noted with respect to the transformed 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in early 1968. The 
Czechoslovak opening had, in his words, "made every compass 
needle of hope in society at once being to swing round and 
point towards the Party." 
The strength of the autonomous peace movement in 1982-
83 together with the depth of anti-missile sentiment evi-
dent at the time of the Soviet missile deployments in late 
1983 are but two indications of how easily the formation of 
an independent peace council could have such an effect. 
Nonetheless, an effect of this kind would be certain to 
develop more gradually. The present, relative weakness of 
the autonomous peace movement which is comprised of an 
estimated few thousand persons in approximately 200 groups 
is one reason this would tend to be the case. Another is 
the pervasive sense of resignation within the population at 
large. This hopelessness is, in turn, reinforced by the 
certainty of a hostile reaction by the DDR' s Warsaw Pact 
allies to any development like the formation of an 
independent peace council especially in East Germany. 
Nonetheless, the proposal along with the others con-
cerning continued membership in the Warsaw Pact and East 
German sovereignty as well as the open letter to the SED 
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Congress itself, is enormously significant. The proposal is 
significant because it is symptomatic of the crystallization 
of not just a new political opposition but one with an in-
depth political critique of the nature and direction of East 
German society complete with a specific proposal for an 
institutional mechanism designed to initiate a process of 
major social and political change. 
In addition, the importance of this new democratic and 
ecologically-oriented opposition is accentuated by the fact 
that it has emerged from within the core of the most durable 
and significant movement of protest ever to have existed in 
the DDR. It is likewise a phenomenon which, as the debate 
over nuclear power indicated most recently, has proven 
itself capable of tapping into the very real aspirations of 
a large segment of East German civil society. In this 
respect, the new opposition has only one short-lived prece-
dent, the spontaneous, revolutionary workers' movement of 
June 1953. Furthermore, the importance of this new opposi-
tion is made even more profound by its ongoing links to and 
collaboration with oppositional movements in both halves of 
Europe and by the increased space this creates for it and by 
the new political space it is virtually certain to acquire 
as a result of the changes underway in the USSR, the SED's 
stubborn resistance to following Gorbachev's policies of 
"Glasnost" and "Perestroika" notwithstanding. 22 
East Germany's leaders consequently now find themselves 
in a situation familiar to their counterparts in 
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Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. They now have to con-
tend with a numerically small but serious, articulate, bold 
and dynamic opposition which appears destined to be an 
ongoing force in the life of the German Democratic Republic 
and which, in the event of a significant political opening, 
could potentially be placed at the forefront of a movement 
of social resistance. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
Shortly after his arrival in the West Nico Huebner, a 
disenchanted young East German remarked, "There is a com-
1 plete lack of any central liberal alternative" in the DDR. 
Indeed, since the consolidation of the SED's monopoly of 
power at the end of the 1940' s no such alternative has 
existed either institutionally or as a manifestation of 
either organized or high profile dissent. This is due to 
the fact that dissent has been either leftist or Christian 
in orientation or has involved a fusion of both leftist 
politics and Christian doctrine. 
Accordingly, the workers' insurrection of June 1953 
decisively demonstrated the East German workers' strong 
rejection of SED rule and their allegiance either to the 
West German SPD or to the ideals of the more radical wing of 
the German workers' movement. The dynamics of the revolt 
also indicated a very radical character, i. e. mass strikes 
and the appearance of autonomous factory committees. 
In 1956, the dissident movement centred around Wolfgang 
Harich and the Marxist intelligentsia. So ne i ther could 
this movement be characterized as liberal. These SED dissi-
dents accordingly desired the realization of a 'Polish 
October in the DDR' ostensibly as a means to put East 
Germany's Marxist course back on track. They did not seek 
to abandon it. Likewise their programmatic goals knowingly 
implied movement towards achieving a united, socialist 
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Germany. 
This desire to re-invigorate and set East German 
Socialism right served as an important precedent which, 
essentially, was followed up by Havemann, Biermann, Heym, 
Wolf and Bahro all of whom had been members of the SED as 
well. This aspiration was similarly reflected in the intel-
lectual critics strong affinity with the Prague Spring 
experiment in Czechoslovakia and the subsequent enthusiasm 
which many of these same people felt for Eurocommunism. 
Expressions of Christian dissent hardly engendered a 
central liberal al ternative either. To the contrary, the 
criticism of the SED's policies which emanated from the 
Churches and their respective communities has since the 
early 1960's been marked by a radical pacifist dynamic and, 
more recently, by an ecological awareness characteristic of 
the Green movement. The Church also unintentionally proved 
to be the midwife of the autonomous peace and ecology 
movements which have challenged the nature and direction of 
East German society in a fundamental way quite at variance 
with what could be expected from a liberal movement. 
Furthermore, the critics in these movements remain highly 
skeptical of the West and a definite continuum exists 
between their activities and the concerns of persons like 
Havemann, Heym and Bahro. In addition, the most prominent 
dissident wi thin the East German Protestant community is 
Rainer Epplemann who wrote the Berlin Appeal together with 
the Marxist Havemann and who now closely associates himself 
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with Wolfgang Templin, another Marxist whose ideas resemble 
those which were espoused by Havemann. 
In more general terms, the Church, in having 
facilitated the birth of these autonomous movements has been 
indirectly responsible for the emergence of the new 
opposition rooted in them. Furthermore, this is an 
opposition which is also openly skeptical of the West as 
well as the East, has fundamentally questioned the nature 
and direction of East German society and holds a view of 
what East German Socialism should be that recalls some of 
Bahro's ideas at the time of his arrest in 1978. In having 
played this role the Church effectively spawned a 
manifestation of political opposition which is at least as 
significant as the brief oppositional challenge by the 
workers in June 1953 and which appears likely to acquire 
much greater long term importance. 
Even the human rights activism embodied in the 
Initiative 'Peace and Human Rights' does not form the basis 
of a central liberal alternative to the present political 
order in the DDR. This is the case because it is principal-
ly a response to the repressive onslaught the State un-
leashed against the autonomous peace movement while at the 
same time its spokespersons have expressed no desire to 
embrace the West. 
If it is true that there has not, in any meaningful 
sense, been a visible liberal alternative present with East 
German society it has, until very recently, also been true 
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that dissent and critical thought in the DDR is very unique. 
One can appreciate this by contrasting the development of 
dissent in the DDR to the development of dissent in other 
East bloc states. 
East German dissent and critical thought bears 
virtually no resemblance to either Bulgarian or Romanian 
dissent. In these two East bloc states dissent has been 
principally conf ined to short outburs ts of working class 
discontent and relatively minor incidents of nationalist 
dissent involving ethnic Hungarians and Germans in the case 
of Romania, and subtle nationalist dissent by the Turkish 
minority in the case of Bulgaria. The human rights activism 
of Paul Goma in Romania constitutes the only bas is of any 
similarity. This is so simply insofar as Goma openly 
identified with Charter 77 as has the Initiative 'Peace and 
Human Rights.' 
In contrast to Romania, open working class dissent was 
evident in a spectacular way in June 1953 but has been 
nearly non-existent since. In contrast to both Romania and 
Bulgaria dissent involving national minorities virtually 
does not fit into the picture in East Germany. 
no numerically large national minorities. 
The DDR has 
The situation in the DDR is also different from that of 
Hungary. This is mainly due to the differences between the 
regimes which followed their respective working class upri-
sings of the 1950's. Another factor is the differing roles 
played by the Churches. Unlike the DDR's Protestant Church, 
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the Hungarian Catholic Church has been very accommodating to 
the political status quo and was not nearly as instrumental 
in fostering autonomous peace activism in Hungary. It has 
also had no substantial relationship to autonomous ecologi-
cal activism. Autonomous peace activism in Hungary has also 
proved to be less durable than in the DDR. 
Nonetheless, important similarities exist. Both the 
DDR and Hungary experienced a massive expression of working 
class unrest in the mid-1950's followed by an almost com-
plete absence of open protest by workers since. During the 
1960's anti-Stalinist currents of Marxist thought exercised 
a strong influence on the critical intelligentsia of both 
states although leading Hungarian intellectual critics like 
Miklos Haraszti subsequently turned away from Marxism while 
their East German counterparts did not. Most importantly, 
the oppositions in the DDR and Hungary have both arrived at 
a point where they combine an interest in peace issues with 
human rights activity and are deeply involved in the process 
of East-West dialogue involving independent movements in the 
East bloc and the Western peace movement. 
Likewise, manifestations of dissent and critical 
thought in Czechoslovakia and the DDR have very much in 
common as the Initiative 'Peace and Human Rights' indicates. 
But there were few similarities in the past. In fact, only 
two really stand out. One involves the way in which dissent 
had been frustrated by the persistence of Stalinist and neo-
Stalinist rule in both states. The other, related phenome-
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non involves the two societies having both endured Soviet 
military intervention to terminate the numerically largest 
movement for change which has appeared to date in each 
country. 
The differences between East German and Czechoslovak 
dissent have been cumulatively more profound. Thus, the 
Soviets resorted to military action to quell a workers' in-
surrection marked by mass strikes and street violence in the 
DDR. But in 
non-violent, 
Czechoslovakia they moved against a strictly 
reform movement led by the ruling Communist 
Party. Furthermore, Czechoslovakia has not experienced 
anything like the June 1953 events in the DDR while the East 
Germans have never lived through an experience like the 
Prague Spring. In the DDR, the one real reform movement in 
the SED was thoroughly routed in its infancy and those who 
subsequently drew inspiration from the Prague Spring were in 
no way in a position to mount a significant challenge to the 
SED's political course although Bahro seemed to believe 
otherwise. 
The strength of Marxist ideology and radical left 
politics within East German dissent and critical thought 
also stands in sharp contrast with what has transpired in 
Czechoslovakia. Marxist 
distinct minority within 
dissenters make up a notable but 
Charter 77. But otherwise they 
have not been a political factor except during the existence 
of the student circles at the time of the Prague Spring and 
for a short period afterwards. The most radical manifes-
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tations of protest to date centred around the short-lived 
workers' councils movement of late 1968 and the Western 
influenced counter-cultural and punk scenes which remain 
active today. However, the latter two phenomena have not 
engendered an ongoing, politically-focused movement although 
official attacks on the progressive rock band 'Plastic 
People of the Universe' did encourage the start of Charter 
77. By contrast, in the DDR, such manifestations of 
youthful protest have been closely wed to the autonomous 
peace movement. One observer summed the relationship up as 
follows. 
Independent peace initiatives form the political 
cutting edge of a combative youth culture invol-
ving many thousands of East German youth in all 
important cities. Not a movement in the Western 
sense - such organized movements are in any event 
impossible under the bureaucratic regime but 
clearly more than just a mood, a diverse blend 
embracing left-socialists, pacifists, counter-
culturalists, punks and ecologists whose common 
denominator is thorough-going opposition to the 
militarization of East German societY.2 
The absence of an autonomous peace movement in 
Czechoslovakia marks another very important contrast. Quite 
unlike in the DDR, autonomous peace actions have been spon-
taneous, few in number and isolated. In fact, Charter 77 
has consistently been the principal source of independent 
commentary on peace and peace-related issues. As was the 
case in relation to Hungary, much of the difference with the 
DDR stems from the differing roles played by the main church 
in each state. The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia is not 
officially accepted like the Protestant Church is in the 
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DDR. It was probably incapable, under Husak at least, of 
playing a midwife role in relation to political activism and 
almost certainly would not have dared to try. This meant 
that anyone in Czechoslovakia who desired to engage in inde-
pendent political activity did not have the limited degree 
of protective cover available in the DDR and could only turn 
to Charter 77 and its Western sympathizers for protection or 
support. 
The role of the East German Protestant Church in 
fostering much of the proliferation of dissent and critical 
thought since the conflict over the imposition of conscrip-
tion in 1962 constitutes the most important, but not the 
only, similarity with the situation which has prevailed in 
Poland. Simply stated, the movements which have shaken East 
German and Polish society in the 1980' s came into being in 
large measure because of the institutional autonomy of their 
respective, leading Churches and have survived to the extent 
which they have because of the 'space' available on church 
property. This means that the Catholic Church in Poland and 
the Protestant Church in the DDR have both been midwives to 
the most important, sustained expressions of dissent and 
cri tical thought in their respective societies. Further-
more, the movements whose rise they facilitated both 
experienced the political dilemma highlighted by the 
protests and severe repression of autonomous peace activists 
in Jena and Weimar who took their protest actions to the 
streets. There has also been at least some degree of 
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tension between these movements and the Church in their 
respective societies as they developed and inevitably tested 
the limits of official tolerance and began to fundamentally 
call into question the political status quo. 
Elsewhere, a certain similarity can be noted with 
respect to intellectual dissent. This was especially true 
during the 1950's and through to the early 1970's. In the 
mid-1950's both Polish and East German intellectual dissent 
was strongly marked by reformist aspirations. Both had 
essentially the same political direction and neither rejec-
ted Marxism, only the product of its alleged perversion 
under Stalinist rule. 
In the sixties too, Polish student and intellectual 
dissent was not marked by a rejection of Marxism. Kuron and 
Modzelewski's 'Open Letter to the Party' exemplified this 
fact although their document did comprise a more thorough 
attack on the Soviet system than could be found in the 
tracts of East German Marxist dissidents during the 1960's. 
Furthermore, the Warsaw student protests of March 1968 may 
have expressed anti-Soviet feelings but they were not anti-
Socialist in character insofar as there appears to have been 
strong sympathy with the Czechoslovak experiment going on at 
the time. Thus, it was not until the 1970's that Polish 
dissident intellectuals shifted increasingly away from 
Marxist ideology and intellectual dissidence became very 
distinct from its counterpart in the DDR. 
Other very important similarities exist today. These 
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have developed in part because of the grave ecological 
crisis in Poland which has made ecological activism a very 
important part of the dissident scene as in the DDR. In 
particular, this situation has made environmental issues a 
major programmatic concern of both Solidarnosc and the new 
Freedom and Peace (WiP) movement. Solidarnosc's concern is 
illustrated in its programmatic document 'Poland in 1985' 
which articulates the banned union's "assessment of the 
overall situation in Poland and proffers some prospects for 
the future." 3 
The birth of independent peace activism in Poland in 
the mid-1980's which weds peace issues to ecology and human 
rights issues is another, crucial example of how Polish 
dissent now bears important similarities to East German 
dissent. Furthermore, the Freedom and Peace movement, which 
is the principal expression of this activism, also emerged 
from within the country's main Church. It also arose with a 
focus on compulsory military service and social militariza-
tion and now, like the East German peace movement, is 
forging links with the western peace movement, and 
particularly with END and certain activists from the Green 
movement in West Germany. In addition, WiP has been 
influenced by the Western peace movement and, in the 
aftermath of Chernobyl, has become the medium for public 
protest against nuclear power. Given that WiP is currently 
"the most active group in the opposition" and that it is 
" the only group working on the street" this shows yet 
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another very significant similarity between Polish and East 
German dissent today.4 
Nonetheless, there are obvious and very important 
differences between East German and Polish dissent and 
critical thought. East Germany has not experienced, nor 
could it experience by itself anything like the Polish 
events of 1980-81 or the huge underground movement which 
followed the declaration of Martial Law. These differences 
are due to the distinct historical development of German and 
Polish societies and their unique relations with the Soviet 
Union in this century. 
Another clear difference lies in the roles played by 
workers in each of the two countries. Whereas the Eas t 
German workers powerfully asserted themselves just the one 
time the Polish workers have repeatedly acted as the motor 
force for social and political change in Poland. Their 
relative acquiescence during the 1968 student unrest consti-
tuted about the only occasion where the workers did not play 
a major role in an important manifestation of dissent prior 
to the 1980's. 
Overall, in some respects, East German dissent is very 
unique to the en tire Soviet bloc. For example, it is the 
one East bloc state where feminism is a very significant as-
pect of the movement of political oppos it ion. Feminist 
activity, which is either implicit or explicit, has been 
documented in the USSR, Poland and, to a slight degree, in 
Czechoslovakia. But in none of these states has it assumed 
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the kind of prominence evident 
Ecological consciousness 
in the DDR. 
has also been a higher 
priority in the DDR although Poland now ranks a close second 
and the devastation of the ecology is currently a major 
concern of Czechoslovak dissent as well. Conversely, expli-
cit human rights activism has been far less of a factor in 
the DDR than elsewhere and this situation has only started 
to change in the last two years. In turn, all of these 
unique characteristics of East German dissent and critical 
thought are either products of its far left political 
orientation or the influence of Western oppositional forces 
like the Greens or a combination of the two. 
While it is true that certain Wes t German Greens have 
reached out to and had varying degrees of influence on the 
oppositional movements in most East bloc states, their im-
pact has been the greatest in the DDR. This fact is 
indicative of the way in which East German dissent and 
cri tical thought has been directly affected by West German 
developments and particularly issues relative to the German 
Question. This is true to a degree which has only been 
surpassed by developments originating in the USSR, insofar 
as factors external to the DDR are concerned. 
The Soviet Union I s dominance of the DDR was the most 
decisive factor in the development of East German dissent 
and critical thought during the 1950's. This phenomenon was 
exemplified by the affects of the USSR I S military inter-
ventions in the DDR in 1953 and Hungary in 1956 and by the 
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Soviets repeated decisions to keep Ulbricht in power thereby 
maintaining a neo-Stalinist system of rule. These Soviet 
policy decisions doomed open manifestations of dissent to 
the margins of East German political life at least up until 
the storm of protest generated against the 1976 expulsion of 
Wolf Biermann. Furthermore, in the interim, the Soviets 
termination of the Prague Spring experiment had a similar 
effect in mitigating against major manifestations of dissent 
and critical thought. This action reinforced a neo-
Stalinist policy direction in the DDR as the invasion of 
Hungary had done before. 
On the other hand, Moscow's authorization of the Berlin 
Wall as a device to shore up the DDR and facilitate Western 
recognition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe had a 
somewhat different effect. It shattered whatever hopes East 
Germans harboured in 1961 for a substant ive return to a 
Western version of political pluralism and seriously dam-
pened aspirations for German re-unification. Achieving the 
latter had been a dominant objective of East German dissent 
up to August 13, 1961. Consequently, the USSR was instru-
mental in sustaining the absence of a liberal alternative as 
part of the dissident scene throughout the 1960 I S and in 
precluding anything other than a gradualist, reform-oriented 
strategy for political change until the appearance of 
Rudolph Bahro's critique of 'Actually Existing Socialism' in 
the mid-1970's which advocated a more radical course. 
Stated differently, the USSR compelled those East 
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Germans openly aspiring for social and political change to 
become increasingly DDR-centred in their objectives. The 
Soviet Union did this by authorizing the action which was 
decisive to the rapid consolidation of a much more viable, 
increasingly distinct and SED-led society in what had been 
the Soviet Zone of Germany. As a result, with the exception 
of Bahro, only DDR-centred strategies were put forward until 
peace issues came to dominate the dissident agenda owing to 
the concerns of East Germany's religious community. Signi-
ficantly, the latter development also occurred under the 
impact of growing peace activism across Europe and especial-
ly in west Germany. 
Such west German influences by their very nature 
sustain the relevance of the German Question to East German 
dissent and critical thought. They have also been a 
political constant in the DDR. Yet their visible impact on 
the content of dissent and critical thought has been far 
from consistent. Thus, these phenomena were highly 
significant factors up to and during the June 1953 workers' 
insurrection and have risen to prominence under the impact 
of autonomous peace activism. But during the 1960' sand 
most of the 1970's they were far from decisive in their 
influence on dissent. 
To be specific, during the 1953 workers' insurrection 
the weight of West Germany's influence on the DDR was 
exemplified by the clear express ion of continued, strong 
East German worker support for the west German SPD. This 
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also reflected the fact that the permanent division of 
Germany seemed almost inconceivable in 1953. It further 
showed that the East German workers still saw themselves as 
Germans and retained an attachment to the traditional 
political focus of German worker aspirations. 
In the aftermath of the defeat of the workers in June 
1953 there were two notable, open manifestations of West 
Germany's influence on discontented East Germans. The most 
significant of these was the mass exodus of East Germans to 
the Federal Republic. The other was the desire for German 
re-unification embodied in Harich's reform programme. How-
ever, in the sense that the mass exodus of East Germans was 
the most pronounced manifestation of the impact of West 
Germany on the DDR's citizens, it must be stated that West 
German influences were much more of a hindrance to opposi-
tional activity than a catalyst for it, until long after 
August 13, 1961. 
Following the erection of the Berlin Wall Havemann 
stood virtually alone in openly embracing an all-German per-
spective. While the other critical intellectuals tended to 
share his view that the DDR was the better German state they 
did not share this strong preoccupation with the German 
Question: a preoccupation Havemann maintained until his 
death in 1982. The German Question simply did not figure 
prominently in the concerns they openly expressed about East 
German society. 
Bahro exemplified this lack of orientation to an all-
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German perspective. His primary concern was to see the 
realization of an East German social order which would be 
qualitatively different from and superior to the one preva-
lent in the Federal Republic. Furthermore, Bahro adopted 
this goal with an eye toward advancing the cause of Marxist 
Socialism globally. Yet even he, and others like Heym and 
Kunze, found himself turning to west German television and 
or to west German publishers in order to disseminate his 
views to a mass audience in the DDR. In effect, even 
dissent by the likes of Bahro and Heym was not manifested 
separately from West Germany's influence on the DDR. This, 
in turn, further demonstrated how the German Question has 
affected all manifestations of East German dissent and 
critical thought to at least some degree. 
The subsequent appearance of the Havemann Initiative 
and the Berlin Appeal had the effect of returning the German 
Question to the centre-stage of dissident activity in a 
programmatic sense. More recent, and more explicitly 
oppositional documents such as the East German reply to the 
Prague Appeal and a statement marking the 25th anniversary 
of the Berlin Wall have sustained this prominence. 
Critically, these oppositional statements, coupled with new 
phenomena like the affinity which has developed between cer-
tain West German Greens and the new East German opposition, 
have also had the effect of demonstrating the way dissent 
and critical thought in the DDR, has in a very real sense, 
come full circle. 
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Nonetheless, in the process of having come full circle 
East German dissent and critical thought has acquired a very 
different political content which closely approximates that 
of radical and al ternat i ve politics in the other Germany. 
Consequently, the new oppositional force present in the DDR 
and the political milieu which embodies it can now be depic-
ted as a movement of social resistance in its embryo which, 
to a large degree mirrors what can be termed west Germany's 
dissident movement. Thus, dissent in the DDR, as in the 
Federal Republic, 
been to a large 
has undergone a transformation. What had 
extent, a manifestation of discontent by 
workers who identified with political parties or ideas born 
of the German Marxist tradition is now firmly rooted in the 
"new movements" which emerged in the West during the 1960's 
and early 1970' s. Specifically, these include the ecologi-
cal, feminist and anti-nuclear movements.* 
There are, nonetheless, major differences between East 
and West German dissent. But these differences are largely 
tactical in nature and attributable to the major differences 
between the two German states. This is especially apparent 
with respect to the different degrees to which civil 
liberties are in force and why, and, perhaps even more so, 
concerning the differing capacities of the two states to 
adapt to domestic pressures for social and political change. 
By way of conclus ion one must note the irony of the 
situation in the DDR today. This irony lies in the fact 
that active concern about issues related to peace were 
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instrumental to the birth of this new political opposition 
which has openly taken up the German Question and placed 
issues inseparable from it at the forefront of an agenda for 
political change and, in doing so, has implicitly questioned 
the very legitimacy of the East German "peace state." 
Furthermore, this political opposition rooted in the autono-
mous peace movement appears destined to comprise a very sig-
nificant, ongoing force in East German society and 
constitutes the potential focal point for any serious 
challenge by 
And finally, 
means that 
the embryonic movement of social 
the likely endurance of this new 
almost 40 years after the German 
resistance. 
opposition 
Democratic 
Republic was established as a separate German state pursuing 
a clearly distinct path of social and political development, 
its neo-Stalinist leaders seem destined to continue to be 
openly haunted by the threatening specter of the German 
Question. 
*This is entirely appropriate given that the DDR is a 
leading hazardous waste dump for other European states. In 
1983, the Federal Republic sent about 20,000 shipments of 
hazardous waste to the DDR, while in 1984 the Netherlands 
sent 4000. 5 
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POSTSCRIPT 
During the summer of 1987 the author visited East 
Berlin and met with two prominent activists associated with 
The Initiative 'Peace and Human Rights.' While there the 
author first saw three issues of 'Grenzfall' which is one 
of two new unofficial publications produced by activists in 
East Berlin. Grenzfall has been appearing since late 1986 
in quant i ties of 500 to 800 copies per issue. The most 
recent issues have been 22 single-spaced typed pages in 
length. 
Grenzfall and the other independent journal 
'Umweltblaetter' are the first known, regular samizdat 
publications to have ever appeared in the DDR and, 
according to the author I s sources, they have been warmly 
received within the independent peace movement. 
Photocopied issues of Grenzfall can be obtained from the 
author at the following address: 
Bruce Allen 
P. O. Box 284 
Main Station 
St. Catharines, Ontario 
L2R 6T7 
Canada 
